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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

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TURKEY

PART IX

JANUARY TO JUNE 1925

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ERRATA.

No. 162, page 159, line 5: After "Tkhub" read "[*sic*]."
No. 187, page 181, line 1: For "No. 247" read "No. 477."

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Turkey.

Part IX.

[E 56/56/44] No. 1.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received January* 5, 1925.)

(No. 956.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 31, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 904 of the 24th December regarding the Græco-Turkish differences over the application of the Exchange of Populations Convention, I have the honour to report some information given to a member of my staff by M. Politis, the Greek Chargé d'Affaires at Angora, now on a short visit to Constantinople, which throws interesting light on the Tewfik Rushdi–Exindaris negotiations.

2. M. Politis said that the Turkish Government had succeeded in representing the breakdown in these negotiations as entirely due to the Greek Government, and had raised an outcry in the Turkish press on this account. In reality the Greek Government had asked for the modification of the clause (not reproduced in the summary given in paragraph 4 of my despatch under reference) providing for the evacuation within a time limit of Greek refugees settled in Moslem houses in Western Thrace. This modification amounted to the substitution of "gradually" for the time limit mentioned. On the other hand, the Turks had insisted on the withdrawal from the convention of any mention of the right of absent Ottoman-Greek refugees, who were eventually proved to be "établis," to return to Constantinople.

3. Since my despatch under reference was written, attacks in the press and interpellations in the Assembly have concentrated on the Greek treatment of Moslems and their properties in Western Thrace, on the failure of the Greek Government to liquidate fairly the property of exchanged Moslems, or to execute the declaration relating to Moslem properties in Greece (document No. IX in the Lausanne Treaty instruments). This campaign ended in a decision of the Turkish Government to begin by way of reprisals the sequestration and exploitation of the immovable property to Turkey of absentee Hellenic subjects, and the payment of the proceeds of such exploitation to exchanged Moslems, who had suffered by the Greek Government's failure to carry out the Exchange of Populations Convention.

4. M. Politis stated that in fact the Turkish Government had been pushed reluctantly into this measure by the campaign which they had themselves begun or at any rate allowed to go on. His own strong impression was that the Turkish Government were only too anxious to avoid foreign complications with Greece or anyone else. He did not believe that the Government would actually proceed to carry out the threatened measure of reprisals, which in itself amounted to very little. Ever since the Greek defeat the Turkish Government had in fact sequestrated Hellenic property in Anatolia, and these sequesters had in only a few cases been removed. In many cases, *e.g.*, Hellenic coal mines at Heraclea, the Turkish Government was actually exploiting Hellenic property already and was probably pocketing some at any rate of the proceeds.

5. M. Politis concluded by saying that M. Exindaris was expected back this week from Athens with fresh instructions, and he certainly gave the impression that these

instructions would in fact enable them to suspended negotiations with Tewfik Rushdi to be successfully concluded in which case the Turkish Government would probably gladly drop its policy of so called reprisals

I have &c
R C LINDSAY

[E 58 58 44] No 2

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (*Received January 5 1925*)

(No 958)

Sir *Constantinople, December 31, 1924*

IN my despatch No 939 of 24th December I mentioned the possibility that the Turkish Government had been brought to enter negotiations regarding the position of the Ottoman Debt by the pressure of financial necessity It is extraordinary how little is known in Constantinople of the real financial position of the Turkish Government Sir A Rucker has I believe drawn up a report for the Council of Foreign Bondholders and promised me a copy but he has left for France without sending it to me and such facts as I can give you are mere straws in the wind They all come to me from good authority but I am quite alive to the risk of drawing general inferences from them

2 The budget for the current year provided for a deficit of £T 11 000 000 The sums allotted to each Ministry were published in the press but it is only in the last few days that Colonel Woods has been able to obtain with difficulty a printed copy of the whole budget Even as it is it only expresses the ostensible intentions of the Turkish Government and gives no picture of the state of the national finance A statement of the accounts of past years is so far as I can ascertain non existent and I have not heard that the Assembly has ever even asked for one I am told that the accountancy of the State administrations is so chaotic that nobody knows where they are and I imagine that the Government must be carrying on from hand to mouth Turkish Ministers when asked how they are getting on always say that there is considerable unexpended margin in the departments so that they always have something in hand This is doubtless true of some Ministries for it requires a certain amount of efficiency for a department to spend its credits according to programme but it is also a fact that a few weeks ago the Assembly after a perfunctory discussion voted supplementary credits of £T 15 000 000 rather more than 10 per cent of the whole expenditure of the State as estimated in the budget So far as revenue is concerned the Minister of Finance claims to have received some windfalls from the abandoned properties which I should think is extremely unlikely to be realised in these days Abdul Khalik Bey however admits that he expects no more cash from this source for some time In other revenues the Turkish Government has collected £T 330 000 as tax on spirits where the Debt Administration used to collect £T 600 000 In this as in the case of the tithe they have abolished the old system without waiting to construct the new The tithe used to be raised on the gross production of each individual cultivator it is now calculated on the surplus income each village has from outside the village It must be far more difficult to collect and M des Chesnes tells me that the Turkish Government is losing £T 10 000 000 over it this year To fill the gap the land tax has been multiplied sixfold but this tax never gave anything like a small yield and its efficient collection depends on the cadastral survey which is non existent There is corruption everywhere and Colonel Woods tells me it is rampant in the customs Officials are paid so little that they cannot live on their salaries and yet the State can afford to pay them more The vicious circle is complete and revenue expenditure and all administrations are equally prejudiced

3 Yet if these are true facts the only tangible consequence must be that somewhere there will be a mounting deficit I do not know where I cannot believe that the Ottoman Bank is making large advances officials and pensioners at Constantinople are still paid and the bills for goods purchased abroad especially those for the army have so far been met punctually I am told that in the eastern vilayets no budget is laid for and the report I think prevailing there enclosed in your despatch No 1301 of the 20th instant affords some confirmation But it hardly accounts for the discrepancy and I can only admit to being puzzled

4 Be the truth what it may, it is pretty clear that more capital will have to be put into Turkey before any interest is likely to come out The Turks will, I anticipate, make a loan an essential condition of any settlement of the debt question, and bondholders and lenders, under the influence of such impressions as I have detailed above will require the most stringent guarantees for past and future loans Some sort of advisers might conceivably meet the requirements of European financiers, but, though the Turks freely admit the need of foreign help, their efforts to obtain it have not hitherto been of a promising nature There are a very few foreign experts working unobtrusively in Turkey in adequate salaries notably a German Swiss at the Agricultural Bank, and I think one or two in the Posts and Telegraphs, but usually the foreigners engaged are cheap men of a low type In every case the Turkish authorities carefully and even ostentatiously avoid consulting the Foreign Government in the selection of their experts When Ali Haidar Prefect of Angora wanted foreigners to help in the modernisation of his town, he went to Berlin and recruited thirty or forty Germans by advertising in the papers The men are of the foreman type and receive at Angora £10 a month in gold, and there have been endless difficulties with them ever since and even before, they arrived When the Ministers decided last spring to engage Hungarian engineers for the railways they sent someone to Budapest with orders to find the men and have them sent to Turkey within a fortnight Of course, the engineers have proved complete failures and the Hungarian Minister has had great difficulty in saving them from dismissal To afford satisfaction to a European lender an adviser would surely have to have executive powers clearly laid down in some formal agreement perhaps even in statute The Turks are as yet far from any such conception and I foresee still further from any idea of surrendering the control or administration of any special revenues to a foreign body such as the Council of the Debt It is useless to show how valuable advisers may be in the future or what inestimable service the Debt Administration has rendered in the past The Turk may be ashamed of his present misgovernment but he consoles himself with the thought that at last he has swept the foreigner out of every position of privilege and influence in the country and at last Turkey is really governed by the Turk It is hard to believe that any section of public opinion outside Constantinople is yet ready for the great reversal of policy involved in any departure from this principle

5 The inference to be drawn is that negotiations between the Government and the bondholders in the near future are likely to end in failure and that things must get worse before they can get better The prospect seems equally gloomy for both parties

I have &c
R C LINDSAY

[E 59 55 44] No 3

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (*Received January 5 1925*)

(No 959)

Sir *Constantinople, December 31 1924*

WITH reference to my despatch No 955 of to day's date I have the honour to report that I was given by the Greek Chargé d'Affaires at Angora the memorandum of his staff regarding the position of the new Patriarch

2 M Politis declared that owing to the popular clamour the Turkish Government had at first at the moment decided to order the immediate expulsion of Mgr Constantin from Turkey and he be elected Patriarch, without writing for any pronouncement by the League of Nations Mixed Commission M Politis had a long and private interview with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and strongly protested At first the latter refused to listen to him saying that it was purely an affair of internal politics M Politis then reminded him of Ismet Pasha's pledge of the 16th January 1923, at Lausanne and explained that Turkish Government realised the effect which a decision tantamount to making that pledge ineffective would have not only in Athens but also in London According to M Politis Chukri Kaya then changed his tone and discussed the question for two and a half hours As a result of that conversation, Chukri Kaya had promised to ask the Minister of the Interior to modify the instructions sent to the police at

Constantinople, not only in the direction of leaving Mgr Constantine, if elected, free to carry on his duties until a legal decision had been reached by the Mixed Commission under the Exchange of Populations Convention, but also in the sense of being with greater circumspection as to their treatment of the Synod and the Patriarchate as a whole

3 Some colour is lent to this version of what happened by the facts that the press campaign about the expulsion of the Patriarchate has suddenly subsided, and that to-day's papers produce a communiqué from Athens issued by the Turkish legation there, to the effect that the Turkish Government respects the Œcumenical Patriarchate as an institution purely religious and devoid of all political character, and that as regards the new Patriarch the Turkish Government observes a strictly neutral attitude, his case being a matter for the Mixed Commission

4 M Politis states that the Greek case for the retention of the present Patriarch here though perhaps technically exchangeable rested on the argument set forth in my despatch No 940 of the 24th December namely that Ismet Pasha's pledge of the 10th January (see pp 326 7 of the Lausanne Conference Blue Book) related to the Patriarchate as an institution and that its members, wherever they travelled or were sent to serve, were really still part of the institution at Constantinople M Politis added that at first difficulties had been raised by the neutral members of the Mixed Commission who argued that they could only take cognisance of the text of the Exchange of Populations Convention where no mention was made of the Patriarchate or Metropolitans M Politis had retorted that if that argument were valid the neutral members of the commission would have to endorse the passports of Greeks on Tenedos and Imbros if the Turks suddenly decided to expel them, because their exemption from the exchange was only secured by article 14 of the main Treaty of Lausanne and not by the convention itself Clearly the commission must be guided by common sense and take account of the whole framework of the Lausanne settlement

5 M Politis now thinks that all the neutral members are in favour of pronouncing against the exchangeability of the new Patriarch and indeed of any members of the Synod but he is still a little doubtful of General de Lara

6 The change in the Turkish Government's attitude M Politis ascribes to his opportune reminder to Chukri Kaya Bey of Great Britain's interest in the matter and he is I think anxious to create generally but unostentatiously the impression here that Great Britain is behind Greece As the political aspect of the Patriarchate cannot be entirely separated from the religious, and as the Greek Government are doubtless chiefly anxious about the former, I think it is fortunate that the whole question seems to have been steered into the hands of an impartial judicial body like the Mixed Commission whose decision it is to be hoped all parties will accept

7 The reluctance also seems justified that the Greek Government is no longer amenable of fighting its own diplomatic battles and defending its own interests with the Turkish Government without the assistance of any of the Great Powers

8 I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens

I have, &c
R C LINDSAY

E 10620 7840/44] No 4

Mr Austen Chamberlain to Mr Lindsay (Constantinople

(No 44)

Sir, *Foreign Office January* 9 1925

I HAVE received your despatch No 8o9 of the 26th November last enclosing copies of a memorandum prepared by the Allied Inter Allied Commission at Constantinople regarding the Turkish infractions of the minorities clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne The memorandum was taken to Rome by the British delegation to the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations held there last month, and formed the subject of several informal conversations both with the French delegation and with the Director of the Minorities Section of the League

2 As a result of these conversations I am inclined to consider that the case in its present form is not a sufficiently convincing one to justify the action which has been proposed It is in fact possible that the Turkish Government may be able to put forward some kind of plausible defence in regard to practically all the infractions of which they would be accused For example, as regards the Abandoned Property Laws the Turkish Government would no doubt argue that the law was of universal application and was not directed specially against the minorities who are in fact not mentioned therein while as regards the question of the return of Ottoman Armenians to Turkey that the question formed the subject of lengthy discussions at Lausanne which led to no undertaking on the part of the Turks that the persons concerned would be allowed to re enter the Turkish State

3 Such lines of defence would not be convincing and in view of the known facts of the case would indeed be disingenuous and misleading But there is little doubt that it will be necessary on future occasions to bring Turkish infractions of the minorities clauses of the treaty before the League and I am therefore of opinion that the first occasion on which such action is taken should be one where the case against the Turkish Government is overwhelmingly clear and of such a nature as not to admit even of a plausible defence I understand that this view is shared by the Director of the Minorities Section of the League, and that there is a serious risk that if the case is brought forward in its present form, the only result may be to weaken the hands of the League in dealing with future cases of a similar nature

4 The Council of the League will however be dealing to some extent with the question of the treatment of minorities in Turkey and in Greece at its next meeting in March when it will consider the reports received from the Greek and Turkish Governments on the treatment of the Turkish and Greek minorities in Western Thrace and Constantinople respectively This will offer an occasion for any other representations in regard to the minorities question which it may be decided to make If therefore any further information of a more convincing nature in connection with the Turkish treatment of minorities can be obtained before that date His Majesty's Government will be prepared to reconsider their attitude and possibly to reopen the question with the French and Italian Governments with a view to a joint communication on the subject to the Council of the League It is possible that such further information may be obtainable in regard to the expulsions of Ottoman Christians from South Eastern Anatolia to Syria and elsewhere, which as you are aware have formed the subject of considerable previous correspondence between this Department and His Majesty's mission

5 I shall therefore be glad if you will consider this question again in the light of the present despatch, and report in due time before the middle of next month whether any further information of the nature referred to above is likely to be available

I am &c
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

[E 194/194/44] No 5

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain —(Received January 12,

(No 17)

Sir, *Constantinople, January* 7 1925

I HAVE the honour to report that since the 17th December, the date of my despatch No 924 two changes in the Turkish Cabinet have taken place In the first place it has been decided by the Assembly that a separate Ministry of Marine shall be constituted, and one Ihsan Bey, Deputy for Jebel i Bereket, has been selected to fill the new post Apart from the technical side of this question, on which I am reporting separately the only political importance of this event is the personality of Ihsan Bey I am given to understand that he is one of the President's most devoted personal henchmen and his appointment must increase the strength of Fethi Bey's Government of those influences opposed to the liberalism which Fethi Bey himself seems to profess The other and the more important, change is the resignation of Rejeb Bey Minister of the Interior, which was announced on the 4th instant, and took the public somewhat by surprise The reason alleged in the letter of resignation is that a majority of the Cabinet had decided that in future prefects of large towns such as Constantinople and Angora should be elected instead of being appointed by the Government This was one of the items in the programme of the new Progressive party which was more or less adopted by the People's party,

and, put shortly, it means that Constantinople shall be allowed to manage her own municipal affairs instead of having them managed for her by Angora. To this measure Rejeb cannot assent, and he therefore resigns. As he is the most capable of Fethi's lieutenants, his disappearance from office weakens the Government, probably also it means that Fethi's premiership is drawing to its close and that Rejeb is preparing or being prepared to succeed him at the head of a new Cabinet more reactionary in character and readier to adopt the vigorous methods which are favoured by Mustafa Kemal. Jemil Bey, Deputy for Rodosto and hitherto secretary-general of the People's party, succeeds Rejeb at the Interior. I have as yet no information as to his personality worth reporting.

2. That recoil himself is being pushed in the direction of reaction is shown by the decision taken a week ago to close the two small newspapers, the "Tok Seuz" and the English Orient News." Concerning the latter I have reported to you separately. The article of the press law in virtue of which those journals are closed authorises the Council of Ministers temporarily to suspend papers whose writings are of a nature to imperil the internal or external security of the State. Intrinsically the Government's action is of small importance, but it is clearly regarded by the papers of Constantinople as a serious menace for the future liberty of the press. Editorial articles criticise the Government severely and express disappointment that Fethi, who they regarded as a moderate man, should have allowed himself to be drawn into the path of repression. In the Assembly on the 4th January Fethi made a speech in reply to an interpellation on the subject in which, so far as the "Tok Seuz" is concerned, he covered the action taken by pointing to its strict legality, strongly disavowing at the same time any intention to arm against the liberty of the press. A considerable part of his speech was devoted to the case of the Orient News," in which he made the point that no foreign journal will enjoy the hospitality if anti-Turkish sentiments may be expected to flow from the use of that hospitality. The speech made a good impression on the Deputies, but on the whole, I fancy, confirmed the view that the closing of the insignificant Orient News" was only meant to cover with an anti-foreign, and therefore rather popular, appearance a menace really addressed to the Opposition press of Constantinople in general.

3. From the beginning it was clear that Fethi's Cabinet was transitional in character and that the moment, as if the President, alarmed at the defections from his own party, was crying to draw nearer to the new Opposition. This view is probably erroneous. Mustafa Kemal, by opposing Fethi to the Premiership, took pressure off the Progressists with the result that they have made little or no apparent progress in the last few weeks and new sails are being trimmed to the wind. He is now preparing again to follow courses which he has really never abandoned, and I can only feel surprised that to-day's suggestion is put forward.

4. The Assembly continues its regular sittings which, from the newspaper accounts, are of extraordinary dullness. Occasionally there is some tub-thumping over Greek misdemeanours in Western Thrace, but more usually the subjects for discussion are [illegible] interest, as provision of school books, the Prescription Incident, a grant to build some artist's stricken town, or the disposal of the furniture from the ex-imperial palaces. There is an atmosphere of unreality in these proceedings when one thinks of the vast legislative work of reconstruction and realisation that Mustafa Kemal has set before it as necessary. The fiscal, educational and judicial systems all require reform. A new code of family law must be created. But these projects are under preparation, but my colleagues from Angora tell me that they never hear them spoken of.

5. The President of the Republic, accompanied by Latife Hanum, has left Angora and is now making a stay at Konieh. How the journey will be extended, if at all, and what its objects are, I cannot say. Customs are kept in mystery or which the press has extra sleuth specialists. One theory, for which I cannot vouch, is that the Government intends to appropriate to the use of the State the very considerable properties of the Bektashi and Mevlevi Dervishes, whose centre has always been at Konieh and in that part of Anatolia.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 195 58 44] No. 6

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. — *Received January 12.*)

No. 18.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January 7, 1925.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 6 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a memorandum with enclosures, which has been prepared by Sir Adam Block in regard to the Turkish budget estimates for the past and coming years.

2. Copies of Annexes 4 and 5 are not enclosed as they are identical with those already sent in my above-mentioned despatch.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

Enclosure 1 in No. 6

Sir Adam Block to Mr. Lindsay.

Sir, *Constantinople, January 5, 1925.*

BY direction of Sir Adam Block I beg to enclose herewith for your information, copy of a memorandum which he has prepared for the budget of Turkey for the years 1924-25 and 1925-26.

In this memorandum special notice must be taken of the credits to the amount of £T 20 millions shown in the last page affected to extraordinary purposes such as railway construction, &c.

I have, &c.
(For Sir Adam Block)
V. GARBIAN, *Secretary.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 6

Memorandum on the Budget of Turkey for the Years 1924-25 and 1925-26.

REVENUE for the year 1924-25 was estimated at £T 1,129·2 million and expenditure at £T 1,140·4 million, showing thus a deficit of £T. 11·2 million. After the budget was approved by the Chamber of Deputies supplementary credits were voted during the year for £T 16 million.

In previous years the Ministry of Finance, in presenting the budget, showed its receipts of the past year and receipts for nine months of the current year, which finishes the 29th February next, and it is impossible to understand how the deficit as been covered. The Minister assured that certain credits would not be spent and that receipts would in some cases be higher than had been anticipated. But in consequence the figures those statements can be of little value, and it is not unlikely that the suspicion is correct that the Government has, to a certain extent, availed itself of secret reserves and has utilised the proceeds of the sale of property abandoned by the deported populations.

The receipts for 1924-25 were estimated above at £T 1,129·2 million, an increase of £T 35·5 million on the preceding year. The figures given are of the most exceedingly optimistic, and as a matter of fact many items where an increase was expected have shown a decrease.

Taking the gold figure of receipts and allowing for loss of territory by the war and the depreciation of the Turkish lira there is a drop of 13 per cent. in 1924-25 compared with the receipts for the last pre-war period. The indirect taxation produces 39 per cent. of the total receipts whereas before the war it produced 20 per cent. The increase is due to the new consumption taxes and to the increase in the value of the articles taxed *ad valorem*.

It is to be noted that it is to the advantage of the Government, which pleads poverty as an excuse for not paying its creditors, to show a deficit. Taking the population at 13·2 millions as against the Government estimate, I consider (for foolishly) the burden of taxation was only at £1 6s. per head, or £T 4·1 paper currency. Before the war it was £T 1·41 gold or £T 11·28 paper currency. Annexed is a table showing the burden of taxation per head in England, France, Italy, Bulgaria, Greece, Roumania, Jugoslavia and Turkey (Annex 1*).

* Not printed.

Passing to expenditure the budget of 1924-25 showed a decrease of £T 6,368,000 as against the preceding year

The war having come to an end the "national defence" credit is reduced by 46 per cent, viz, to £T 27·3 million On the other hand the expenditure on the navy and on railway construction has been increased The aggregate amount affected to army and navy represents 24 per cent of the total expenditure

No provision was made for the external debt on the ground, it is stated that the distribution of the debt has not yet been defined The additional credit required for this purpose would amount to about £T 60 million for payment in the currencies mentioned in the various loan contracts

I annex a table showing a comparison between the receipts for 1924-25 and 1923-24 (Annex 2*) and a table showing expenditure for 1924-25 and 1923-24 Annex 3*)

The budget for next year, 1925-26, is on a still more generous scale The receipts are estimated at £T 145·3 million and expenditure at £T 162·3 million, the deficit being £T 17 million

It can be reasonably assumed that the Minister of Finance would not have budgeted for £T 145·3 million of receipts as against £T 129·2 million in 1924-25, viz an increase of £T 16 million had he not the conviction acquired perhaps from his knowledge of the actual revenue of the current year, that the estimate of that year has been greatly exceeded, and the fact that he faces a deficit next year seemingly without perturbation, shows either that he believes his estimate of receipts is still capable of expansion or that he is wilfully underestimating his receipts in order again to show to the public the desperate financial situation of the country which would justify Turkey in demanding a reduction of the debt charges

If the above budgetary estimates are correct there is a deficit of £T 11 million in 1924-25 and supplementary credits for £T 16 million, the deficit of 1925-26 being of £T 17 million the total deficit in the two years amounts to £T 44 million How is this possible?

The notable increases in the estimated receipts for 1925-26 are —

	£T
Land tax	6,000,000
Professional tax ("temettu")	1,000,000
Customs	4,500,000
Tobacco revenue	5,700,000
Sale of State lands	6,500,000
Consumption tax (petroleum, sugar, tea, &c.)	3,100,000
	26,800,000

Exception can be taken to several of these items, more especially to items 1, 4 and 5, but there is no doubt that a better control in the Customs Department, where very extensive corruption exists and in the collection of the consumption tax, together with an improvement in trade may justify a certain optimism

The increase in the land tax is attributed to the new law on the collection of the tithe, which includes the sextupling (or more) of the land tax Time will show if this will produce £T 6 million It has been asserted that the tax collectors will have difficulty in extracting the tax from the landowners in outlying districts, who may be without sufficient ready cash to meet the new demand and further, that from lands which have been reassessed during late years the increase is so heavy that the landowner will be unable to stand the strain, which on rural property will be 24 per cent on the estimated value of the land The produce of the land, if exported or sold, is still subject to a tax of 10 per cent

A tax on profits is to replace "temettu" (the professional tax) In view of commercial depression, it may be doubted whether the estimated increase of £T 1,000,000 is justified

The receipts from tithe, spirits, posts and telegraphs show a decrease of —

	£T
Tithes	8,150,000
Spirits	2,100,000
Posts and telegraphs	1,330,000
Total	11,580,000

The tithe suffers a decrease of £T 8,150,000 The system of adjudication and the farming of the tithe is to be abolished Products to be exported or consumed in towns will pay 10 per cent (instead of 12½ per cent), and products consumed by the peasantry itself or in the villages are exempt from all taxes Hence the estimated decrease There will certainly be to the producer an alleviation of his burdens, but contraband and an increase in the number of officials required to carry out the operations necessitated by the new law may still further reduce the benefits of the State

Passing to the expenditure, the draft budget for next year shows an increase on the current year of £T 21,856,000 The items showing an increase are —

	£T
National defence	6,421,000
Pensions	1,817,000
Public debt	1,535,000
Justice	1,376,000
Customs	1,294,000
Foreign affairs	1,170,000
Police and gendarmerie	1,547,000
Public education	1,007,000
Health	1,593,000
Interior	923,000
Total	18,683,000
Other Departments	3,173,000
Total	21,856,000

Of the above sum £T 8,641,325 are for increase of salaries The number of officials rises from 74,477 to 79,673

For the first time the present Government has made some provision for the service of the external debt A sum of £1,2·2 million has been provided. It would require for the integral payment of the annuities (excluding arrears, a sum fifteen times as great if the currency of the contracts is to be respected

No mention is made of the sum of 43 million francs required to buy out the existing Tobacco Regie Company, probably because this sum is to be deducted from the net revenue of the last year of the Régie

The budget of next year in the same manner as that of the current year, contains certain extraordinary credits as follows

	£T Million
Construction of the railway Samsun-Sivas-Angora	8·0
Construction of the railway Diarbekir-Arghana	1·0
Construction of the railway Kutahia-Tavshanli	2·0
Railway repairs	2·0
Construction of a harbour at Mersina	0·2
Irrigation works at Brussa	0·4
Exchange of populations	6·4
Total	20·0

I annex a table showing estimates of receipts (Annex 4*) for next year compared with the estimates of the current year's budget and a comparative table (Annex 5*, of estimated expenditure

ADAM BLOCK

Constantinople December 1924

[E 197/197/44] No 7

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain —(*Received January* 12)

(No 21.)

Sir *Constantinople, January* 7 1925

WITH reference to my despatch No 270 of the 20th March last I have the honour to report that in its session of the 22nd ultimo the Grand National Assembly

* Not enclosed.

discussed a short Bill of four articles for the creation of a separate Ministry of Marine.

2. Article 1 of the Bill, laying down that naval affairs should be taken from the Ministry of National Defence and that a Ministry of Marine should be set up to deal with them, was accepted without difficulty.

3. Article 2. The Naval Staff is under the orders of the Chief of the Naval Staff, and is attached to the Department of the Chief of the General Staff, gave rise to a heated debate in which the Prime Minister intervened to explain the reasons for attaching the Naval Staff to the General Staff. Fethi Bey stated that the defence of the country against foreign aggression, whether by land or sea or air, was one, and must therefore be concentrated in the hands of the General Staff. The Government were convinced of the advantage of having a separate Ministry of Marine to carry out reforms in the Navy, to have ships repaired, and to deal with the question of the training of naval officers. The Ministry of National Defence had not the time to deal efficiently with such matters. Fethi Bey urged the creation of a Ministry of Marine with a budget of £T 5,000,000 or £T 6,000,000, otherwise, he said, the country might find itself without a navy at the end of a few years.

4. The debate was continued in the General National Assembly on the 29th ultimo, when Fethi Bey, replying to a criticism that the Bill gave the Ministry of Marine two heads, stated that the Minister of Marine would deal with the fleet and the General Staff with the co-ordination of the movements of the fleet in time of war. After some further discussion the Bill was passed without amendment by 138 votes to 24.

5. Article 3, stating that the law enters into force from the date of its promulgation and article 4 entrusting the Council of Ministers with the carrying out of the law, are the only articles with which Turkish laws of the present regime invariably end.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 8

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. (*Received January 13.*)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 12, 1925.*

MY despatch No. 1559 of last December.

Greek Chargé d'Affaires informs me that his Government are alarmed by turn which question of patriarchate seems to be taking.

League of Nations representatives on Mixed Commission have drafted resolution whereby they intend to hand over duties of present patriarch to exchange but consider other issues raised by whole question of patriarchate to be such that decision is outside their competence.

Turks will accept this resolution, but Greeks, fearing that Turkish Government will abuse situation so created to get rid of Patriarch before signatories of Lausanne Treaty can intervene, have asked that decision of Commission by reference to Athens.

Greek fears are, I think, exaggerated, and draft resolution of Commission has, at any rate, merit of preventing Patriarch leaving the country as an exchanged person, as its terms will preclude Commission from giving necessary visa for his departure.

Clearly, however, League of Nations representatives are shelving a responsibility which it would be much better that they should take, and unless some intervention follows their decision Turkish Government may be driven to renew pressure on Patriarch to leave.

M. Politis has therefore urged his Government to take matter up in Paris, Rome and London in order that Lausanne signatories may either intervene directly or may induce League of Nations to instruct their representatives on Mixed Commission to take cognisance of Ismet's Lausanne pledge and decide issue themselves.

In my own opinion latter solution would be much better than direct intervention by Powers. I am not clear however how or what procedure it can be effected since matter is still technically before Mixed Commission, and since legal competence of League and their members on Mixed Commission in this issue may be considered

open to doubt. In any case, I believe it probable that any sign that Great Powers or His Majesty's Government were alive to necessity of strict fulfilment of Ismet's pledge and were watching issue would prevent Turks taking any hasty action should Mixed Commission pass proposed resolution. I also think League's representatives on Mixed Commission are unduly timid and do not realise how difficult it will be for Turkish Government to reject a League decision.

No. 9

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. (*Received January 14.*)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, January 13, 1925.*

MY telegram No. 3.

Copy goes to Athens by bag to-morrow.

E 276, 175, 44] No. 10

Memorandum on Zekai Bey's Suggestions regarding Mosul.

THE upshot of the Turkish Minister's conversations with Sir W. Tyrrell and Sir G. Lloyd is that if only we will agree to restore Mosul to Turkey she will be ready to conclude a close economic and political *entente* with us, greatly to our advantage.

2. A similar hint was conveyed to Lord Curzon at Lausanne by Ismet Pasha, who indicated that if Turkey got satisfaction as regards Mosul she would consent to anything else for which we might ask in the treaty. The present reappearance of an offer of this kind certainly shows (even when due allowance has been made for the usual Turkish love of bazaar methods in negotiation) that the Turks still attach real importance to the Mosul question, and the emphasis laid by the Turkish Minister on the Kurdish question as a vital interest for Turkey suggests that, while this can hardly be their only concern in the matter, it does weigh with them a great deal from the point of view of their prestige with the Kurds in their own territory. Their anxiety in this respect is indeed genuine and may be genuine.

3. For us, the Turkish Minister's overtures raise two sets of questions: (*a*) Is it now possible or desirable to withdraw the matter from the League of Nations and try to settle it directly by a bargain of this kind with the Turks? and (*b*) what is the value of the economic advantages (railways, &c.) which the Minister holds out to us?

4. Dealing first with (*a*), it was decided some three or four weeks ago, in view of the arguments advanced by Mr. Lindsay, to abandon the idea of direct negotiations which had been raised in the Turkish Minister's first interview with the Secretary of State, and to inform the Minister, if he referred to the subject, that His Majesty's Government prefer to leave the matter in the hands of the League. The question, therefore, arises whether the latest proposals of the Turks justify a departure from that decision.

5. In the first place, it seems doubtful whether His Majesty's Government now have the right to negotiate direct with the Turks on this subject. The Treaty of Lausanne provided for a period of nine months within which the two Governments should endeavour to reach direct agreement. That period expired last July, after the breakdown of the Constantinople Conference owing to the refusal of the Turks to recede one inch from their claim to the whole of the Mosul Vilayet. The dispute was then referred in accordance with the treaty, to the Council of the League, and the Council, after hearing what the Turks and we had to say, finally accepted the task of finding a solution and appointed a commission to investigate the matter and furnish proposals for a settlement.

6. Assuming however, for the sake of argument that we still have the right to negotiate direct with the Turks and to settle the matter at short notice, a deal which involves the cession of Mosul to Turkey such a procedure involves several serious difficulties —

(*a*) We have solemnly claimed in the case which we presented to the Council of the League that the severing of the Mosul Vilayet from Iraq would create an absurdity from the racial, economic and strategic points of

view. If we were to give up Mosul in exchange for other advantages how could we justify this *attitude* to the League and the world in general?

(*b*) A surrender of Mosul to Turkey would be regarded by the Turks as a shameless desertion. Last summer the Irak Constituent Assembly made great difficulties about accepting our treaty with King Faisal and finally tacked on to their assent to it a rider to the effect that their acceptance was conditional upon our getting satisfactory assurances about Mosul. The Iraks are now ready to move restive against us if we abandon the claim we have agreed to great sacrifices in order to secure, and to throw ourselves into the arms of the Turks. British prestige in Mesopotamia would be seriously damaged by any such step.

(*c*) We should lose a still more considerable asset so far as regards the further exploitation of the northern part of the Mosul Vilayet which will be exposed to the fullest degree of Turkish competition if they were now invited to do so by the more friendly Angora Government.

(*d*) Past experience of efforts to reach a direct agreement with the Turks is not encouraging. First there was the breakdown of the Constantinople Conference through the refusal of the Turks to consent to the cession of the Mosul Vilayet, although they expressed their preference for direct negotiations with Great Britain rather than negotiations with the League. Later on, when pressed by the late Prime Minister with whom it has been decided not to proceed and finally since the change of Government an attempt of which the precise details are not known to us, to exert pressure on His Majesty's Government to offer to Great Britain a concession for the Mosul vilayet in return for Mosul, the Turkish Government have refused to negotiate with us at all.

(*e*) The concession sought from the League is already overdue by about six months and is still London to Constantinople Angora and back before the arrival of Irak report to investigate matters on the spot. Longer delay may go far to nullify the value to us of the concession, for the Turks may well be taking advantage of the time to organise their forces in Mosul with a view to the eventual occupation of the vilayet, and to strengthen their position in the event of the League rejecting their claim.

(*f*) Our experience at Brussels last autumn in the efforts of the Turks to accept decisions by the Council of the League affecting the Irak frontier even though they knew that, should the Turkish troops cross that frontier, they would find themselves confronted by British troops, was not encouraging. We might therefore be given a trump card for nothing, as it is possible that the Turks would not dare to risk a war with us for the sake of Mosul, but we might also be left waiting for the removal of the Commission to the Irak frontier, after which any pressure we could bring to bear would be far more difficult to apply, and the Turks might refuse to accept the decision of the Council in any case.

7. In return for the Turkish *de facto* recognition of the Irak frontier, even if they refused to recognise it *de jure*, we should be prepared to offer them a treaty of friendship and neutrality, and to support their admission into the League of Nations. We should also be prepared to enter into negotiations with the Turkish Government for a commercial convention on the basis of the most favoured nation clause, and to give sympathetic consideration to any request which they might make for a loan. We should, however, make it clear that we could not recommend the grant of a loan to Turkey unless the Turkish Government showed a more friendly attitude towards us than they have hitherto done, and unless they undertook to settle the Ottoman Debt on terms which would be acceptable to the bondholders. We should also require that the Turkish Government should withdraw their claim to the Mosul vilayet, and should undertake to refer the question of the frontier between Turkey and Irak to the League of Nations for settlement in accordance with the principle of self-determination. We should also require that the Turkish Government should withdraw their claim to the Mosul vilayet, and should undertake to refer the question of the frontier between Turkey and Irak to the League of Nations for settlement in accordance with the principle of self-determination.

8. There remain the more practical proposals to substitute for British enterprise of legal rights in the restricted Mosul Vilayet, the railway rights in Turkey. As regards the first, there is reason to hope that the likely event of the restoration of the Mosul Vilayet to Turkey. His Majesty's Government would continue to assert the validity of the Anglo-Turkish Concession to the Turkish Petroleum Company, although they might avail themselves of the Turkish offer in order to share the regional monopoly with the Germans. This offer would therefore present a certain advantage should the Turks fulfil their side of the bargain, which is always a hazardous assumption.

9. As regards the Bagdad Railway, which Zekai Bey attaches to His Majesty's Government this is a Turkish liability undertaking of which the majority of the shares are held by the French and by the Reparation Commission. In proposing to hand it over to British enterprise the Turks quite typically ignore the rights of the present shareholders. They also and equally characteristically ignore article 10 of the Franco-Anglo-Turkish Treaty by which the Bagdad Railway was allotted to the French. Of the other Turkish railways the most important is the Anatolian Railway, a concession of which a British group, the Anglo-Turkish Trust Company, is the owner. This company has for the past two years been engaged in vain attempts to induce the Turkish Government to restore to it and to them as representatives of the shareholders. The former's refusal to do so is perhaps the best of all the many indications that the policy of the Turkish Government is to retain their railways and other enterprises although in this matter they are prepared to allow new foreign capital to be sunk in them and possibly to accept the assistance of foreign experts. As a matter of fact we do not want the Bagdad Railway. It has always been understood, although the understanding has never been formally stated, that the French would cede it to us. We do want and we are entitled to retain the Anatolian, but this right has never been admitted by the Turks, who would probably realise its bargaining value if we should ever be forced by the Turkish system we have consistently opposed to enter into negotiations with them. A formal agreement previously to Mr. Franklin Bouillon's formal agreement provided that Mosul and Chester might be sold to His Majesty's Government. It seems fairly certain that the Turks would not allow us to get from the railways offer would be the privilege of investing further British capital possibly in accordance with the advice of British technical advisers in the existing and prospective development of the Turkish railway system. It is most unlikely that we should get any return on all these undertakings and very questionable whether we should get a return on the investment.

10. Should these conditions not well be incorporated in Zekai Bey's memorandum it might be remarked that a concession of the Bagdad Railway was pledged to the French under the Franklin Bouillon Agreement. I asked what that revised from the Secretary General Mr. Gregory would think of his present suggestion. The answer was that the terms of the Chester concession might be drawn to less attention. The difficulties of the British group interested in the Anatolian Railway might be alleviated by Mr. Gregory there might be represented to him the feelings of the unfortunate British holders of Turkish Consolidated, Bonds and Constantinople Municipal Loan.

11. Finally Zekai Bey's suggestion as to the whole matter is open to grave doubt. We are not sure that it represents the same view of the late Government as Lord Curzon did. The latter was unmoved from himself and that he had no difficulty in finding legal reasons as to the matter generally in question. We have a great deal at present differences of all kinds to be developed of which the Anglo-Turkish control of all Turkish railways are typical rendered by the Government still less attractive by the fact that the might assume a line to Constantinople subsequent Turkish Governments. We are only too painfully familiar with the Turkish method of bargaining with the Powers at the expense of others and of exploiting consequent complications to evade the fulfilment of promises. In a variety of reasons therefore Zekai's advances should be received with the utmost caution. We have no doubt of the ultimate approval to negotiate with Turkey on the basis of the most favoured nation clause, but we should press interests in question to obtain the most good of Turkish opinion with its offensive assertion that His Majesty's Government can be bullied by the offer of minor advantages to betray Irak and flout the League.

Foreign Office
January 14, 1925

[E 291/55/44] No 11

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain —(Received January 19)

(No 26)

Sir *Constantinople, January 13, 1925*

WITH reference to my telegram No 3 of the 12th January and my despatch No 959 of the 31st December, I have the honour to report some further information regarding the present position of the discussion of the question of the Greek Patriarch in the Mixed Commission of the Exchange of Populations This information was given in confidence to a member of my staff by M Petersen, the Swedish substitute delegate on the sub committee of the commission who are examining the issue

2 After long discussions the neutral members of the sub committee have drafted a formula which, by substituting affirms the technical liability to exchange of the ecclesiastical Mgr Constantine according to the terms of the Convention for the Exchange of Populations but in view of the obligations understood to have been undertaken by the Turkish Government at Lausanne with regard to the patriarchate the Mixed Commission in regard the issues raised by the case of Mgr Constantine to exercise their powers to decide

3 According to M Petersen this draft if passed as a resolution by the main commission would effectively prevent the present Patriarch being exchanged because no one can be sent out of the country as an "exchanged" person without the visa of the commission At the same time the commission relieve themselves of the duty of interpreting the obligation taken by Ismet Pasha at Lausanne to maintain the patriarchate which will then be a matter, they feel for the Great Powers to settle with the Turkish Government The draft also satisfies the Turkish representatives on the commission who are prepared to accept it because, at any rate it admits the exchangeability of Mgr Constantine under the terms of the convention On the other hand the Greek representative on the sub committee has asked for instructions before he will consent to return to Athens and consult his Government It is understood to be his opinion that he was not to propose to his Government a personal suggestion of his own that the patriarchate be moved altogether to Mount Athos Outside the sub committee he has explained to the neutral members that in his opinion the draft resolution, by its admission of Mgr Constantine's exchangeability would again rouse Turkish opinion against the patriarchate and advise the Government either to make its position here intolerable so as to force the present Patriarch to leave the country in spite of the refusal of the Mixed Commission to visa his passport

4 M Petersen and his colleagues doubt whether the suggestion regarding Mount Athos has been seriously put forward They believe that the Greek Government is anxious to delay matters in order that some chance or other the League of Nations or the Great Powers may be able to intervene before even any final decision is taken by the Mixed Commission On the other hand my informant assures me to believe that in local Greek circles connected with the patriarchate the possibility of moving to remove the patriarchate to Mount Athos is being seriously considered

5 Whatever policy the Greek Government intend their representatives to adopt it seems unfortunately probable that the neutral members of the Mixed Commission will be alert to give neither display of timidity similar to that which they showed in the early stages of the *Etablissements* dispute On technical legal grounds they have perhaps a better case for resisting the responsibility of a decision but they are unaware of the strength of their position (a strength founded on the attitude of both the Greek and Turkish Governments towards the League of Nations) and they do not appreciate how far they could go to relieve the tension of Greco Turkish relations by taking up a firm and decided attitude on the issues which come before them and pushing matters through quickly if necessary to a majority decision

I have, &c
R C LINDSAY

[E 362/362/65] No 12

Note communicated by M de Fleuriau

NÉGOCIATIONS franco-turques au sujet de transports militaires sur les tronçons syrien et turc de l'ancien Chemin de Fer de Bagdad

Le Gouvernement français insiste pour faire ajouter au texte déjà accepté par le Gouvernement turc la formule "Il va de soi que la présente convention ne porte pas atteinte aux obligations imposées par la Société des Nations et, en cas de guerre, par les règles de la neutralité" On a fait remarquer au Gouvernement turc que la Cour de Justice de La Haye donnerait certainement raison à la thèse française No 1

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 20 janvier 1925

[E 429/175/44] No 13

Mr Austen Chamberlain to Mr Lindsay (Constantinople,

No 90)

Sir *Foreign Office, January 21 1925*

THE Turkish Minister whom I had not seen since my first reception of the Diplomatic Corps called upon me this afternoon by appointment made at his request

2 Zekai Bey observed that we had had more than one conversation with Sir William Tyrrell but this was the first opportunity of speaking to me about the various bones of contention It appeared to him that Turkey offered a great sphere for commercial collaboration between the two countries Were there, he asked, any political obstacles to such economic collaboration? He saw no obstacles either on the Turkish or on the British side He thought, therefore that such collaboration was possible, and that the little affair of Mosul might be put to one side As to the attitude of the British Government and whether it was disposed to see Turkey established as a strong and stable Power

3 I replied that there was no desire on the side of His Majesty's Government or the British people except to cultivate friendly relations with Turkey as now established

4 Encouraged by this expression of our general policy, the Turkish Minister repeated the question which he had already laid at the feet of his friend Mr Ryan at their interview Would we not settle together the question of the Mosul boundary without waiting for the decision of the League of Nations? For Turkey this was a vital matter She could not acquiesce in the division of the Kurds If we could agree that Mosul to Turkey, arrangements in regard to economic interests could easily be made We might be confident have the expectation of the oil fields and a guarantee from Turkey as far as she was concerned of the integrity of Iraq as this demarcated

5 I told Zekai Bey that I regretted that the Turkish Government and our own had been unable to reach an accord on this subject at Lausanne In spite of Lord Curzon's express declarations the Turkish Government appeared still to be under the illusion that the policy of the British Government was influenced by some interest in the oil fields which might be found in that quarter This was a complete delusion I went further that suspicions on inside and turning to the substance of his proposal what was the actual position? We had agreed to refer our difference to the League of Nations We had stated our case in our capacity as the mandatories of Irak and trustees for the people of that country and it was impossible that I should bargain away their rights or interests against economic concessions to Britain or British citizens Had we referred the matter to the League we should be bound await the League's decision which His Majesty's Government had in advance pledged themselves to accept

6 Zekai Bey then began to suggest that if the decision of the League was adverse Turkey might be entitled to a mosee I told him that I could not suppose that on this he was speaking the mind of his Government It would be a serious thing for the Turkish Government to defy the British Empire a still more serious thing, perhaps for Turkey to place itself in opposition to the body which represented as far as anything could represent the conscience of civilised opinion I was sure that there was too much wisdom in the councils of Angora for them to take so very grave a decision

7 Zekai Bey turned around this point for some time, developing Turkish difficulties, suggesting an exchange of populations and so forth, but I declined to alter my position I was wholly at one with him in desiring friendly relations between Turkey and Great Britain I saw great economic advantages, especially for Turkey, in a cordial friendship between us though I warned him incidentally that there could be no idea of a loan from the British Government, but I added that I did not think that we could usefully take up again the fruitless discussions of Lausanne, and that we should be wiser to await and to accept the decision of the Council of the League

8 The Minister then asked me whether I refused to consider any proposals for an understanding I told him that if the Turkish Government authorised him to make specific proposals I would of course, give them most serious consideration but I deprecated his making any such proposals if their basis was to be the cession of Mosul in return for economic concessions for to such proposals I could only return a negative answer, in the second place I insisted that if any proposals were to be made they must not be mere feelers on his part for which the time had gone by, but proposals definitely authorised by his Government and by which that Government was prepared to stand

9 Before leaving Zekiai Bey asked whether in the event of Turkey deciding to join the League of Nations Great Britain would support a request by her for a permanent seat on the council I told him that this was a request which apparently was going to be made to me by every country in turn I could only say to him, as to others that I must reserve our liberty till the question arose at Geneva

I am, &c
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

[E 412/55/44] No 14

Memorandum from the Italian Embassy (*Received January 23*)

(Translation)

THE Turkish delegation has addressed to the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations a demand for the removal from Constantinople of the new Œcumenical Patriarch Constantine, asserting that this individual is included in the category of persons subject to exchange

The Greek Legation at Rome has suggested to the Royal Government that it would be suitable that the League of Nations in order rapidly to settle the possible dispute involved which threatens to constitute a new obstacle to the re establishment of normal and peaceful conditions in the Near East should give proof of its interest in the question by drawing the attention of the Mixed Commission which may be considered as an organ of the League to the dispositions of the Lausanne agreements regarding the maintenance of the patriarchate at Constantinople The Royal Embassy would be glad to know the views of His Majesty's Government in this matter

Italian Embassy, London,
January 22, 1925

[E 415/55/44] No 15

M Caclamanos to Mr Austen Chamberlain (*Received January 24*)

Sir *Greek Legation, London, January 21, 1925*

FOLLOWING my note of the 29th December last, I have the honour, upon instructions from my Government to draw the kind attention of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the continued danger of the expulsion of the newly elected Œcumenical Patriarch Mgr Constantine and many of the prelates constituting the Holy Synod, on the ground that they are to be submitted to the stipulations for the exchange of populations embodied in the convention signed between Greece and Turkey on the 30th January 1923 at Lausanne and constituting an integral part in the Lausanne Treaty

The Greek Government think that if His Britannic Majesty's Government, as one of the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne would be so kind as to suggest to

the secretary general of the League of Nations to remind the neutral members of the Mixed Commission now sitting at Constantinople and dealing with the question of the exchange of populations that the Turkish delegation at the Conference of Lausanne has given solemn pledges about the maintenance of the patriarchate in Constantinople and that such declarations are to supersede any consideration deriving from the above mentioned convention of the 13th January 1923 a very important step to a favourable solution of the question and the maintenance of the patriarchate in Constantinople would be made

The Greek Government venture to hope that the British Government in their interest to the consolidation of peace and good understanding in the Near East could see their way to make this suggestion to the secretary-general of the League of Nations whose friendly intervention in the circumstances will not fail to have in their opinion a conclusive result impressing the Turkish Government that one of the important decisions reached at the Lausanne Conference would not be violated without attracting the attention of Governments who took part in the Conference of Lausanne

I have, &c
D CACLAMANOS

[E 435/194/44] No 16

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (*Received January 26, No 47*)

Sir *Constantinople January 20, 1925*

I REPORTED in my despatch No 17 of the 7th instant that Rifat Bey had resigned from the post of Minister of the Interior Two or three days later it became evident that an acute Cabinet crisis had broken out in Angora as a result of Rejeb's withdrawal The question at issue you will recollect, was whether the prefects (*Inspecteurs généraux*) of Constantinople and Angora should, as now, be appointed by the Government, or as the Prime Minister desired be elected in some manner Reference to a meeting of the People's party was necessary, and it was clear that Rejeb who was a fine fighting politician had the bulk of the party behind him and would be able to secure a decision in favour of his own view and against that of his ally Chief Fethi Bey For twenty four hours it seemed as if Fethi would have to resign at once and that a further split in the People's party might take place this time over the definite issue of the prefects Prolonged meetings of the Cabinet took place and there was an incessant exchange of telegrams with the President, who was then at Konieh What passed is of course not known but in the end the Ghazi called a halt on the extremists of the Popular party and it was forthwith decided that there should be no crisis At the meeting of the party the proceedings passed off in a quiet manner and Fethi and Rejeb explained their points of view, and the former announced that as a compromise measure the Government had decided to pass a law providing that prefects should be appointed by the Government from among the elected members of the municipal councils, a solution of the question which is probably distasteful to Fethi and certainly entirely unsatisfactory to Constantinople and to the Opposition party in the Assembly As to the President he may have been unwilling to face the risk of a further disintegration of the Popular party or he may have felt unready just yet to find a successor to Fethi Bey Perhaps he was actuated by both motives and as a result Fethi gets another lease of life as Prime Minister

2 Mustafa Kemal himself is still on tour He remained for ten days or so at Konieh and as he took part in throwing some bouquets at the Bunuk Chelebi (the hereditary head of the Mevlevi Dervishes) it may be inferred that there is no present intention of secularising the properties of the Dervish orders. From Konieh he has proceeded to Aksaia and beyond it to Deurt Yol. There is still no indication of any definite reason for the tour and there is no ground for regarding this visit to the Syrian frontier as in any sense an anti French demonstration Perhaps like that of last summer to the eastern provinces, it is an electioneering tour, the pleasure of which would be enhanced by the prospect of escaping from Angora at a particularly inclement season

3 I reported in my despatch No 924 of the 17th December that Nureddin Pasha, a reactionary had been elected Deputy for Brussa, beating the official

candidate of the Popular party and that the validity of the election was disputed on the ground that the Pasha had not duly resigned from his position as general in the army. The question came up for discussion in the Assembly on the 18th January, and it turns on the interpretation of laws obscure in their meaning, as only Turkish laws can be. The serious lawyers of the Popular party took no part in the debate, and the progressives mostly spoke in favour of Nureddin's election though he is a reactionary and by no means one of them. In the event the back benchers of the Popular party took charge of the proceedings and the vote went for invalidation by 130 votes to 56. The figures seem to show that there was some cross voting, and though the big battalions did win it is creditable that some effort was made to settle the issue on party lines.

4. On the whole the past fortnight has been quiet and uneventful and the press of the town has mainly occupied itself with the questions of how precisely Constantine will get rid of his present prefect and whether or not Mustafa Kemal's brother-in-law was guilty of intoxication and insult to the wife of the Hungarian Minister at the Rose Noire. These however are matters of engrossing interest but insufficiently urgent to call for special despatch.

5. Two or three weeks ago Ismet Pasha came down from Angora and established himself in Halki on the Prince's Islands to convalesce. I asked Nusret Bey at the time whether the Pasha received visitors and said I would like to call on him while he was there. A couple of days ago an appointment was made and yesterday I paid my visit accompanied by Mr. Forbes Adam who had known the Pasha at Lausanne. His Excellency received us with great affability and was clearly anxious to be friendly. We chatted very pleasantly for half an hour but though more than once I brought the talk to the verge of politics he was not anxious to follow and I did not care to force the pace so that nothing passed worth repeating. After what I had heard of his health I was surprised to find him so alert and looking so well. Mr. Forbes Adam thought he looked better now than he had looked at Lausanne and that his deafness is not perceptibly worse. The Pasha himself said he had suffered only from overwork and that the rest and the change of climate were working wonders with him. The doctors come twice a week, consulted over him and told him he would have to stay some months in Halki but he was thinking of travelling against them.

6. A relative Turk who lives on the island tells me that the Pasha was visibly weak when he arrived that the improvement in his appearance is striking and that he has put on "kilos" in weight. I think he is making a fine recovery and that he should be ready to resume office by the time the President is ready to part with Fethi Bey.

I have &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 362 362 65, No. 17

Sir Eyre Crowe to Mr. Lindsay.

My dear Ambassador, *Foreign Office, January 21, 1925.*

I WRITE to thank you for your private letter of the 20th January about the Turkish request with regard to military control of the Syrian and Persian frontiers. I am glad to see that you have replied to the effect that you are sure that His Majesty's Government will appreciate the courtesy and consideration which inspired the communication to us.

You mention that it was already accepted by the Turkish Government. In view of the vital importance of the question I think we should be very glad if the French Government would tell us whether the arrangements being negotiated are such as will eventually be communicated to the League of Nations under the Covenant.

Believe me, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

No. 18

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) D *Foreign Office, January 28, 1925.*

YOUR telegram No. 3 of 12th January (Ecumenical Patriarchate).

Greeks have now formally asked us to approach the League, but I do not consider that it can properly be asked to intervene. Its direct responsibility ceased with appointment of neutral members of Mixed Commission and it has no *locus standi* for either interpreting or enforcing provisions of Lausanne settlement except where an appeal to it is specifically provided for. Nor does gravity of dispute appear to be such as to justify appeal under Article 11 of Covenant.

At the same time after all the trouble we took at Lausanne to extract Ismet's pledge in respect of the retention of patriarchate we can not remain inactive if Turks now attempt to evade their undertaking.

You will therefore in your French and Italian colleagues, whose Governments I am approaching, receive necessary instructions, you are authorised to join with them in informal representations to the Turkish Government drawing their attention to the formal pledge given by Ismet Pasha at Lausanne and pointing out that any attempt on their part to change the position of the patriarchate in such a way as to interfere with its hierarchical constitution and activities would be regarded by the Allied Powers as a violation of their solemn promise.

E 415 55 44 No. 19

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

(No. 332.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 28, 1925.*

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship herewith copies of correspondence* with the Greek Minister and the Italian Ambassador regarding the position of the newly elected Ecumenical Patriarch at Constantinople whom the Turkish Government are now trying to expel from Turkey on the ground of his doubtful liability to exchange under the Exchange of Populations Convention of Lausanne. I also enclose a copy of a telegram which I have addressed to Mr. Lindsay on this subject.†

2. I request that your Lordship will approach the French Government in this matter, and suggest to them that they should instruct their representative at Constantinople as soon as possible to join with his British and Italian colleagues in making the proposed representations to the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

E 415 55 44 No. 20

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Marquis della Torretta.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, January 29, 1925.*

WITH reference to your note of the 22nd instant regarding the position of the new Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I have now received a note from the Greek Minister asking that His Majesty's Government should approach the League with a request for its intervention in this matter.

2. His Majesty's Government are, however, doubtful whether such a course is practicable more especially as the League has always maintained, and with apparent justice, that its responsibility in connection with the Mixed Commission ceased with the appointment of the neutral members of that body.

3. M. Calamaros has therefore been informed that His Majesty's Government do not consider that this question is one in regard to which an appeal can properly be addressed to the League of Nations at the present stage.

4. On the other hand, in view of the importance which was attached during

* Nos. 14, 15, 20 and 21. † No. 18.

the course of the Lausanne Conference to the retention of the Œcumenical Patriarchate at Constantinople and of Ismet Pasha's solemn pledge on that occasion the Allied Powers cannot well remain inactive in the face of any Turkish action likely to reduce the position of the patriarchate or to lead to its ultimate extinction or removal His Majesty's Government are therefore instructing His Majesty's representative at Constantinople to concert with his Allied colleagues in the matter and should they receive the necessary instructions from their Governments, to join with them in drawing the attention of the Turkish Government to the formal pledge given by Ismet Pasha at Lausanne and in pointing out that any attempt to interfere with the normal constitution and activities of the patriarchate would be regarded by the Allied Powers as a violation of the pledge concerned

5 I am informing M Caclamanos that instructions in this sense are being sent to Mr Lindsay and shall be glad to learn at an early date whether the Italian Government see their way to issue similar instructions to their representative at Constantinople

I have &c
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

[E 415 55 44] No 2

Mr Austen Chamberlain to M Caclamanos

Sir *Foreign Office, January 29 1925*

WITH reference to your letter of the 21st instant regarding the position in Constantinople of the newly elected Greek Œcumenical Patriarch Mgr Constantine I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government do not consider that this question is one in regard to which an appeal can properly or usefully be addressed to the League Nor does it at the present stage

2 His Majesty's Government are however instructing His Majesty's representative at Constantinople to concert with his Allied colleagues in the matter and, should the latter receive the necessary instructions from their Governments to join with them in drawing the attention of the Turkish Government to the formal pledge given by Ismet Pasha at Lausanne, and in pointing out that any attempt to reduce the position of the patriarchate in such a way as to interfere with its normal constitution and activities would be regarded by the Allied Powers as a violation of the pledge concerned

I have &c
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No 22

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received January 30)

(No 13)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople January 30 1925*

YOUR telegram No 13

Mixed Commission passed the day before yesterday a resolution generally in terms of draft referred to in my telegram No 3 paragraph 4

Early this morning Patriarch was expelled by Turks, saying by train His passport has not been visé by Mixed Commission

I will comment later

(Repeated to Athens.)

No 23

Sir M Cheetham to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received January 31)

(No 14)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens January 31 1925*

NEWS of expulsion of Patriarch was received here yesterday evening during sitting of Chamber and forced immediate subject of debate

Prime Minister stated that the attitude of the mixed commission was contrary to regulations of commission and to the Treaty of Lausanne since Greece had

formally declared that she could not be party to a treaty which contemplated departure of Patriarch His language was otherwise patriotic, but conciliatory and he suggested that Chamber should address to friendly countries protest against Turkish action

Attitude of Government was reserved

General Pangalos made warlike speech, leaders of parties being however more sensible

Later I saw Prime Minister as well as President of the Republic at dinner given by the latter I pressed on them both the necessity of seeking issue by peaceful means Prime Minister said that he would propose to Turkish Government reference of whole question to The Hague M Claudbrun the new French Minister gave similar advice

(Repeated to Constantinople, No 1

No 24

Sir M Cheetham to Mr Austen Chamberlain—(Received February 1)

(No 15)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens January 31, 1925*

MY telegram No 14

This morning's papers irrespective of party express almost indignation at what they term barbarism of the Russian rebuke of Christian Powers

Venizelist press protests that time may come when Greece can no longer put up passively with Turkish provocation Royalist press with usual lack of initiative attributes situation to mistakes of their opponents I have from editor of "Hestia" who is intimate with Prime Minister that latter considers present juncture most critical for Greek Turkish relations and is contemplating threat of war Greek Government would do everything to avoid hostilities and for that reason desired to appeal to The Hague and to the League of Nations.

(Repeated to Constantinople No 2)

E 585 585 44 No 25

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received February 2)

(No 67
Sir *Constantinople, January 28 1925*

I HAVE the honour to report that a number of Hungarian students have just paid a ten days visit to Turkey as guests of the Turkish Government Although moved as a hard test for things of seemingly greater importance, a handsome credit was to the young and the students, in the intervals of visiting schools, hospitals and the usual sights were entertained without stint at lavish dinners and teas Altogether the visit seems to have been a great success The students arrived able to sing Turkish patriotic songs and at least one of their number was capable of giving expression in a public speech in Turkish to his admiration for the recent struggle of the Turkish people, which he said he and his comrades had come to study and which they hoped to imitate As a trophy they brought a shield of their own contrivance for presentation to Mustafa Kemal Pasha but as the Ghazi is still touring in Cilicia they had to leave it with the prefect of the city for delivery

2 The visit so far as I am aware, had no object more specific than to keep alive a tradition of sympathy between the two peoples which has of late years been fostered by the exchange of such courtesies and by the war Both sides like to dwell on their Transatlantic connection Instant though it is and the Turks, having no supporters at present, are no doubt glad to cultivate a friendship which may serve them in the event of any Balkan disturbance My Hungarian colleague, M de Tahy, who is an active man, has thrown himself with some zest into these festivities, and I think the visit will have some small effect in strengthening relations between the two countries

I have, &c
R C LINDSAY.

[E 590/55/44] No 26

Note communicated by M Caclamanos, Feb 1st, 25

EARLY on the morning of the 30th January, the Turkish authorities of Constantinople, acting upon instructions from Angora encircled the Patriarchal Palace at Phanar and forced the Oecumenical Patriarch Mgr Constantine VI, to leave under escort of Turkish police agents

He was taken to the railway station of Sirkedji and there expelled on a train bound for Greece under a constant escort His Holiness having already reached Greek territory

It is very obvious that such action on the part of the Turkish authorities does not constitute a coup not only because the Oecumenical Patriarch could not be assimilated to a citizen under the obligation of exchange, but because even in this case the ecclesiastical council could be expelled in accordance with the regulations of the exchange, without being supplied with a special passport by the Mixed Commission, which however it is known will this time on no account be allowed not to issue

The news of the forcible expulsion of the Oecumenical Patriarch has created the deepest consternation in the whole of Greece, where feelings are running high

The Greek Government are lodging a strong protest in Angora stressing the solemn pledges given by Turkey at Lausanne to the effect that they would respect the Oecumenical Patriarchate and therefore the person of the Patriarch himself

One might note that by this unprecedented action the Turks have totally ignored the undertaking given by them during the recent session of the League of Nations Council at Rome that pending the decision of the forthcoming session of the Council in March on the question of the minorities in Constantinople and Thrace they would carefully abstain from any act likely to affect these minorities

In order further to give evidence of their conciliatory intentions, the Greek Government are proposing that the question should immediately be referred to the High Court of Justice at The Hague Only in the event of this course being rejected by Turkey would Greece have recourse to the League of Nations direct, under article 14 of the covenant

It should be borne in mind that of the whole population of Greece at the present moment one quarter consists of refugees who have been under the secular tradition of looking to the Oecumenical Patriarch, not merely as their venerated ecclesiastical primate, but as the supreme spiritual leader of the nation It would hardly be excessive to say that the feeling with regard to the person of the Patriarch compares for this section of the Greek people with that of the Catholics towards the Pope

Of course the miseries suffered by the refugees and their plight in general contribute to dispose them more acutely, the rest of public opinions being also influenced by them and there are no fewer than sixty delegates in the National Assembly drawn from their ranks This is not materially without a wider bearing on the whole of the National Assembly

It will, therefore be realised that the situation in Greece has become extremely delicate and there would be no reason for astonishment were even a soviet coup d'état to prove one which could not be really checked by the present Government, already in danger of their overthrow

Greek Legation, London,
January 31, 1925

No. 27

Sir H Cheetham to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received February 2)

(No 16. Confidential)
(Telegraphic) *Athens February 1 1925.*

MY telegram No 15.

Since receipt of news of expulsion of Patriarch, Prime Minister has not concealed from me that apart from external dangers Turkish action threatens his own position as well as internal tranquillity of the country He is in fact, afraid popular excitement may offer opportunity for one or other of the military leaders

to proclaim dictatorship of the type already too well known Meeting of Chamber on the 30th January permitted General Pangalos to make bellicose speech and Prime Minister has postponed further sitting until to-morrow, when feeling will be calmer He is above all nervous lest refugee Deputies, whose sentiment is particularly affected by expulsion may turn against him

He told me he might be forced now by public opinion to adopt attitude in the Chamber which would be considered provocative

There have been rumours of military without foundation of breaking off relations with Turkey or withdrawing Greek representative or at any rate appealing to League of Nations under article 11

In short without any threat all I have discouraged such a conception of the situation and recommended extreme caution

My immediately following telegram contains resume of note to Turkish Government which should be presented at Angora to-day and appears moderate in tone

Repeated to Constantinople No 3

No 28

Sir H Cheetham to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received February 2)

(No 17)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens February 1 1925*

My immediately preceding telegram

Following is resume of Greek note :-

1 Expulsion of Patriarch carried out by Turks at Lausanne on 16th January 1923, during passage of Patriarch and also that date of signature above treaty

2 Turks from mixed commission alone not competent to settle all questions including presence with Patriarch in matters subject to exchange Patriarch should have without visit to Angora

3 Refers also to the decision of League of Nations taken at Rome 13th December last by which Turkish Government was invited to avoid action prejudicial to rights of Greek communities in Constantinople

4 Finally note protests against attack on head of Orthodox Church and authorities of Greek community in Constantinople and proposes to appeal to Hague Tribunal in accordance with article 44 of the Treaty of Lausanne

Repeated to Constantinople No 4)

No 29

Sir H Cheetham to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received February 2)

(No 18)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens, February 2 1925*

MY telegram No 15

Mass meeting attended by about 50,000 people passed resolution yesterday appealing to signatories of Treaty of Lausanne not to permit breach of treaty by Turks and calling on Government to maintain firm attitude

Crowd subsequently demonstrated against Turkish Legation, shouting for war, but order was maintained by police Demonstration was not on scale similar to ones at the time of plebiscite

Dismissal of 1923 class which is due in three weeks has been held up
(Repeated to Constantinople)

No. 30

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received February 2)

(No 22
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople, February 1 1925.*

MY telegram No 15

Turks have acted more rapidly than even M Exindaris whom I saw night before expulsion anticipated

At present Angora has to much at stake now at defends its action Turks may argue that Mixed Commission's resolution admitted exchangeability of present Patriarch who was elected by Greeks in spite of doubt as to his status and with knowledge of risks, and that it merely declared Commission's competency to decide other issue that Turkish Government are sole judges of proper interpretation of ratified declaration made by the representatives at Lausanne and that they were prepared to fulfil that pledge in so far as Greeks elect to participate in exchange otherwise Greek

Apparent legal case might perhaps be made out in these circumstances although Turkish reply is quite contrary to the spirit of Lausanne settlement as well as to understanding with Mixed Commission regarding interests of their respective nationals

In any case Turkish Government presented *fait accompli* will not now care much about possible reference to Powers, but I think we ought to point out that nothing short of formal abrogation by part 1 likely to bring present Patriarch back to Constantinople would satisfy Turkish opinion, or that even if the Powers were ready to use their interests at Greek Church Greeks would to-day necessarily be served thereby

While protest however strongly worded and though unquestionably justified on question of principle will affect the situation in practice and I still think intervention by League or reference to The Hague Court is best solution in all points of view

With a view to get view of court before possible to invoke articles 42 (last paragraph) and 44 of Treaty of Lausanne I think we certainly should endeavour to establish without much delay former article 1 of Greek pledge could be invoked in support

Possibly this course might involve Greek Government in difficulties but I think it would be better to intervene here all the same and to suggest to Greek Government that if rejected it is for us to urge the matter further under last paragraph of article 44 for case to be taken straight to International Court, Greek Government having in that event only to indicate their claim to act as arbitrator or nominate their representative on Council to act as one of the two members to be chosen by Council

In suggesting this I do not think Greek Government should be affected by fact that their request for League's good offices was also made to Council of League of Nations (see Athens despatch No 940) as they may have deliberately preferred less formal procedure open to Greek Government probably did not anticipate that we would refer the circumstances to Council but Greeks themselves might themselves be taking this course Moreover I would consider Allied position in bearing in mind pledge given by Greek Government towards minorities in Greece, protest submitted by Allied representatives might not be inopportune even if Greek Government were seeking well formed Council of the League question not itself of immediate interest

(Repeated to Athens No 2)

No 31

M Lvassatelli to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received February 2)

(No 24)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople February 1, 1925*

MY telegram No 22

Greek representative on Mixed Tribunal tells me that Greek Government have addressed strong protest to Turkish Government recent surrender of matter to be referred to Hague Court If Turkish Government refuse this Greek Government propose to appeal to the League of Nations under article 11 of covenant Turkish press unanimously approves of expulsion of Patriarch

(Repeated to Athens No 3

No 32

Mr Phipps to Mr Austen Chamberlain —(Received February 3)

(No 45)
(Telegraphic) R *Paris, February 2 1925*

MY despatch No 261

Following is summary of French Government's reply

Matter is complicated by particular case of Patriarch, and it must be borne in mind that recent decision of Mixed Commission whereby Patriarch was declared exchangeable has furnished Turkish Government with pretext for its action

Under these circumstances French Government consider that it is of first importance that present excited state of feeling should be calmed down With this end in view French Government consider that urgent representations should be made to Turkish Government not to carry out further expulsions, especially as regards members of Holy Synod At the same time, it should be suggested to Greek Government that it should nominate *locum tenens* from those prelates who are unaffected by Exchange Convention

Greek Government may if it sees fit, appeal to The Hague Court regarding interpretation of 1923 convention of decision of Mixed Commission and of undertaking of Ismet Pasha at Lausanne concerning Patriarchate

Note adds that French Ambassador in London will explain French Government's views

Text by bag to-morrow

No 33

Consul-General Sharpe to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received February 3)

(No 1)
(Telegraphic) R *Salonica, February 3 1925*

GOVERNOR GENERAL asks me to inform you that views expressed by Turkish Government at Patriarch die issuing great indignation amongst all classes of the population of Macedonia and Thrace who unanimously demand reinstatement of Patriarch

Governor General seems to fear popular excitement and growing demonstrations may influence Government's decisions and result in some untoward action being taken

(Repeated to Athens)

No 34

Mr Austen Chamberlain to Sir H Chetham (Athens,

(No 13)
Telegraphic) *Foreign Office February 3 1925.*

(R) YOUR telegram No 16 of 1st February Expulsion of Chalcedon Patriarch from Constantinople

Your action approved

You should inform Greek Prime Minister that His Majesty's Government feel appreciation of moderation shown by His Government and would regard with disapproval any measures any precipitative policy (End of R)

(Confidential)

Such representations are likely to prove more effective if made independently. You should therefore act immediately without waiting to consult your colleagues.

No 35

Sir H Cheetham to Mr Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 4.)

(No 20
(Telegraphic) R *Athens, February 4, 1925*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No 22

Turkish Chargé d'Affaires has made following communication to Athens press

1 Mixed Commission of Exchange and Constantinople authorities in December 1924 that Mgr Constantine was subject to exchange having been born in Anatolia and settled at Constantinople after October 1918 Mixed Commission has recognised above

2 Turkish Government was merely put into execution decision of commission, and would have no objection if person properly qualified by terms of Treaty of Lausanne were elected as Patriarch

3 Turkish Government thought conclusion of Treaty of friendship for Greece could not make foreign intervention in purely domestic affair

Secretary-General Ministry for Foreign Affairs states that in spite of its denial from the outset semi-official press gives general view of Turkish Government attitude which does not in course constitute reply to note of Greek Government

Suggestion in second paragraph of Turkish communication would be unacceptable here

(Repeated to Constantinople No 6)

No 36

Sir H Chetham to Mr Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 4.)

(No 21)
(Telegraphic) R *Athens, February 4, 1925*

MY telegram No 19

Internal situation remains as ever. There is reason to believe that Prime Minister's visit was not altogether successful in deferring discussion of Lausanne Agreements which is now distracted by Deputies' attacks on Public Security Act somewhat allayed by reported appeal of Pursat Effendi, ex-deputy of Constantinople, appeal to The Hague

No 37

Mr Austen Chamberlain to Mr Keeling (Constantinople)

(No 22)
(Telegraphic) D *Foreign Office, February 4, 1925.*

YOUR telegram No 22 of 1st February. Expulsion of Oecumenical Patriarch

Please say that His Majesty's Government suggest that with a view to prevent question from assuming wide proportions Allied representatives at Constantinople should invite the Turkish Government to refrain from expelling any other members of Synod whether technically exchangeable or not

In view of Turkish action hitherto it seems improbable that Turks will agree to this and point of putting forward proposal calculated to meet with rebuff appears at first sight. You may however use your discretion in joining your Allied colleagues in such representations to Turkish Government as you consider likely to ease situation.

(Repeated to Athens No 10 Rome, No 24 and Paris No 46 (by bag))

No 38

Mr Austen Chamberlain to Sir H Cheetham (Athens)

(No 16.)
(Telegraphic) D *Foreign Office, February 4, 1925.*

MY telegram No 13 of 3rd February. Expulsion of Oecumenical Patriarch

Please concert with your French colleague in suggesting unofficially to Greek Government that they might consider desirability of endeavouring to secure appointment of *locum tenens* to Patriarchate from among non-exchangeable members of Synod to sit at Constantinople until question of exchange is solved

You should point out that this course would prevent question of removal of Patriarchate as institution from becoming acute at this moment and would therefore help to diminish tension pending possible reference of case of Mgr Constantine to Hague Court to which I never-the-less think it seems extremely doubtful whether Turkish Government will agree

Repeated to Constantinople No 23 Rome No 25 and Paris, No 47 (by bag)

No 39

Sir H Cheetham to Mr Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 5.)

(No 23
(Telegraphic) *Athens, February 4, 1925*

YOUR Telegram No 13

Replying in respect to Prime Minister's assurance to the utmost of your instructions. He said that declaration of war would be a wide one remaining in force at present at height of the Allied crisis. He referred again to strength of feeling amongst refugees especially in Macedonia. I think, and told him so, that Allied Governments' views as set out in telegram 13th February to you. (End of R

Though Prime Minister said nothing to this effect I think he had hoped for some expression of sympathy. He assured me he thought Italy would conform her attitude to that of England and France. I am taking no action.

No 40

Sir H Chetham to Mr Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 5.)

No 24)
(Telegraphic *Athens February 4 1925*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I find it hard to believe that there is any evil intent as far as concerns the present but it is possible that officials of the Station may be purposely suggesting to impress Europe. On the other hand there might be danger of serious demonstrations in Salonika leaders' stamping centre. Chief difficulty of Government seems to be to find argument that concession made now would merely lead to further Turkish demands resulting finally in expulsion of all Greeks from Turkey.

I understand that General Mazarakis Chief of General Staff is opposed to hostilities

No 41

Sir H Cheetham to Mr Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 5.)

(No 26.)
(Telegraphic) *Athens, February 4 1925*

YOUR telegram No 14

I have so far acted entirely on my own account, although I was aware that French Minister held similar views to mine

No 42

Sir F Young to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received February 5)

No 14)
Telegraphic R *Belgrade February 4 1925*

I ENQUIRED of Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday what was thought here with regard to expulsion of Patriarch from Constantinople He told me that Greek Government had invited Jugoslavia and Roumania as Orthodox countries to join with them in making protest at Angora As Minister for Foreign Affairs was absent on his constituency no decision had yet been taken

Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs personal opinion was that as Jugoslavia had no diplomatic relations with Turkey it would be difficult to take such a step He thought support of Greeks might be used for hostile press campaign against Turks

In fact this press campaign has already begun

(Repeated to Athens.

No 43

Sir F Young to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received February 5)

(No 15)
Telegraphic *Belgrade, February 4 1925*

My immediately preceding telegram

There are indications that the Turkish press will be made the most of in order to cause Greece fear war necessitating closer relations with this country

The propaganda of the Turks also has had the effect of restraining electors of Serb Socialist party voting for Turkish section of the Opposition *bloc*

(Repeated to Athens)

[E 590 55 44 No 44

Mr Austen Chamberlain to Mr Ross

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 5, 1925*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Mr Chamberlain's despatch of the 22nd ultimo forwarding a memorandum from Constantinople on the question of the election of a new Oecumenical Patriarch and to request that this question may be kept under the careful attention of His Majesty's Ambassador

I have &c
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

E 728 55 44 No 1

Note by Sir Eyre Crowe

THE Turkish Minister called upon me to-day in order to explain once more the attitude of his Government in the matter of the Oecumenical Patriarch He threw no new light on the subject, but he said that he was charged by his Government to declare that they had received reports from Greece which tended to show that the Greek Government were beginning to take measures of mobilisation and were preparing for war In consequence it would be necessary for Turkey to make her own preparations to take danger from attack on her frontiers In this connection they had informed the Serbian and Bulgarian Governments that should Turkey be forced to go to war and invade Greek territory, it was their intention in no case to annex any part of such territory but at the end of the war to evacuate it and leave it independent The Turkish Government however still entertained the firm hope that any conflict would be avoided, and they expressed the wish that His Majesty's Government should negotiate with the Greek Government for this purpose

I told the Turkish Minister that I had no reason to doubt that the Turkish view of the alleged warlike preparations in Greece were entirely unfounded, and I begged

him to do his best not to allow his Government to rush into provocative measures without reconsideration

I then asked what exactly he meant us to do by way of mediation He explained that the Turkish Government could not recede from their position as regards the expulsion of the Patriarch They regarded this incident as closed, but he assured me that the Turkish Government were firmly resolved to abide by the undertaking given to Ismet Pasha that the institution of the patriarchate would be preserved All that the Greeks had to do was to proceed to the election of a new Patriarch who fulfilled the requirements of Turkish law in being a Turkish subject, resident at Constantinople before 1918 What the Turkish Government desired was that we should put pressure on the Greek Government to accept the situation and promote the election of a new Patriarch under these conditions

I said that I thought the word 'mediation' was not perhaps very fortunately chosen for describing the rôle which the Turkish Government wished His Majesty's Government to play I was quite ready on my part to accede to our becoming the advocate of Turkey in a case in which there was a *bonâ fide* difference of opinion between her and Greece for whilst I said I did not question for a moment the good faith of the Turkish Government in putting forward the view which he had repeatedly expressed I hoped the Turkish Government on their part would admit the good faith of the Greek Government who took a different view If the Turkish Government as he assured me were so anxious to avoid any cause of further trouble and if they were as firmly convinced as they expressed themselves of the correctness of their attitude why did they not agree to the proposal which I drew the Greek Government's attention to, that the difference should be submitted upon by arbitrator?

The Minister replied that they could not admit arbitration in a matter which concerned their honour I pointed out that this was inadmissible because, whenever there was a dispute between Turkey and another Power it was obvious that the latter would say that Turkey's honour was affected but this did not also affect Greece whose interests in the Oecumenical Patriarchate could not be denied Moreover the reason that had been given that the Patriarch should be chosen himself among Turks

I asked the Minister whether apart from asking for British "protection" his Government were taking any other steps In reply he gave every assurance that the sole desire of his Government above all was to maintain the most friendly footing with Great Britain and he dwelt on the efforts which he personally was always making in order to promote British interests in Turkey economic and other and the interest British capital in Turkish enterprises &c I said that I could not refrain from observing that if these were the sentiments animating his Government they did not seem to be effectually translated into practice by the attitude of the Turkish authorities towards existing British interests in Turkey He gave no specific example where we had any reason to be discontented but I declined to enter into any details this question now having been handed over to the Lausanne Conference for settlement I did not wish to pursue this matter further as to do so might only lead to the representatives of British industrial and financial undertakings in Turkey persisting in their claims with the result that I should be thrown back on the Patriarchate

Rejecting this latter question the Turkish Minister again pressed me to use our influence with the Greek Government to cause the opposition of the Turkish demand for the immediate election of a new Patriarch

I said that the request were put in terms which I did not see how His Majesty's Government could possibly meet in this way We had carefully refrained so far from taking sides openly in favour of the Turks or the Greeks on the question in the matter at issue in effect had been to act as a friend to Turkey in promoting a friendly spirit and to induce a reconciliation on either side I still thought that Turkey would be wise not to say anymore about accepting the offer of contribution but that His Majesty's Government should reply to any possible reference to them at Lausanne by declaring themselves in favour of the Turkish thesis which I took to be that

At this moment the Turkish Minister with whom my conversation had hardly proceeded quite peacefully suddenly got up from his chair and declared in a very rude tone that he had nothing more to say to me and left the room

[illegible]

February 5 1925

No 46

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received February 6

(No 25)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople February 5* 1925
MY telegram No 24
... meeting in Greek ... proceed before Assembly yesterday Turkish ... Minister implies secret ... Lausanne ... Greece ... Assembly ... proceedings and ... the treaty ... Greek ... Turkey ... Powers ... Patriarchate ... Powers
Sub-Committee ... Constantinople ... Patriarchate ... Turkish Government were only arranging ... Assembly ... Constantinople ... Patriarchate ... Question ... Patriarchate ... exchange
Latter ... Patriarchate ... Turkish ... Greek ... Turkey ... Turkish ... Turkey ... Turkey ... Turkey

given in consequence. He also informed me that the Turkish Minister in Paris had explained to the French Government the statement made to those Governments by me, to the effect that I had been induced to withdraw from Greece Turkish troops who had evacuated Thrace pending the settlement of the question of Thrace by the Peace Conference, by the fact that the difficulty was settled. The representatives of the French Foreign Office who had received the communication had formed the Turkish Minister that they had appeared to be no intention on the part of the Greeks to attack Turkey, and that there was therefore no object in the commencement. M. Herriot had also told Ismid Moukhtar and the Turkish Government that it was not to the interests of the Allies that Turkey should be encouraged to suppose that there was any difference of opinion between the Allies.

The Ambassador then read to me the instructions which he had been about to receive from M. Herriot in regard to the question of Cologne. He said to me that M. Herriot desired that the answer which he was to make to your Lordship should be communicated to me before it was given, in order that I might have an opportunity of expressing my views on the subject. I told him that I could give no opinion on the evidence with which he had supplied me as to the attitude of the French Government, but that I could not help being surprised at the language which M. Herriot was reported to have used in the Chamber of Deputies to the effect that he was acting in the policy of the French Government in regard to Cologne, and that he had always been anxious to carry out this country might be induced to withdraw its troops from the Rhine. I had always understood that it was the policy of His Majesty's Government that the question of the occupation of Cologne was to be governed entirely by the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. I pointed out that the Treaty of Versailles, by its very nature, must be interpreted by the Allies as a whole, and that the withdrawal of troops from Cologne was only one of the many questions which would arise for consideration when the Allies came to consider whether Germany had carried out her obligations under the Treaty. I could not, therefore, admit that the question of Cologne was to be governed entirely by the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. I pointed out that the Treaty of Versailles, by its very nature, must be interpreted by the Allies as a whole, and that the withdrawal of troops from Cologne was only one of the many questions which would arise for consideration when the Allies came to consider whether Germany had carried out her obligations under the Treaty.

I then read to him the greater part of my telegram No. 30, and sought earnestly to point out how ill it seems to me that M. Herriot has thus passed over the Ambassador's statement that Dr. Luther's Government will not desire the Ambassador's presence. I believed the very first thing the Government would do would be to send a Note to Berlin, and I urged that we should not, by any hasty action on our part, be the cause of a breach between Germany and the Allies which might lead to a European conflagration

No 54

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir Horace Rumbold (Berne)

(No 29)
Telegraphic [illegible] *Foreign Office, February 7, 1925*

ŒCUMENICAL Patriarch

Turkish Minister informed Sir H Grindle at interview that if Greece would withdraw her proposal Turkish Government had undertaken to discourage propaganda against the Patriarchate

He recalled that Turkish Government had agreed to put pressure on Greek Government to cease attempts to secure election of new Patriarch contrary to Turkish desires and was now entitled to break its pledge regarding Patriarch

Sir H Grindle stated pressure would be applied but there was *quite* different spirit between present Turkish interpretation of Lausanne Treaty and that of Greece Turkish Government should accept interpretation proposed by Greece

Zekai Bey replied that dispute had been created by Greek attack and discussion was against wishes of Turkish Government which desired friendly relations with Great Britain Turkish Government would therefore welcome withdrawal of proposal by Greece

Sir H Grindle had impression that this might ease tension and requested suggestion that could be made to Greek Government through Turkish Minister at Athens for communication to Greek Government

(Repeated to Constantinople Athens and Rome)

I communicated this telegram to Paris Embassy and Mr Porter, Director at Quai d'Orsay, has now informed Embassy that he presumes Constantinople Powers are being informed by Turkish Government

(Repeated to Constantinople No 29 Rome to Athens No 21 Paris No 55 Angora and Rome No 38)

E 686 55 44 No 3

Memorandum on the Œcumenical Patriarchate by Constantine

It is necessary to study the relations between the Ottoman Government and the Patriarchate from the point of view of the Patriarchate

(a) *Religious*

It is of course to say that the Patriarch still head of the Orthodox Church a number of Orthodox churches for the most part responding to national divisions exist but Patriarch is always regarded as representative of the Orthodox The Œcumenical Patriarchate has been established since before the war was limited to the Greek speaking Orthodox and Asia Minor Constantinople Thessaly provinces added to Greece since 1912 He was regarded with special reverence by the Sultans of the various Orthodox Churches Orthodox Patriarchs of Antioch Jerusalem and Alexandria have possessed the title of Patriarch ever since them and was never known as more than *primus inter pares* Whether he can in any sense be regarded as forming a real obstacle to the Orthodox Church going world is question and if the patriarchate ceased to exist there seems to reason to suppose that the movement Orthodox Churches would be seriously affected There is in fact no parallel between this position and that of the Pope

(b) *Political*

The Œcumenical Patriarchate since foundation of Constantinople 4th century has practically always been under the control of the civil power established at

Constantinople With the rupture with Rome in 1054 this control of the civil power became almost complete there was therefore commonly no question of the Patriarch accepting a position of dependence on the Ottoman Government after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 the policy of the Turks at this time was not to interfere with the religious life and institutions of the races they were about to administer with a view to their ultimate conversion to Islam and the fact that the Moslem world there was little or no distinction between nationality and religion and therefore all who lost since they did not belong to it were regarded rather as territorial than national the Turks to treat the Œcumenical Patriarch as the head of the Greek community in Millet in the Empire to make use of him for purposes of administration and to confer on him privileges which had been granted him by the Christian Emperors

Later on in the 19th century when the control of the civil power became under the Turks an integral part of the administrative machinery of the Ottoman Empire* and the Turks were able to take regulations regarding the appointment and functions of the Patriarchate which were justified by the circumstances which the Patriarch himself was expected to respect and where interference in his election of candidates or in the particular case by the Ottoman subjects of the candidates must be approved by the Ottoman Government where the Patriarch who had always acted to exercise his functions to the best of his ability with the full support of the Turkish Government†

With the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire the great Orthodox nationalities of Europe developed and in each case the Patriarchate was regarded by the Patriarch of Constantinople as an encroachment on their rights and privileges especially in the case of Greece which claimed the Patriarch as a national Hellenic institution and the Patriarch himself was expected to support Hellenic aspirations to the utmost of his power

[illegible] was adopted soon after the Greek Greece [illegible] the Patriarch of Constantinople [illegible] 1922 when Greek [illegible] Patriarch Meletios was elected at Athens [illegible] Greek Church this election was not recognized by the Turkish Government [illegible] 1922 and 1923 and [illegible] to take possession of his see [illegible] Turkish [illegible] Greek [illegible] Meletios was [illegible] Turkish [illegible] Turkish [illegible] Turkish

was actually drafted for the Lausanne sign but at the last moment they refused to sign any undertaking. However just before the meeting of the Grand National Assembly on the 30th January, 1923 a letter was finally agreed to and sent containing a general undertaking that the institution of the patriarchate should be allowed to remain in Constantinople provided it returned to purely religious and spiritual activities. This so far as the public was concerned was the end of the matter. It is unfortunately of a very general nature and gives no record of the secret negotiations of the meeting.*

The details of the present discussions are briefly as follows. According to the Exchange Convention of 1923 all Ottoman Greeks excepting those established in Constantinople before 1918 are to go to Turkey for Greece an exchange for the Moslems of Greek nationality in Western Thrace. When the last Patriarch had been elected and before the actual selection of the Metropolitans of Imbros and Tenedos the Turks raised the question of whether the Patriarch should be allowed to remain in Constantinople. It was pointed out by the Ecumenical Patriarchate that the Patriarchate was an institution of the Orthodox Church and not of the Greek State and that the Patriarch was elected by the Synod of Bishops and not by the Greek Government. The Turks replied that they were willing to leave the Patriarch in Constantinople provided that he took no part in politics. This was agreed to by the Patriarch and the Turkish Government was informed that Mgr. Constantine had been elected. The Turks then

Exchange Convention contains clause letting well enough alone of
persons expelled Turkish assets not affected Specific cases of income
tax assessments Institution
for settlement of such character Treaty between States
Convention of foreign Powers

Note that the worst features of Treaty of Lausanne would be invoked
by Greek and Christian subjects of Turkish Government who have no claim to reference
to Hague

Note case of expulsion of Greek subjects from Turkey Appeal
Treaty basis for good relations Hope that Greek Government
will not take important step at present issue

No. 7

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess of Ripon

No. 30
Telegraphic
Constantinople, 1927
Vol. Eugenia No. 10

My last telegram Mr. Monroe
instructed to support Patriarch's claim but
communication such right by reason of treaty stipulations
Turkish Government to which Mr. Monroe appeals
Lausanne Treaty does not contain
affairs
Greek Government could not possibly
consent to
Patriarch
Turkish Government
suggestion
Repeated to Athens, Belgrade No. 2

No. 38

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess of Ripon

No. 62
Telegraphic
Therapia, February 7, 1925

My French colleague
Turkish Government in Paris
assessing
Turkish
Turkish
Turkish

[E 777 55 44] No. 9

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (Received February 9)

No. 27)
Sir,
Constantinople, January 19

IN my despatch No. 9 of the
Greeks
Patriarch
Mount Athos
Patriarch
Turkish
Patriarch
Patriarch
Turkish
Patriarch
Patriarch
Patriarch

E 779 498 44

No. 8

Supplementary Instructions issued to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited, with regard to the Protection of British Interests in the Persian Gulf

(No. 781)

Foreign Office, February 5, 1925

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 44 of the 12th November 1924 [illegible] I have to transmit herewith, for the information of your Government, a copy of a letter from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited, enclosing a copy of a letter from the Admiralty, dated the 2nd December, 1924, with regard to the protection of British interests in the Persian Gulf.

2. The Company's proposals have been carefully considered by His Majesty's Government, who are in general agreement with the views expressed by the Admiralty.

3. In the event of the Persian Government refusing to accept the proposals of the Company, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to support the Company in the measures which they propose to take for the protection of their interests, provided that the Persian Government are informed beforehand of the nature of the measures which it is proposed to take, and that the latter are limited to the minimum necessary for the purpose in view. His Majesty's Government would also be prepared to support the Company in the measures which they propose to take for the protection of their interests in the event of the Persian Government refusing to allow the Company to carry out the measures which they propose to take for the protection of their interests, provided that the Persian Government are informed beforehand of the nature of the measures which it is proposed to take, and that the latter are limited to the minimum necessary for the purpose in view.

4. In the event of any trouble arising in the Persian Gulf, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to support the Company in the measures which they propose to take for the protection of their interests, provided that the Persian Government are informed beforehand of the nature of the measures which it is proposed to take, and that the latter are limited to the minimum necessary for the purpose in view.

5. With reference to the last paragraph of my despatch No. 44 of the 12th November, I have to request that you will inform the Persian Government that His Majesty's Government are ready to treat with them for the conclusion of a South East Asia Treaty, and that they would be glad to receive proposals to that effect from the Persian Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) R. C. LINDSAY

Enclosure in No. 8

Lettre complémentaire des Instructions communiquées par le Foreign Office aux Chefs de la Protection des Marines britanniques dans le Golfe Persique

Il vient de me parvenir une lettre à la date du 2 novembre 1924 [illegible] relatives à la protection des intérêts britanniques dans le Golfe Persique.

[illegible] Persian Government refusing to accept the proposals of the Company, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to support the Company in the measures which they propose to take for the protection of their interests, provided that the Persian Government are informed beforehand of the nature of the measures which it is proposed to take, and that the latter are limited to the minimum necessary for the purpose in view. His Majesty's Government would also be prepared to support the Company in the measures which they propose to take for the protection of their interests in the event of the Persian Government refusing to allow the Company to carry out the measures which they propose to take for the protection of their interests, provided that the Persian Government are informed beforehand of the nature of the measures which it is proposed to take, and that the latter are limited to the minimum necessary for the purpose in view.

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l'application de mesures tendant à protéger les victimes de ce genre de justice, la perte de tous les biens qu'elles possèdent en Turquie. Il a donc été jugé à propos, par un terme du protocole du 24 juillet 1923 qui engage la déclaration gouvernementale susmentionnée, que le Gouvernement turc devrait prendre des mesures pour empêcher que ces personnes ne soient dépossédées de leurs propriétés et biens en Turquie, et qu'elles ne soient privées de leurs droits de propriété, moyennant paiement d'une juste indemnité, dans le cas où elles seraient obligées de quitter définitivement la Turquie. Le Gouvernement turc a déclaré qu'il était prêt à donner effet à cette disposition, mais il a fait remarquer que, comme la plupart des biens en question avaient été abandonnés pendant la guerre, il serait très difficile de déterminer avec exactitude la valeur de ces biens et de fixer le montant de l'indemnité à payer. Il a proposé que la question fût soumise à un arbitrage.

Le Conseil a pris connaissance avec intérêt de ces différentes communications. Il a noté que le Gouvernement turc était prêt à donner effet à la disposition du protocole du 24 juillet 1923 relative à la protection des biens des personnes qui ont quitté définitivement la Turquie, et il a exprimé l'espoir que le Gouvernement turc prendrait les mesures nécessaires pour donner effet à cette disposition. Il a également noté que le Gouvernement turc était prêt à soumettre à l'arbitrage la question de l'indemnité à payer pour les biens abandonnés par les personnes qui ont quitté définitivement la Turquie.

Le Conseil a décidé de transmettre les documents susmentionnés à la Commission consultative et technique des communications et du transit, pour qu'elle les examine et lui fasse rapport à sa prochaine session.

Le Conseil a pris connaissance d'une lettre du Secrétaire général, en date du 15 mars 1924, transmettant une lettre du Gouvernement turc, en date du 12 mars 1924, relative à la question de la protection des biens des personnes qui ont quitté définitivement la Turquie. Le Gouvernement turc a déclaré qu'il était prêt à donner effet à la disposition du protocole du 24 juillet 1923 relative à cette question, mais il a fait remarquer que, comme la plupart des biens en question avaient été abandonnés pendant la guerre, il serait très difficile de déterminer avec exactitude la valeur de ces biens et de fixer le montant de l'indemnité à payer. Il a proposé que la question fût soumise à un arbitrage.

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seulement les Alliés, mais aussi le renvoi des employés alliés des sociétés. Mais cette question n'a pas été séparée de la question générale du renvoi des employés non turcs, à laquelle les missions alliées n'ont pas cessé de s'intéresser très vivement. Les diverses notes qui ont adressées au Gouvernement turc à ce sujet ont eu pour effet de faire cesser la pratique contraire et d'amener celui-ci à accorder aux étrangers intéressés les équitables garanties qu'ils étaient en droit de réclamer. Les réponses du Gouvernement turc à chacune des notes très pressantes qui avaient été envoyées à ce sujet ont été données dans les lettres suivantes : Annexe No 9 (lettre du 20 mars 1924), Annexe No 10 (lettre du 29 mars 1924), Annexe No 11 (lettre du 5 avril 1924), Annexe No 12 (lettre du 12 avril 1924), Annexe No 13 (lettre du 19 avril 1924), Annexe No 14 (lettre du 26 avril 1924), Annexe No 15 (lettre du 3 mai 1924), Annexe No 16 (lettre du 10 mai 1924), Annexe No 17 (lettre du 17 mai 1924), Annexe No 18 (lettre du 24 mai 1924), Annexe No 19 (lettre du 31 mai 1924), Annexe No 20 (lettre du 7 juin 1924), Annexe No 21 (lettre du 14 juin 1924), Annexe No 22 (lettre du 21 juin 1924), Annexe No 23 (lettre du 28 juin 1924), Annexe No 24 (lettre du 5 juillet 1924), Annexe No 25 (lettre du 12 juillet 1924), Annexe No 26 (lettre du 19 juillet 1924), Annexe No 27 (lettre du 26 juillet 1924), Annexe No 28 (lettre du 2 août 1924), Annexe No 29 (lettre du 9 août 1924), Annexe No 30 (lettre du 16 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ur cas particulier, de se référer à la déclaration dont il s'agit. Adrian Bey dans sa réponse déclara expressément que la déclaration du Ministère des Affaires étrangères était à son égard et engageait pleinement l'acte de conformité ses dépêches antérieures à cette date, dont le texte et les annexes ce dernier lui avait transmis.

Cette déclaration est précisément celle dont le gouvernement prétend que les faits eux-mêmes ont établi le caractère illusoire. Le Traité de Lausanne a soigneusement évité de stipuler des garanties spéciales pour les minorités. Le traité d'alliance anglo-irakien du 10 octobre 1922 a été conclu sous la pression des événements qui avaient failli emporter l'armée anglaise elle-même. Les dispositions de ce traité sont en contradiction avec les principes de la Charte de la Société des Nations. Les garanties qu'il contient ont été données à la Société des Nations comme des garanties spéciales. Les Assyriens ont été abandonnés à leur sort. Les Kurdes ont été écrasés. Les Arabes ont été soumis à un régime d'oppression. Les Turcomans ont été massacrés. Les Yézidis ont été persécutés. Les Chrétiens ont été dispersés. Les Juifs ont été pillés. Les Mandéens ont été opprimés. Les Shabaks ont été exterminés. Les Kakaïs ont été massacrés. Les Zazas ont été déportés. Les Gorans ont été déportés. Les Hawramis ont été déportés. Les Bajalans ont été déportés. Les Barzanis ont été déportés. Les Talabanis ont été déportés. Les Jafs ont été déportés. Les Feyli ont été déportés. Les Lurs ont été déportés. Les Bakhtiaris ont été déportés. Les Qashqais ont été déportés. Les Afshars ont été déportés. Les Shahsevans ont été déportés. Les Turkmènes ont été déportés. Les Yomuts ont été déportés. Les Goklans ont été déportés. Les Tekkés ont été déportés. Les Ersaris ont été déportés. Les Salors ont été déportés. Les Sarik ont été déportés. Les Chodors ont été déportés. Les Saryks ont été déportés. Les Ersaris ont été déportés. Les Tekkés ont été déportés. Les Goklans ont été déportés. Les Yomuts ont été déportés. Les Turkmènes ont été déportés. Les Shahsevans ont été déportés. Les Afshars ont été déportés. Les Qashqais ont été déportés. Les Bakhtiaris ont été déportés. Les Lurs ont été déportés. Les Feyli ont été déportés. Les Jafs ont été déportés. Les Talabanis ont été déportés. Les Barzanis ont été déportés. Les Hawramis ont été déportés. Les Gorans ont été déportés. Les Zazas ont été déportés. Les Kakaïs ont été massacrés. Les Shabaks ont été exterminés. Les Mandéens ont été opprimés. Les Yézidis ont été persécutés. Les Chrétiens ont été dispersés. Les Juifs ont été pillés. Les Arabes ont été soumis à un régime d'oppression. Les Kurdes ont été écrasés. Les Assyriens ont été abandonnés à leur sort.

Le contraste est frappant. Il ne vous échappera pas que le caractère particulier de ces événements les expose. Il est inutile de rappeler que la plupart des événements qui se sont produits dans le pays ont été provoqués par des causes qui ne sont pas imputables à la Société des Nations. Il est donc impossible de prévoir les événements qui pourraient se produire dans le pays. Il est donc impossible de prévoir les événements qui pourraient se produire dans le pays. Il est donc impossible de prévoir les événements qui pourraient se produire dans le pays.

ANNEXES

Recueil des pièces annexes à Mémoire représentatif du Gouvernement

N° 1. Note de Adrian Bey à Sir Austen Chamberlain, 24 août 1921.
N° 2. Note de Sir Austen Chamberlain à Adrian Bey, 10 octobre 1922.
N° 3. Note de [illegible] à Adrian Bey, 15 février 1923.
N° 4. Note de [illegible] à Adrian Bey, 10 mars 1923.
N° 5. Note de [illegible] à Adrian Bey, 20 mars 1923.
N° 6. Note de [illegible] à Adrian Bey, 30 mars 1923.
N° 7. Note de [illegible] à Adrian Bey, 5 avril 1923.
N° 8. Note de [illegible] à Adrian Bey, 15 avril 1923.
N° 9. Note de [illegible] à Adrian Bey, 20 avril 1923.
N° 10. Note de [illegible] à Adrian Bey, 25 avril 1923.
N° 11. Lettre de [illegible] à Adrian Bey, 30 avril 1923.
N° 12. Lettre de [illegible] à Adrian Bey, 5 mai 1923.
N° 13. Lettre de [illegible] à Adrian Bey, 10 mai 1923.
N° 14. Arrangements [illegible] à Adrian Bey, 15 mai 1923.

ANNEXE I

[illegible]

[illegible]

ANNEXE II

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

ANNEX

[illegible]

ANNEX

[illegible]

ANNEX 5

[illegible]

[illegible]

ANNEX 4

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

ANNEX 9.

Aidan Bacle to the Representatives.

La légation de Pologne auprès de la Porte a bien voulu porter à la connaissance du Ministère des Affaires étrangères de Turquie que le Gouvernement polonais a décidé de mettre à la disposition des Missions diplomatiques de France, de Grande-Bretagne, d'Italie et du Japon, pour leur usage exclusif, un certain nombre de wagons-lits et de wagons-restaurants qui circuleront sur les lignes polonaises.

Le Gouvernement ottoman, désireux de faciliter [illegible] engagements [illegible] les pays [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

ANNEX 14

Arrangement conclu entre la Société du Chemin de fer Mondain à Smyrne et la Société des Tramways Smyrniotes, le 14 février 1923.

Convention No. 14 du 14 février 1923-1924.

Entre les soussignés :

La Société anonyme du Chemin de fer Mondain à Smyrne, ayant son siège à Smyrne, représentée par M. Edouard Brasse, administrateur délégué, autorisé par décision du Conseil d'administration du 15 décembre 1922, sanctionnée par la Direction générale de la Société, en date du 19 décembre 1922, ci-après dénommée la Société du Chemin de fer Mondain, d'une part ;

Et la Société anonyme des Tramways Smyrniotes, ayant son siège à Smyrne, représentée par M. Edouard Brasse, administrateur délégué, autorisé par décision du Conseil d'administration du 15 décembre 1922, sanctionnée par la Direction générale de la Société, en date du 19 décembre 1922, ci-après dénommée la Société des Tramways Smyrniotes, d'autre part ;

Il a été convenu et arrêté ce qui suit :

Fait en double exemplaire à Smyrne, le 14 février 1923-1924.

LABEYRIE,
Délégué de la Société du Chemin de fer Mondain à Smyrne.

BRASSE,
Administrateur délégué.

Arrangement conclu entre la Société du Chemin de fer Mondain à Smyrne et la Société des Tramways Smyrniotes, le 14 février 1923.

Convention No. 14 du 14 février 1923-1924.

Entre les soussignés :

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Il a été convenu et arrêté ce qui suit :

Fait en double exemplaire à Smyrne, le 14 février 1923-1924.

ALWYN PARKER,
Délégué de la Société des Tramways Smyrniotes.

BRASSE,
Administrateur délégué.

Arrangement conclu entre la Société du Chemin de fer Mondain à Smyrne et la Société des Tramways Smyrniotes, le 1er Juin 1926.

Convention No. 14 bis du 1er Juin 1926.

Entre les soussignés :

La Société anonyme du Chemin de fer Mondain à Smyrne, ayant son siège à Smyrne, représentée par M. Edouard Brasse, administrateur délégué, autorisé par décision du Conseil d'administration du 15 décembre 1922, sanctionnée par la Direction générale de la Société, en date du 19 décembre 1922, ci-après dénommée la Société du Chemin de fer Mondain, d'une part ;

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Il a été convenu et arrêté ce qui suit :

Fait en double exemplaire à Smyrne, le 1er Juin 1926.

WEYL,
Délégué de la Société d'Exploitation du Chemin de fer Mondain.

BRASSE,
Administrateur délégué.

Enclosure 2 in No. 60.

Précis of Information supplied by His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo.

IN October 1913 His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo reported that since the signing of the Lausanne treaty the Turks in Southern Anatolia had become much more aggressive against Christians, with the object of thereby obtaining the most favourable terms for the abolition of the Capitulations. Cases of robbery, with violence, had been of frequent occurrence, and in some instances the police from Antioch had, after the lapse of considerable time, succeeded in tracing the stolen property and in arresting the thieves. Such cases, however, were rare, and no attempt had been made to bring the culprits to justice.

In January 1923 His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo stated that shortly before the Angora Government had declared a Turkish decree annulling all agreements between Turkish subjects and foreigners, by which the latter had been granted the privilege of paying their taxes through their own consulates. Many Turks had thereupon refused to pay their taxes, and had even threatened to kill the tax-collectors if they were compelled to do so.

By the Treaty of Lausanne, Syria was divided into two zones, the Turkish zone comprising the vilayets of Aleppo and Marash, and the French zone the vilayet of Deir-el-Zor and the Sanjak of Alexandretta. In the Turkish zone, which was evacuated by the French in December 1922, the Turkish authorities refused to permit the circulation of French currency.

In February His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo reported that it was said that the Turkish authorities intended to levy a tax on Christians in the form of a contribution to the Turkish Red Crescent Society. It was reported that the Christian inhabitants of Urfa were being forced to subscribe to the Turkish Red Crescent Society.

In March His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo reported that a case was under trial at Adana in which Turks were charged with having murdered a Christian, and that the Christian witnesses for the prosecution were being intimidated by the Turkish authorities. The Christians were afraid to appear in Court, and the Turkish witnesses for the defence refused to give evidence.

In June His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo reported that a Christian was said to have been murdered by Turks at Marash, and that the Christian witnesses for the prosecution were being intimidated by the Turkish authorities. The Christians were afraid to appear in Court, and the Turkish witnesses for the defence refused to give evidence.

In July His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo reported that a Christian was said to have been murdered by Turks at Marash, and that the Christian witnesses for the prosecution were being intimidated by the Turkish authorities. The Christians were afraid to appear in Court, and the Turkish witnesses for the defence refused to give evidence.

In August His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo reported that a Christian was said to have been murdered by Turks at Marash, and that the Christian witnesses for the prosecution were being intimidated by the Turkish authorities. The Christians were afraid to appear in Court, and the Turkish witnesses for the defence refused to give evidence.

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E 772 55 44 — No. 61

Sir A. Ponsonby to Mr. Austen Chamberlain — Received February 9.)

(No. 34.)

Sir, *Belgrade, February 5, 1925.*

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 14 and 15 of the 16th ultimo respecting the effect in this country of the expulsion of the Greek Patriarch from Constantinople, I have the honour to state that the principal feeling called forth by this event and the reported excitement towards it in Greece was that it gave a good reason for letting Greece the necessity of breaking with this country. It may thus, perhaps, be said that whatever is written and done here, is

with the object of making Greece understand that her interests lie in giving a good price for Serb's services as a permanent ally.

2. I enclose the translation of an article in the "Vreme" which shows how the incident was at once seized on for the above-mentioned purpose as well as, incidentally, for the electioneering advantage of blackening the Turkish party, whose leader, Ferad Beg Bey, is reported in another despatch as temporarily confined in prison.

3. I do not think that the prospect of the removal of the Oecumenical Patriarchate from Constantinople was ever treated seriously in any particular quarter in Serbian circles. It may be remembered from my despatch No. 398 Confidential of the 25th October last proposal to that effect did not meet with at any rate immediate favour even from the Serb Great Servian Government. I believe that the Turkish Government's reasons for taking action against the Serbian Church last January have not yet been explained to this Government, but come to a decision in regard to the request made by the Hellenic Government that they should join with the Roumanian Government in making a protest at Angora. The "Pravda" to-day states as follows:

> "The Ministry for Foreign Affairs have to-day received the report that Great Britain, France and Italy will make a common protest at Angora and will request the Turkish Government to restore the Patriarch to his prerogatives, but it will not take any steps to expel him from the territory of the Turkish State."

I have &c.
ALBAN YOUNG.

Enclosure 1 in No. 61

Extract from the "Vreme" of February 3, 1925.

EXPULSION OF THE PATRIARCH.

SOME days ago it was stated at Athens that the Oecumenical Patriarch had been given a notice to quit which constituted a flagrant violation of the Turkish Treaties. The expulsion has been contrasted in the most unfavourable manner with the attitude awaiting the decision of the League of Nations which should have dealt with this question, and even with the friendly manner in which every Government should observe towards neighbouring States and still more towards the head of the Christian Church in Europe.

There is, however, reason to fear that the whole Christian world after the Great War has shown itself insulted by the unbridled attitude of the Turkish authorities, who, in replying to the protests addressed to them, have not even taken the trouble to observe the most elementary rules of politeness. Thus, after the events of the war, and last but not least in Constantinople, where the Patriarchate was subjected to the Allied occupation, the Turkish authorities regard the Patriarchate as a purely Turkish institution, which was founded by the Sultan Mahomet II. after the capture of Constantinople, and which was subsequently protected by the Sultans and Byzantine Emperors, who were also Turkish subjects. The Russian Church, the great and powerful protector of Pravoslavism generally, protected the Constantinople Patriarchate regarding everything in connection with it as a question affecting its own prestige. This Russia is now no more.

But the Pravoslav Balkan States, and the greatest Pravoslav Power since the fall of Russia is our country, whose duty it is to stand up for the interests of this great united of Pravoslavism in general, are in no way particular.

For not only the religious feelings of the Serbs, but the question for long centuries Turkey was our irreconcilable enemy, and there are sure signs that even to-day she has not changed her attitude but waits as Austen Chamberlain [illegible] operation she makes use of her usual cunning and methods keeping up relations with the Left elements in our own country whose object is to hinder the development of our national and economical life in the south. For this reason it has not yet been possible in spite

of the great love of peace of our country and in spite of wish to be in good relations with everyone to restore regular diplomatic relations with National Turkey.

It is characteristic that many of those nations who were defeated in the Great War have changed their attitude for the worse and that especially recently they have been showing a warlike attitude which promises no good for the international relations of these countries with their neighbours and which is especially significant in connection with interior conditions in certain States. [illegible] of the telegram of the late Chancellor Wirth acknowledging. The meritorious work of Herr Kraft for [illegible] German Catholics' Congress decided to create the impression among the north-western circles of R. I. C. [illegible] and the handful [illegible] Germans in this country at the 80 millions of their warlike relatives [illegible] the north over all [illegible] on the basis of the Angora Government and especially such ones as strikes at both the religious [illegible] national feelings of the Serbs will call for having the sympathy of Herad Dinic, the envoy [illegible] that Bishop Dositej Kotchis [illegible] South Serbia stands the whole night and assistance of Angora. Moral assistance and perhaps material assistance [illegible] just as Radic and his allies desire.

As regards the [illegible] reasons which have compelled the Turks to take such steps [illegible] against the Oecumenical Patriarch who is the head of the Greek Church and of the Greeks generally, events at Constantinople [illegible] to our attention recently [illegible] Greeks. For the Turks always attack those who [illegible] weakest [illegible] one reason or the other. In this respect our southern neighbour, after her seven years' war with Turkey which [illegible] after her victorious campaigns which were in the end [illegible] over to presents a very favourable object for Turkish attack. Apart [illegible] there was denounced with the Serbian Kingdom which was Greece's best guarantee of security in case of war and which made it possible for her to [illegible] against result from any [illegible]

No. 62

Note Verbale from the Austen Chamberlain (*Received February 10*)

No. 35.)
(Telegraphic) *Athens, February 9, 1925.*

My telegram No. 29.

I learn officially from Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs that their reply to Turkish note will be a short one, stating that it is the intention of the Greek Government to refer the question to the League of Nations under Article 11.

E 846/194/44 No. 67

Consul Heaphy to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (*Received February 11*)

(No. 18. Confidential.)
Sir, *Aleppo, January 28, 1925.*

I AM indebted to the French Delegation Department for the material for the following notes on Mustafa Kemal Pasha's recent visit to Aleppo.

2. Mustafa Kemal arrived in Aleppo on the 23rd January. The municipality of Aleppo telegraphed inviting them to be present at the ceremonies in connection with the inauguration of the Turkish Republic on the 5th February. Mustafa Kemal replied saying he could not arrive on that date, and arrived in Aleppo on the 24th. His Private Secretary reported that he had no [illegible] intention of making any [illegible] speeches.

3. On the 25th he received at Dervish [illegible] the following was at first arranged. The object of this visit was stated to be [illegible] purely. It was accompanied by his wife, his secretary, general Tahsin Bey, his private secretary, Essad Reza Bey, two aides-de-camp and [illegible] Ismail Hakki. At Dervish [illegible] was received by a [illegible] staff [illegible] to whom he made a short speech of thanks for the warmth of their welcome. He spent the morning shooting and in the afternoon received notables, including two [illegible] leaders, Kara Hassan and Mussa. A merchant of Alexandretta was introduced to Mustafa Kemal who asked [illegible] Turks living in Syria were oppressed and showed some surprise [illegible] that the population was satisfied with the mandatory Power.

4. On the 17th he is reported to have continued his journey from Osmanieh to Islahieh, but there is no detailed information about his movements for the next few days. Mr. Vice-Consul Cotton reports that on the 21st he was at Mersina and that the town was decorated in his honour.

I have, &c.
W. HOUGH.

No. 64

Sir A. Chatham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. (*Received February 11.*)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, February 10, 1925.*

MY telegram No. 18.
1923 class has been released.
(Repeated to Constantinople No. 10.)

No. 65

Sir A. Chatham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. (*Received February 12.*)

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, February 11, 1925.*

MY telegram No. 35.
Greek Government now inform me that reference of their request to the League of Nations will be based on Article 11. Object is to avoid mention of war.

E 869/55/44] No. 66

Memorandum respecting the possible Removal of Greek Ecumenical Patriarch from Constantinople.

THE Secretary of State has asked for the observations of this Department on the question whether His Majesty's Government should not now openly advise the Greek Government that the best solution of the patriarchate question would be to transfer the patriarchate from Constantinople elsewhere, and whether they should not announce in Parliament that this is their policy.

If there were a hope of securing the retention of the institution of the patriarchate at Constantinople we have strongly to be favoured to separate the purely spiritual position of Mgr. Constantinos as Exarch and delegate for the office of Patriarch from the general position of the observance of Greek pledges. This perhaps involves a petitio principii of the Lausanne thesis, which is based upon the existence of such a hope or intention.

We have hitherto restricted our intervention to the Ecumenical, in the form of unofficial advice to both sides. Thus we have suggested to the Greeks that arrangements should be made to ensure that the seat of the patriarchate be carried on at Constantinople so that it may not appear that the headquarters of the institution have been transferred with the exception from Athens. Mgr. Constantinos and it is possible that we might even now, if necessary, to urge the Greeks to secure the resignation of Mgr. Constantinos and the regular election of a candidate possessing the necessary legal and other qualifications, but that has never been insisted. We have no reason to think that the retention of the patriarchate at Constantinople is desirable in itself, but merely on the general principle that since the Lausanne Treaty we should use our influence at Lausanne to secure the pledges and safeguards for minorities contained in it, it behoved us to do what we could to secure its fulfilment.

We know, however, that there is a very strong party among the Constantinople (Ottoman) Greeks which desires the retention of the patriarchate, in order that it may be free from interference from the Turkish authorities, and there is little doubt that the position of the patriarchate, if it remains in Turkey, will always be unsatisfactory. Moreover, the motives of the Greek Government in pressing for its

retention in Turkey are open to considerable criticism. They are almost avowedly political, and obviously based on the conception of the patriarchate as the focus and centre of Hellenism and Greek irredentism in Turkey rather than on any idea of its spiritual importance. It is more than doubtful whether it is desirable that we should support such a policy.

On the other hand we could not urge the desirability of the removal of the patriarchate from Constantinople without first considering alternative arrangements and their consequences. The alternatives would appear to be the removal of the patriarchate to—

(*a*.) Greek territory other than Mount Athos;
(*b*.) Mount Athos; and
(*c*.) Some other, more or less neutral, territory, i.e., territory not under the control of an Orthodox Power or forming part of the province of a national Orthodox Church.

(*a*.) *The Removal of the Patriarchate to Greek Territory other than Mount Athos.*

There would appear to be several objections to this. The Orthodox Church is practically the whole of Greece is a European question purely local development of the patriarchate. The ruling position of the Patriarch even in New Greece would, therefore, be retained. It would be open to Greece to become more appealing to the Greek National Church and consequently of Greek Government, and the restitution of the patriarchate might even be used to increase Greek influence among the Orthodox States, which would be bought dearly by loss of political influence and would certainly not be in the best interests of the Orthodox religion.

(*b*.) *Removal of the Patriarchate to Mount Athos.*

There would be much to be said for this, as Mount Athos is a kind of neutral enclave in the Balkans and the centre of Greek Orthodoxy and a symbol of independence. At the same time its political importance would inevitably decrease and there is reason to believe that the Greeks themselves would not favour this solution. Mr. Baltazzi informed the Secretary of State some time ago that he considered that Mount Athos was altogether "too monastic."

(*c*.) *Transfer of the Patriarchate to some "Neutral" Territory.*

Mr. Baltazzi says he is quite sure that a majority of Greeks are not unfavourable to the removal of the patriarchate to any neutral territory. There seem to be several objections to this. It would almost certainly involve His Majesty's Government in a great deal of unpleasantness, and might seriously prejudice our relations with Greece and the other Orthodox countries. Palestine is out of the question, because there has always been an independent Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, and in any case there are too many Patriarchs and Consuls already there. Egypt is, of course, out of the question, as the Greeks have already many religious establishments there, and in addition there is in those islands a predominantly Moslem country, and again already possesses a Greek Orthodox Patriarch as Alexandria.

In these circumstances, of the three alternatives, the most favourable on the whole from the Orthodox religious point of view would appear to be removal to Mount Athos, but it is possible that removal to neutral territory, short of Mount Athos, might be open to fewer objections on which the Greek Government would probably insist, though it would furnish the best solution for the time being.

The question that the Secretary of State has raised is whether it is desirable that we should intervene to the extent of making representations as to the future seat of the patriarchate. Probably the answer to this is in the negative. The first consideration is one with which we have to deal, except to the extent that we have assumed by the Lausanne Treaty a moral obligation to support the representations of the Greeks, but not to Greece. The Greeks maintain that they desire its retention there, although we cannot but feel that its declaration we cannot consistently with our same policy oppose it. The last thing we want is to increase the responsibility either towards the patriarchate itself or towards the Greek Government to intervene further than we must either on political or the religious side of the question. For, as the Secretary of State has pointed out, the French attitude in the crusade is likely to be pro-Turk and the Italian attitude anti-Greek, and we cannot go crusading alone.

And it is doubtful if public opinion in this country feels strongly enough about the question to support a crusade

It may be that the Secretary of State regarded the suggested abstention as the best way to avoid becoming involved in a crusade. It might perhaps achieve this result by averting a fresh crisis but we should have saved ourselves at the expense of (1) repudiation of our Lausanne obligations or at any rate inconsistency with our Lausanne policy and (2) an intolerable responsibility for the future of the patriarchate

Any decision should obviously take into consideration the results of the Greek appeal to the League but these are very difficult to foresee. And it is quite possible that the matter may settle itself before the Council meets before the Council. At any rate the crisis is passed the possibilities and existing event, and there does not appear to be any immediate necessity for action by His Majesty's Government or even for a decision as to the policy to be eventually adopted. It is therefore submitted that at any rate in present circumstances there is nothing to be gained by advising the Greeks to remove the patriarchate and instead simple advice which would involve superposing on our moral obligations towards the religious institution of the patriarchate a political responsibility towards the Greek Government and people

Eastern Department, Foreign Office
February 12, 1925

No. 67

Sir R. Graham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, February 12, 1925*

YOUR telegram No. 37 (Ecumenical Patriarch).

Italian Government in lengthy note emphasise importance of preventing either party from taking precipitate action or from adopting an attitude of menacing character.

They suggest that Allied representatives in Athens and Constantinople should urge the two Governments to abstain from any decision until the nature of the problem has been more perfectly cleared and that Angora Government should be invited not to expel any further members of Holy Synod for fear of provoking a more virulent reaction in Greece. Conversations with the two Governments thus invited Allied Powers working in close contact might be able to suggest a satisfactory solution to them.

The Italian representatives in Athens and Constantinople have received instructions to act in this sense with their Allied colleagues. Italian Government are however ready to discuss any other eventual concessions with other objects in view.

In later note to-night Italian Government state that Italian representative in Constantinople after agreement with his Allied colleagues had spoken in this sense to Ansret Bey who had immediately confidentially that conversations were taking place between a representative of Turkish Ministry of the Interior who had come specially from Angora re patriarchate with a view to arriving at a formula for settlement of the question.

Texts by bag.

(Repeated to Athens and Constantinople.)

No. 68

Sir H. Chetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, February 13, 1925*

I HAVE received from Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs authoritative statement of Greek Government's view of patriarchate question. Statement which is being should reach you last February. It makes clear sense of danger that misuse of Fort can create renewal of patriarchate's advantage as to be taken by the Vatican to

install Roman Catholic Patriarch at Constantinople. It is even more likely that Soviet Government would reclaim patriarchate and instal Russian Patriarch to which end they might very well put pressure on Turkey.

Metropolitan of Athens informed Legation chaperon that if his spiritual person of Patriarch was not an important question. If Turks would not agree to extra territorial patriarchate Greeks would prefer temporary removal from Constantinople preferably to Athos.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 11.)

No. 69

Sir H. Chetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 13.)

No. 39.
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, February 13, 1925*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I have reason to believe that Government's view coincides with that of Metropolitan but that they would be unwilling save in the last resort, to agree to removal of patriarchate etc. In any case they would not be satisfied with bare assurances from Turkey but would require guarantee of League of Nations or of Powers before concluding any agreement.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 12.)

C 2200 298 3 No. 70

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

(No. 570.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 13, 1925*

I HAVE recorded in your despatch that part of my conversation with the French Ambassador this afternoon which related to the question of Locarno and security.

When we had finished this subject the Ambassador said that he desired to mention the position in Austria. Very disquieting reports had reached him from several sources in the Balkans and in Switzerland that the financial arrangements established by the League were breaking down; that the evil results of the deflationary policy had created a catastrophic situation; and that if that were to happen Austria would either make terms with some of the neighbouring countries or would have to break up, one portion going to Hungary, a second to Switzerland, and the third portion going to Germany. He had heard from M. Motta, the President of the Swiss Confederation, who had spoken in the sense that all good Swiss were very strongly disposed against Austria. He himself thought that there was cause for some concern, but did not feel any real anxiety at the moment.

I told his Excellency that I had seen the observations of the League committee, but that I had had no information of any such political character as he had mentioned. I was not without some anxiety as to the situation and had been carefully studying the country. I did not profess to have studied the question entirely but I understood that the real point was that the future of Austria depended on the success of the League scheme. It seemed to me that the League's scheme might be insufficient without an improvement in Austria's economic and commercial relations with her neighbours. I thought the most practical step that could be taken would be to use any influence that we or any of our friends possessed with countries like Czechoslovakia, Poland and Roumania to secure more favourable commercial relations with Austria. This had been pressed upon me recently by Dr. Zimmerman and the League of Nations Commissioner-General for Austria in Vienna, and I had therefore taken the opportunity offered by an observation of Dr. Benes to express that view to him.

The Ambassador was then about to take his leave but I asked him to spare me a few minutes more. I told him that I did not wish to make a complaint but I must express a regret. I referred to an agreement with M. Loucheur about the Embassy at Constantinople. I recalled that I had while in Rome seen Signor Mussolini's adherence to it, and I said that only a few days ago Signor Mussolini

who was getting impatient at [illegible] had agreed, strictly further to defer the appointment of the Italian Ambassador pending the settlement of our agreement was therefore perfectly right. I had assumed as a matter of course that this agreement must be concluded before the Ambassadors were exchanged. Whether Lord Cushendun was pressed, or was desirous to put the Italian Ambassador had already been received in Paris, I regret I do not know, but in fact I found myself to my chagrin using the rare witness with M. Herriot that I had agreed we should always consult each other before taking any decisive step, and I regret that this action had been taken without previous communication with me. And I regretted it the more because it might easily place me in a very embarrassing position with Signor Mussolini. As the Duchess, who dined with me, will report what I had said to M. Herriot, the latter only has said that he was sorry to express his complaint that I should have acted without consulting him.

Your Lordship will agree with me that I was quite right to report to the subject of the Treaty of Lausanne, as we look at further negotiations unless the Prosecution of the Conventions is [illegible]

I have &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

E 912 821 44 No. 7

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. (*Received February 10*)

(No. 61)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 9, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the [illegible] between Turkey and Denmark was signed at Angora on the [illegible] by M. Vasco, the Danish Minister [illegible] and Dr. Tewfik Rouchdi, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

2. Although the text of the [illegible] has not yet been published, Mr. Vasco, on his return to Constantinople, remarked that it was perfectly normal and that the rights of foreign treaty powers [illegible] were fully safeguarded.

I have &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

[E 915 915 44] No. 72

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. (*Received February 16*)

(No. 94)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 6, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith the annual report for 1924 on the affairs of Russians in Turkey.

2. In most capitals the Corps diplomatique stands isolated from the colour of its surroundings. So is it here. As a body I fear we are depressed down at heels, and in a deplorable state of confusion. Over all of us hangs the shadow of Angora, and though we are affected as individuals according to our confidence or lack of confidence in our Governments' firmness and according to our own personal dispositions, the thought uppermost in all of us is a certain depressing sense of the provisional. Like the inhabitants of Constantinople in their vanity we all of us still think ourselves somewhat heroic shrimps left high and dry. With our carapaces rather battered we exchange occasional hints of stray morsels, dart at each other and try to make the best but more often assume *the dansant*. So we watch each other and try to know how to use a knife well for, while those of us who have been creeping enough, lack the chops of memory.

3. For years past our names have never been printed in any official list, nor can I now further assist you to attempt such a task, for I doubt if there is any one of us knows the correct designation of colleagues, and I suspect that some of us hardly know our own. We are Ministers, Ambassadors, representatives, delegates

visiteurs, Chargés d'Affaires and High Commissioners, and we have completely set at [illegible] most valuable articles of the Vienna Congress Treaty. Some of us are nearly at peace and some nearly at war. Among those of us who have no relations with Turkey are included enemies, friendly alike. Some of us have missed completely all formalities for the establishment of mutual relations, and the rest of us are in different stages towards that consummation protected in the meanwhile only by [illegible] agreements and quinquies. These various conditions with our various grievances and various pretensions make precedence among us an inextricable mystery. Fortunately there is much to be said for every possible point of view that quarrels are impossible. For my own part, compelled now to put my colleagues down in some sort of order, I will have recourse to the fortuitous dictates of the alphabet, venturing only to separate the sheep of Constantinople from the goats of Angora.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

Enclosure in No. 72.

Report on Heads of Missions.

The portraits in brackets are taken from the 1923 report.

(A) CONSTANTINOPLE.

Austria. M. Auguste Kral.

M. Kral re-opened relations with Turkey [illegible] after the interruption dated from the peace treaties. He was a member of the Austro-Hungarian consular service, and during the war was Consul-General in Albania. He has been at this post in the Balkans and speaks Turkish and Albanian. His manner is characterised by an effusive attitude and he tries to be [illegible] well informed and anxious to be on good terms with His Majesty's Mission and perhaps even with the Office of Service.

He is married.

Belgium. Baron de Vinck de Wenfagne de Scrannes.

M. Michotte de Welle returned to this country in the summer and was replaced by M. Vinck de Wenfagne who is unmarried. He comes from China, Japan and Siam. In person he is short, stout and round and he likes dancing with the tallest ladies. His disposition is genial and he can be [illegible] about Siam, but he is quite stupid.

Bulgaria. M. Stancioff Raeff.

During the greater part of 1923 a General Markoff was left in charge of the Legation in Constantinople in a sort of unofficial capacity. I was at the time of the year, however, the Bulgarian Government appointed M. Stancioff Raeff to be its official representative here. He is a man with considerable experience, having been Bulgarian Minister to Bucharest from 1913 to 1916, and is supposed to be at the Hague when I [illegible] met M. Veskoff and spoke. I was told to have been removed owing to irregularities in his accounts. He is of somewhat sly and shifty appearance, has a story which is improbable in view of his subsequent appointment as second Bulgarian delegate to the League of Nations. In spite of this I rather like the little chap. I have seen a great deal of history more particularly of the period about the Berlin Congress. He recently read to me extracts from a secret agreement signed by Andrassy and Sir Henry Elliott, which he has seen in the archives at Vienna and which constituted a definite agreement between Great Britain and Austria as to the lines which the two Powers would support at the Berlin Congress. He told me with great pride that the existence of this agreement [illegible] to have seen, and that he proposed to have it published in England.

Many years ago when Ferdinand of Bulgaria paid a visit to Constantinople the Sultan wished Turkish to be taught to Bulgarian students in one of the schools or colleges here. Orders were instantly sent for a dozen young Bulgars to be selected, and this M. Stancioff Raeff declares to have been carried out at Galata Serai. He hails from what is now part of Serbian Macedonia. Speaking Turkish fluently he is well informed on local affairs and extremely [illegible] gentil. His assistant is a Bulgarian.

of obscure intrigue inspissated by every sort of personal animosity and political complication and only a very crafty man could keep afloat in such waters I greatly enjoy sparring with M Rakovsky but I take care to have a very long spoon by me

M Rakovsky married this summer a very charming young Bulgarian lady who was brought up in Vienna

Czechoslovakia Dr R Svetlik

[The Czechoslovak representative M Svetlik is married to a Miss Armstrong of Australian origin I know him but little else He gives one the impression of being heavy and uninteresting Most people describe him as a decided bore

M Svetlik is a learned and keen politician but he is a stiff lengthy well read and well educated bore not to be unduly resisted He has been appointed consul general to Australia and is only awaiting the arrival of his successor (who will be a Minister Plenipotentiary Czechoslovakia having signed a Treaty of Friendship with Turkey) to take his departure Mme Svetlik greatly regrets the transfer and perhaps too, the aversion to Europe in general and Paris in particular of the diplomatic corps in spite of the fact that she is going to live in a dull country She is really Irish (as M Svetlik explains at length) and in Armstrong and Gaelic somewhere near Kilkenny

Denmark M Carl Ellis Waldemar

M Wandel does almost entirely the arrangements coming into Ankara especially touring to see He has his own ideas very little where he spends most of his time sitting at fishing When his Government expressed the intention of suppressing the Legation he offered to stay on as Minister without any pay Nevertheless, he takes the rough with the smooth and was just here to Angora to sign a Treaty of Friendship

Mme Wandel is a Dane, of Jewish extraction She is extremely handsome, well read, and quite agreeable

France M Jessé Curély

[Since April M Jesse Curely has been in charge of the French High Commission M Jesse Curely's last foreign post was Peking He served during the war at the Quai d'Orsay where he was Chef du Bureau du Personnel He is a friendly though gloomy reserved colleague but as Stanhope Hardy said of Talleyrand he is for a Frenchman He professes no great love for M Poincaré and his tone of voice and disgust at the attitude of France during the Chanak crisis He has no love for the Turk, but sends his post to the Spa in the hot months

M Jesse Curely has been in Angora since 1924 Colonel Pelle having died in the spring I have found him reserved but very cynical and trustworthy but he stores up rages and slights with the result that he sometimes explodes He is strongly disapproves of the British Foreign Office methods of dealing with Turkey and to quote his words, it is that he will be remembered in history as an Ambassador is appointed, and will be sorry as his position in regard to Mosul takes things very difficult for him

Mme Jesse Curely is an angry looking person, but always cheerful and pleasant I shall be sorry when they leave Constantinople

Germany Herr Rudolf Nadolny

Herr Nadolny arrived in June last post having been at Stockholm and reopened with Turkey as Minister Plenipotentiary the relations which had been interrupted during the Armistice period and pending the conclusion of peace between Turkey and the Allies He has the unusual rank of Ambassador to the German service The Embassy houses in Pera and Therapia have been repaired, repainted and redecorated and a wooden transportable house of some twenty or twenty five rooms has been erected at Angora I have entered into relations with Herr Nadolny, and it has personally reported to me the assurances offered liberally by Berlin to London that Germany will not attempt to oppose in any way British policy in Turkey I am aware that any breach of these engagements though of course in the former I hold the German market open to us with Herr Nadolny's help when required, leaves great embarrassment and leaves the British competitor far behind To this no exception can be taken

I do not think Herr Nadolny has any particularly good status with Turks and there is a marked absence in the relations between the two countries of that cordiality which might have been expected to result from an alliance in war for four years He has a good representative at Angora and is well informed on Turkish affairs, but I think that he is rather to be regarded as really intelligent Personally he is too obsequious to be entirely agreeable, but I understand he can be arrogant enough to his colleagues from minor States He has given one large *musicale* to Constantinople society but he explained to all and sundry that it cost him nothing, because he got the artistes services free in exchange for board and lodging The French Embassy long refused to have any relations with the German Mission, and induced the Belgian Minister Prince rather reluctantly to follow suit, but at a party in this mission last night M Jesse Curély allowed himself to be introduced to and to shake hands with Herr Nadolny

Frau Nadolny is rather a forlorn figure who never opens her mouth without saying thank you

Hungary M Ladislas Tahy de Tarsa et Targeo

M Tahy arrived in May 1924 and like M Kral was formerly in the Austro Hungarian consular service He therefore speaks Turkish In spite of his name he is racially more a Slovak than a Magyar During the war he was at Bagdad, and at one time when there was no neutral consul there, he had to assume charge also of British interests I have been in good relations with him and he strikes me as being a very frank and straightforward man perhaps with rather a hot temper I do not believe he is anti British any more than any of our ex enemies might be expected to be so

Mme Tahy is an agreeable lady of peasant appearance with a family of small children

Italy Signor Guido Cesare Montagna

Signor Montagna arrived in March and M Mussy retired on pension He came from Athens, and has served also in Washington Madrid Sweden and Tehran as Minister He now has the personal rank of Ambassador in the Italian service He is a highly strung energetic individual but is mainly interested in the outside official work, leaving over his dossiers all day long His staff are kept perpetually in the chancery but he does everything himself and when last summer his counsellor rebelled against this ploughing of the sands he was sent back to Rome at once His position is a difficult one as the Italian colony is numerous, emotional and adapts itself with difficulty to the new conditions brought about by the abrogation of the Capitulations Signor Montagna is therefore involved in multitudinous petty controversies with the Turkish authorities which he conducts personally and with acrimony to the detriment both of his own and of his personal prestige with the Turks He has the constant role of the thoroughly irritated but determined achieve great success Dr Schlegelberger began with his visit to Angora in April last and has proceeded apace He now perceives that there are laurels to be gathered at Constantinople and it would be good for a transfer elsewhere I shall be sorry if he gets it as he is a good colleague to me His instructions to work in with this mission, and so far as I know neither he nor his Government have during the past year attempted to cross the policy of His Majesty's Government We exchange notes frequently and I do not think he has more reticences towards me than I have towards him

Mme Montagna was Austrian before marriage daughter of Count Lagothetti late Austrian Minister at Tehran who she met and married her husband As an Austrian she was born in the precincts of the Palazzo di Venezia where she now presides as Italian Ambassadress Her salon green consists of the sandy waste of Constantinople society but make an effort is as hard to find, for the Montagnas are given little public money for entertaining and seldom open their doors She is shut up in the house with her children and an undergenial Italian mother in law and I suspect that the domestic matrimonial may be rather serious

Japan Mr Shiro Hanaoka

Mr Kasami has left for Roumania where he expects to be promoted to the rank of Minister

Mr Hanaoka has only just arrived here from Harbin where he was Consul general I have barely made his acquaintance

Roumania M Tilea or Gikkovitch

M Gikkovitch has been in the Roumanian Service all his life and speaks Turkish In the virtual non existence of any relations between Turkey and Roumania this post is a sinecure of observation He is well informed and quite intelligent

M le Gikkovitch is a worthy plain woman from the Kozsovo region

Netherlands Baron W B R de Weede van Rengers

Baron Rengers is not what is called a Career Diplomatic all ages in Constantinople he bears the official mark of a diplomatist *de carrière* He does not approve of Constantinople as a post He is fond of wine and after dinner can be very diverting Owing to the Dutch Legation being in charge of Austrian interests he has a certain amount of work to do the wise rest of his time is spent in frequenting places where he can get the opportunity of drinking or of seeing a pretty woman

Mrs Rengers is a slow straight weight Mrs Rengers talks too much about her interests Herr Rules

Persia M Seyed Sedik Khan Tabatabai

Sedik Khan arrived in September and is accredited solely in presenting letters of recall as Ambassador at Angora He is of a pleasing appearance and possesses a sense of humour which with the best will in the world cannot help to be considered through an interpreter Unfortunately the Secretary though understanding French is too diffident to speak it He is I think anxious to be on friendly relations with this mission and I have seen him several times but I have had no serious business with him

Roumania M Georges Edality

M Edality the Roumanian Minister was a Deputy of the Great Nish during the war He has been absent on leave from his post since approximately 1922 is to be Roumanian delegate to the next Interparliamentary Union at Warsaw He is accredited He is short and round with a keen sense of his own humour He conceals much shrewdness beneath a mild exterior and his appetite for pleasure does not prevent him from being an energetic constructive expense of others

M et Mme Edality has appeared this winter with a little wife and a tiny but fully grown daughter

Spain M Juan Servert y Vest

The Spanish Minister M Servert y Vest is the doyen of the Ministers He has spent most of his career in South America and finds this climate somewhat trying Except to be ill Chargé d'Affaires of Intriguing but I believe in Constantinople itself he lives rather a secluded life at Buyuk-Dere where he spends the whole year He is a pleasant little man but tastes

Sweden Mr O Wallenberg

M Wallenberg refused on his arrival that he was to be styled Excellency during his stay Turkish interests here are considerable and I don't forget one of this suspicious minded race to have left the legation at Petrograd to come to Constantinople Mr Wallenberg has been very helpful to me in connection with the Prisoners Exchange Agreement with the Angora Government some of the returned Turks of course, desire to stay in Constantinople rather than go back to be treated at Malta I had such requests to make there M Wallenberg was regarded by the Turkish press at Malta with treatment of the Turks This report was very much resented by British authorities and M Wallenberg lost no time in expressing gratitude to the Turkish Government

M Wallenberg goes among the Turks and Turks are always to be found at his evening parties In order rather to please Turks on the point of his departure he changed

Mrs Wallenberg is good natured lady who speaks forth in a torrent stream of Turkish is best described as she takes her evening coffee at dinner

United States of America Rear Admiral Mark L Bristol

I think it a pity that the American Government have not long ago sent a career diplomatist to take charge of the United States High Commission I am not living myself altogether to trust Admiral Bristol

Admiral Bristol and his wife entertain a great deal in a simple way They are both devoted to dancing, and I am told are frequently to be seen at Maxims and other similar places in this town

Admiral Bristol has been here now for five years expecting most of the time to be replaced by a diplomat at any moment At one time his successor had actually been appointed and was packing up to come out here when the arrangements were countermanded at the last moment He himself is quite anxious to get back to the navy would like to stay here till the Three American Treaty is ratified he was recently offered the command of the United States fleet in Far Eastern Waters

In the little business I have had with Admiral Bristol he has proved friendly and helpful and I credit his being anti British He affects to be very strongly pro Turkish and goes to the point of never allowing himself to utter a remark brought to the Turks This makes any reasonable discussion of current questions impossible but as he is not well informed it does not matter His attitude may be due to the excessive discretion usually observed by amateur diplomatists, or to the necessity of maintaining somehow a good standing with the Turks in spite of the acrimonious relations between Turkey and America, which compel him to continue Ching counsel High Commissioner In this latter object he succeeds

Admiral and Mrs Bristol keep a lot of entertaining Till recently at any rate, Mrs Bristol was popular for arrival and not from State Department funds and was run like a ship Ship no stewards do the waiting as ship's stewards as the privates are on ship's work repares them all money on the books of the U S S Scorpion The result though slightly strange at times is nevertheless highly gratifying to Constantinople society in general with whom Admiral and Mrs Bristol are decidedly popular

Vatican

Mgr Pisani retired in the course of the summer and Mgr Cesarano assumed charge in September Mgr Ange Maria Dolci arrived here from Bucharest where he was Nuncio but owing to the non existence of relations with Turkey did not take up his post at once He came partly to settle the question of the Congregational schools partly to attend to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate which is in the throes of a Turkish appointed Greek opposition Patriarch and has seemed to be, and is, rather a failure from too much protection Therefore to Bucharest at the end of the year and Mgr Cesarano is now in charge

Mgr Dolci is a K B E having received the distinction in recognition of his services to British prisoners of war His personality is I understand well known to the Foreign Office

By Angora

Afghanistan Sultan Ahmed Khan

Ali Ihsan is Chief Secretary Ahmed Khan is a brother in law of Ghazi Mustafa Kemal His private life is a scandal, and he longs for the fleshpots of Kabul but his Government will not allow him to come away until the return of his successor who is not yet even designated

France General Mougin

Throughout the year Colonel Mougin has been in attendance at Angora, theoretically as representative of the French High Commissioner for Syria but practically as representative of the French Government He the French High Commissioner here has a very low opinion of Colonel Mougin's capacity General Pelle has described him as being entirely lacking in any critical faculty and as a Frenchman who would like to see interests at Notre Dame His reports are regarded as worthless owing to their long pro Turk bias He is now on leave and will probably not return to Angora

General Mougin returned unexpectedly to Angora on 1st August He describes himself as "l'homme disposition du Président du Conseil Ministre des Affaires étrangères" and M Jessé Curély describes him as "un mélange d'influence et de tasse et de Milligan" He lives in the house of the director of the Ottoman Bank wears horse exercised from all his best rooms and is a familiar figure in Angora in staff uniform Yet I doubt if he has much personal influence with the Turks who regard him as a mere tool and a contemptible one Mougin Pasha

Greece M Jean Politis

M Politis is still Chargé d'Affaires at Angora full diplomatic relations not having yet been established but he occasionally pays visits to Constantinople He was at Lausanne for the negotiation of the Treaty of Peace and is well known to members of the British delegation I have necessarily seen little of him but he strikes me as being intelligent with a keen sense of humour and an objective manner of discussing questions which nevertheless hardly hides the Greek bias on most of his observations

Mme Politis is a Greek lady of Constantinople and courageously refuses to leave her husband alone at Angora She is both agreeable intelligent and good looking

Poland M Romain Knoll

The Polish Legation is permanently at Angora and only a delegation of it resides in Constantinople At Angora they have two houses one in town for the winter and a country house for the summer I have only seen M Knoll once or twice he is a young intelligent sensible good humoured and determined to make the best of his fortune has to live at Angora Yet I fear he is not above stooping to the arts of the sycophant to gain credit with the Turks

Russia M Souritch

I have never yet seen M Souritch, whose title is Russian representative in Afghanistan though he came this summer for a month or two to Buyukdere At Angora the Russians are in course of erecting a new house which it is said is to be of enormous size and of the most fantastic new style of architecture I hear that a vast pile of stones has been assembled in preparation

I understand that Mme Souritch declares that life at Kabul was far more agreeable than it is at Angora

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E 932 55 44] No 73

Sir M Cheetham to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received February 9)

(No. 62. Confidential)

Sir, *Athens, February 8, 1925*

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 21, 22 and 24 of the 4th February I have the honour to report that M Papanastassiou, leader of the Opposition asked the Prime Minister in the Chamber last night to communicate to the Deputies the contents of the Turkish note received on the 6th instant M Michalacopoulos answered that such communication was unusual but that he would shortly give an account of the action which he had recently taken in connection with the conflict of the Patriarchate, and would submit the whole question to the Assembly

2. The news of the expulsion of the Patriarch completely surprised the political world here, as was apparently also the case to some extent at Constantinople The Prime Minister was at first influenced by fear of extremists in the Chamber, who were inclined to advocate immediate reprisals. He gradually developed more confidence, and in my telegram No. 16 I was able to report an improvement in the situation Discussion in the Chamber had been avoided, and the policy of reference to the Hague of the dispute with Turkey was adopted by the Government M Michalacopoulos remained nevertheless, much agitated by the apprehension of further expulsions and the effect which they would have on the refugee population and on political feeling in general In spite of private assurances given him by General Kondylis he was anxious lest the latter should overturn the Government and with it himself as Prime Minister initiate a more spirited and adventurous policy This danger has up to the present been avoided. I discussed the matter thoroughly with M de Chambrun, and he was able to approach the general, I believe with effect, through the French military attaches, who knew him well.

3. I have no reason to suspect the honesty of the Prime Minister's expressed desire for a judicial decision at The Hague or an appeal to the League of Nations. He must be thoroughly aware of the weakness of Greece. When I spoke to him recently, in accordance with your instructions, to suggest the appointment of a *locum tenens* for the patriarchate I said that Greece could not afford to miss any opportunity of a peaceful settlement, seeing that she was unable to count on any support from the Balkan Powers M Michalacopoulos made no attempt to controvert this view, and he is, moreover, nervous as to the attitude of Italy His main preoccupation, however, appears to be the possibility, to which I have referred above of the Turkish Government proceeding if unchecked to the expulsion of the Metropolitans and subsequently of the entire Greek population from Constantinople I was not able to discover whether the Prime Minister had any definite grounds for considering such drastic action on the part of the Turks to be a likely occurrence He at any rate stated his belief that public opinion, which is already, from all reports, very tense in Salonica, would be difficult to control if further expulsions took place

4 The Athens press is now behaving with moderation Elleftheron Vema even went so far as to say, commenting on an article by the Constantinople correspondent that the whole question was brought about by the "Bonapartist, aggressive" attitude of the Patriarchal Council, who had persisted in electing the present Patriarch in spite of warnings that the Turks regarded him as exchangeable The fact that the Patriarch is a "royalist" has not unnaturally tied the hands of the Government who have been unable to put pressure upon the patriarchate without incurring a charge of allowing party feeling to influence them The Government organ "Messager d'Athenes" in this morning's issue takes the line that, Turkey having put herself in the wrong by refusing to go to arbitration it is now for the League of Nations to redress the balance The expulsion of the Patriarch, it argues, is really an attack on the Treaty of Lausanne "That treaty, good or bad, is for the moment the Statute of the East. If the Great Powers who signed it consent to tolerate the licence of the Turks, they cannot expect the lesser signatories to remain impassive spectators"

5 This language seems to me ominous, but it may be only the expression of the eager desire of the Hellenic Foreign Office for some assurance of the European support to which it seems to be considered that Greece has a kind of moral right.

I have, &c.

MILNE CHEETHAM

C 2454 1435/90] No 74

Mr Austen Chamberlain to Sir R Graham (Rome)

(No 216.)

Sir *Foreign Office, February 17, 1925*

THE Italian Ambassador came to see me this afternoon about Albania He asked that I should send instructions to Mr Eyres to advise the Albanian Government to postpone the consideration of the Anglo-Persian Concession by the Assembly until there had been time for a further exchange of views between the Italian and British Governments and for a friendly solution to be reached I told his Excellency that I had just received information that the concession had been passed by the Assembly yesterday and that it gave the right to the Anglo-Persian to prospect for an area of 200,000 hectares which had not, as I previously supposed, been already reduced to 100,000 hectares It was therefore too late for me to take the step which he asked but I was ready to continue the search for a solution satisfactory to both parties in the same spirit of friendship which had actuated me both in this question and in the question of the Geo-arriere But the next stage must be that the Italian Government should answer the question which I had addressed to Rome and state precisely what was the area which they desired to see reserved for Italian exploration It might be that the Italian State railways and the Anglo-Persian company contemplated quite different areas, and in that case no difficulty would arise

The Ambassador said that he was unable to give me this information, but he professed to know that the areas covered by the two parties did at any rate overlap He stated that oil was found and that though the Anglo-Persian Concession was not in terms a monopoly yet in fact it constituted one since the company had chosen the only land in which oil existed I replied that I did not know precisely what land the Anglo-Persian had selected except that they had not and added the part which had been already explored by the Italians As to what he said of a practical

...no power. I had heard that the experts of the Anglo-Persian were themselves divided into two sections of which were the best men and that some at any rate among them thought that the richest area was outside the district which they contemplated taking.

The Ambassador continued to dwell on the susceptibility of Italian opinion and the difficulties created thereby for the Italian Government. He assured me that Signor Mussolini desired to treat the matter as between friends and to prevent its affecting our friendship.

I pointed out that the Ambassador that we could not expect me to do anything to confirm or invalidate the concession and that both in the matter of the gendarmerie and in that of the oil concession I might be exposing myself to very considerable criticism were my action to become known. I would however continue to seek a friendly solution. I repeated that the essential was that the Italian Government should refrain from any threat or demand.

Marquis Theodoli then spoke to me of the reception of the Turkish Ambassador in Paris recalling what he had said to Signor Mussolini in response to which Signor Mussolini had told him that he had now anticipated Italian action by receiving the Turkish Ambassador in Paris.

I said that I regretted the French attitude. I recognised that in the conversations at Paris Mr. Henry and I had spoken only of Constantinople but that we had agreed to move together and that we were aware of the Italian claims to the Dodecanese. I had pressed the French Ambassador that they should express their regret to the Turkish Government that they had embarrassing position which at the moment was not of Italian Government.

The Marquis said that he only wished to add that the matter was Signor Mussolini was the one interested, that was what he appealed at Paris because all that stood for Turkish Ambassador who had been waiting in Rome for three months. He had not been allowed to present his credentials owing to the agreement.

I thanked the Ambassador for his communication and said I thought this would be the last interview.

The object of the report was to ask the Ambassador to see Signor Mussolini personally and to ascertain definitely whether the Egyptian Government were to be free to take the same step as had been decided by His Majesty's Government in regard to the frontier of Transjordan. As I understood it Italy consented to

(b.) *In Turkey in Asia.*

The Ottoman Railway from Smyrna to Aidin

The original concession dates from 1856 and the line since its construction, has been under British management, and was in 1914 regarded as the best managed line in Turkey.

The line is 607 kilom. long, and runs from Smyrna along the Meander Valley to Dineir and Lake Egerdir with branches to Eudemish, Sokia, Denizli and Chivril.

The original founders of the company undoubtedly hoped in time to extend eastward to Konia in order to tap the rich central districts of Asia Minor, but the construction of the Anatolian and Baghdad Railways, which carried with them the right to prevent other railways entering their zone on each side of their lines, prevented the realisation of this idea. Shortly before the war a further limitation on the possible expansion of the company's railway system was provided by the action of the Italians in obtaining for themselves the right to construct railways northward from Adalia. After the war the conclusion of the tripartite agreement would have enabled the Smyrna Aidin Railway Company to link up their line with the Anatolian Railway, and to join up with Italian railways constructed in the Adalia district. The failing through of the tripartite agreement, due to the victory of Kemalism, still leaves the company free to expand eastward or southward, and the Turkish Government have indeed, proposed to the company to construct railways towards Adalia through Burdur and from Dineir to the Anatolian Railway line at Afium Karahissar. The company sustained great losses during the war, and is at present negotiating with the Turkish Government for a readaptation of its concession, which will allow it to recoup to some extent its losses, but nothing has yet been succeeded in reaching any agreement.

It would undoubtedly be in the interest of the Smyrna Aidin Railway Company that the Anatolian Railway should remain under British control, for the passing of the Anatolian Railway under German or French influence would prove an obstacle to the company's ultimate hopes of expansion eastwards.

The Smyrna-Kassaba Railway

The original concession for the construction of this railway was granted in 1863 to a British subject. The railway was in 1893 purchased by the Turkish Government, and a concession for the operation of it was granted to a French company. The total length of the system is 677 kilom. It runs from Smyrna to Panderma with a branch to Afium Karahissar, through which town the Anatolian Railway passes. Although this line and the Smyrna Aidin Railway have been in existence for over fifty years they were only connected during the war at the instance of the Turkish War Office. Proposals have been made to the board of the line by the Turkish Government that they should construct new railways in the direction of Chanak.

Owing to its connection with the town of Afium Karahissar, the future of the line to some extent bound up with that of the Anatolian Railway, and it may be assumed that the French board will fight to prevent the Anatolian Railway passing under British or German control.

The Anatolian Railway.

A concession for the construction of this railway was granted in 1888 to the Deutsche Bank. It runs from Haidar Pasha to Konia, with a branch line to Angora. The total length of the system is 1,935 kilom. It passes through Afium Karahissar, in which town the Smyrna-Kassaba line has a station. At Konia it joins on to the Baghdad Railway, the construction of which was also financed by the Deutsche Bank. In 1922 a British group, Brandeis, Boyd's, Rothschilds &c., acquired an option on the Zuretti Banks majority shareholding in this railway, but has never succeeded in obtaining possession of the line or arriving with the Turkish Government a contract for the running of the same. The Anatolian Railway is the most important railway in Asia Minor, and its importance has been enhanced by the choice of Angora as the capital. The present Turkish Government counts on making Angora not only a political capital, but also the centre of a vast railway system which will embrace Constantinople, Smyrna and Adana on the west, and Trebizond, Erzerum, Diarbekir and Mosul on the east.

At present the Anatolian Railway is being operated by the Turks with the assistance of Germans, and as the rolling stock and material needed to replace depreciation caused by the war have been ordered from Germany. There seems little

likelihood of the British group obtaining possession of this line, for the Turkish Government is resolved to avail itself of the terms of the original concession, and to repurchase it. Funds for repurchase are lacking, but this fact does not prevent the Turkish Government from already utilising the line as its own property. A proposal has been made to the British group by the Turkish Government to the effect that the group would acquire possession of the railway if they consent to construct new railways from Angora to Sivas and from Sivas to Samsun. While the construction of new railways may tempt the British group, it may be taken as certain that they can expect no profit from regaining possession of the Anatolian Railway. The Turks affect to fear that the handing over of the railway system to a British group will have a political significance, and will afford His Majesty's Government the opportunity of continually interfering in Turkish internal affairs. The fear is groundless, and the Turkish Government of course knows this.

The Baghdad Railway

The concession for this railway was granted to the Deutsche Bank in 1903, and was to link up from Konia to Baghdad, Basra and the Persian Gulf via Mosul. It is not yet complete. At present the trains from Konia to Nisibin, with branches to Alexandrette, Aleppo and Mardin.

From the Persian Gulf the railway is open from Basra and Baghdad to Samarra, during the war was extended to Kara Serai, some 7 miles south of Mosul. Only the portion between Nisibin and Samarra remains in the hands of the Baghdad Railway Company.

The operation of this railway are now controlled by the Turks, for the terms of the Turkish Peace Agreement the operation of the greater part of the line has been handed over to the French company, which operates the line, is actively engaged in its reconstruction. His Majesty's consul at Aleppo has recently reported that good progress has been achieved, for this railway, and that the French engineers hope to reconstruct as far as Mosul before the end of this year.

The Mersina-Adana Railway.

The concession for this railway was originally granted in 1886, and the line was for a time operated by British companies. It subsequently passed into German hands. The length of the line is 67 kilom. It connects with the Baghdad Railway at Adana, and would have formed a branch of that line. Although at present operated by the French company the Turks intend to hand it over to the British group which has acquired an option over the Anatolian Railway, the chances of obtaining possession of it are very small.

The Dedeagatch-Dedeagatch Railway.

This is the only pre-war railway in Turkey of which the Turkish Government undertook the construction. It was agreed in 1873 that the concession was granted in 1875, as the Turkish Government was neither the financial credit nor the technical knowledge necessary to complete it. In 1888 a concession for the construction and operation of the railway was granted to a French firm. It is a narrow gauge railway, 41 kilom. long, and serves the ancient capital of Turkey.

(c.) *Railways Projected or under Construction*

The Turkish Government has recourse to foreigners in the first days of railway construction, but even before the war they showed a tendency to impose on Turkish railways a national character and to eliminate as far as possible all foreign influence. The policy of the present Turkish Government is to construct railways without foreign help. Thus in 1923 there was to be a big transfer between Samsun and Alacham to the west and Erzerum to the east, which only Turkish capital and Turkish labour were employed.

The Turkish budget for 1923 contains the following extraordinary credits:—

	£T.
Construction of the railway Samsun-Sivas-Angora	8,000,000
Construction of the railway Diarbekir-Arghana	1,000,000
Construction of the railway Kutahia-Tavshanli	2,000,000
Railway repairs	2,000,000

There are signs that the Turkish Government are finding the construction of these new railways too onerous, and they have made offers to both French and British groups to undertake construction on their behalf. It will be remembered that the French Regie générale des Chemins de Fer obtained in 1914 a concession for the construction of railways in the Black Sea area, *i.e.*, from Angora to the Russian frontier. During the Lausanne Conference the Turks refused to recognise the French claim to be allowed to construct the Black Sea railway system, and even granted a concession to the American, Admiral Chester, for the construction of the system. Admiral Chester was unable to find the funds, and now the Turkish Government has approached both the Regie générale and the British group interested in the Anatolian railways with a view to obtain help to carry out this scheme. The scheme, if carried out, will result in the construction of railways from Angora to Sivas and from Samsun to Sivas, and thence to Diarbekir in the south and to Erzerum and Trebizond in the east. During the war a broad gauge track from the Angora Sivas Railway was laid. At present a Decauville railway has been laid on this track. Several bridges have been constructed and a good deal of [illegible] has been carried out. It will be understood that the construction of the Black Sea railway system has an importance which is more strategic than commercial.

There is a project for the construction of a railway from Diarbekir to the Argana copper mines. These copper mines are the richest in Turkey, and if the line is constructed, the cost of construction will very soon be repaid both by the freights obtained.

[illegible]

It is particularly to the interests of British [illegible] that the suppression of the way should be assisted by the selection of a route which [illegible] the trade of the Turkish Oil and Anglo-Persian Companies. The Lausanne Treaty assures to Great Britain equality of treatment with the Turks will result in very little profit. It is to be hoped that the Turkish Government is to ensure a German expert to the General Inspectorate of railways and ports, and, as Great Britain helped to finance the Anatolian railways, and as British capital is interested in the future of Turkey, British traders should especially have

Lausanne Conference, 1923, [illegible]

No. 76

Sir M. Chrothers to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (Received February 20.)

(No. 41.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, February 19, 1925.*

PATRIARCHATE.

Greek Government have formulated no definite policy as yet. Their ideal would be the suppression on basis of resignation of Patriarch, election of successor from retired metropolitans and undertaking by Turkey that extraterritorial privileges shall not be expected. Most distinct of Turkish Government answers, however, is to the effect that such an agreement to be stable would be ineffective unless negotiated with or guaranteed by Third Power or group of Powers. No direct proposals will therefore apparently be made to Constantinople. Meanwhile no official speculation is active as to what will be the attitude of Turkey at Geneva. Where subject to be presented for discussion question and may find it difficult to avoid discussion basis raised by Greece. Patriarchate remains closed for the present to the Greek internal politics.

Repeated to Constantinople, No. 13.)

MAP SHEWING APPROXIMATELY

RAILWAYS AND RAILWAY PROJECTS IN



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POXIMATELY

PROJECTS IN TURKEY



War Office 1925

[E 1090 194 44 No 77

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received February 23)

No 134)

Sir, *Constantinople February 17, 1925*

IN continuation of my despatch No 47 of the 20th ultimo, I have the honour to report that so far as internal politics are concerned the past month has been fairly quiet and not markedly by striking developments During the latter part of the period the rift brought about by the expulsion of the Ghemeni an Patriarch quite overstood well Other notable events in the satisfactory issue of which certainly strengthened the position of Ismet Beys Cabinet whose attitude in the matter has received the wholehearted support of all Turks whatever their political leanings may be It also had the result of bringing the President back in a hurry to the capital where he arrived on the 2nd instant While in Chester he seems to have travelled about a good deal and to have made himself accessible to the public He made many and lavish promises of roads ports railways and other material improvements and the effect on the country generally was quite evident

2 Nothing more has been heard of the question of protests and how they shall be appointed which early in January early brought Ismet Beys Cabinet to the ground, and the National Assembly has been fully occupied with discussion of the budget, which has to be finally disposed of by the 1st March It has given rise to debates of some heat in the course of various Departments of the State, especially the Interior Ministry last week on the 14th instant some very sharp criticisms were levelled At the Public Works Department the cost in provinces such as Erzerum, exposed to Russian winters, was declared to be extraordinarily high Ismet Bey himself interested by Deputies who visited Dr Ethem during a recent visit to Erzerum, explored the general question of roads with a view to securing economy throughout the country Its wish are potent to every inhabitant of Turkey but nothing more of this sort of course

3 While the political storm clouds are not as yet possible to develop menacing proportions there is taking place under the Progressive party's auspices recently in harmony with Ismet Beys general policy of strengthening and to a certain extent organising opposition to the Government with a view to trials of strength to take place in the voting lobbies It is unlikely that at this stage any would block the Popular party's path, giving any appreciable strength or cohesion By-elections steadily going against them at Brussa Nouri Dr Pasha the Secretary had it all his own way in these but the election which was of the utmost importance to the invalidation of the first ones my despatch No 47 paragraph 3 and at Keshan Ali Aziz and Kiazim Deputies have lost seat by the Progressive Republican Party but are certainly not elected supporters of the Popular party It is said that only at Constantinople where a complete Italian system of control full administrative machinery and the Government take care of electing its official candidates is a element omitted on the spirit of unrest that exists in Turkey Mustafa Kemals prestige is still the dominant factor in politics but in this country like that provokes in Europe constant personal jealousies or grievances to which point is added the inability of any Government to achieve business like terms For this the President gets most of the credit and the United Opposition is here with the one party from a critical standpoint drawing strength

4 Much event has taken up more space in the papers than even the threat of a break with Greece namely the scuffle affray in the Assembly in which Hamid Pasha lost his life The Pasha was one of the best hated soldiers who know not to be that word of course in Turkey was but distinguished himself by his bravery and his services to his country by dozens of wounds For some time he had been highly nervous and irritable and on the 9th February a quarrel took place between him and another Deputy apparently over some very trifling affair and Hamid was heard to use rude and strong language against various persons Among those who present on the occasion was Ali Bey and Hamid suddenly seeing red pulled out of his pocket two revolvers and let them off at Ali A rough and tumble ensued in the floor of the course of which Ali Bey succeeded in getting out his pistol and firing it into Hamid's body When the affray was over Hamid declared that he had really been shot by one Reouf Bey through his private pocket Ex Deputy and devoted henchman of the President's but Reouf was able to show that neither of the two pistols he carried had been fired at all Of course the affair is the talk with rumour and it is freely said that what seems at the face of it to have been a mere brawl brought on by a homosexual

manner was really the murder of an inconvenient personage by the President's henchmen and advantage was taken of this atmosphere by certain parties to invest Halid's funeral with a dignity entirely out of keeping with the sordid circumstances in which he met with his death. The facts of the case at any rate as they have consistently been reported in the press are all against these tawdry pageants, and what comes out most clearly is the fact that Deputies in the precincts of the Assembly are not merely armed but that they prefer to have two revolvers in their pockets rather than one.

I have &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

E 1092/55/44] No. 75

Memorandum by Mr. Austen Chamberlain (Received February 4)

No. 15

Constantinople, February 2, 1925

Sir,

With reference to your despatch No. 6 of the 1st instant regarding the explosion of the Ottoman Public Debt Office, I have the honour to report that the local newspapers and published accounts of the case have fully borne out the statement made by Lord Curzon in the House of Lords on the subject. The speech has been received with satisfaction and the Turkish Government have expressed pleasure that Lord Curzon took the Turkish view of the matter and that they are relieved that His Majesty's Government propose to refer the subject of agreement between France and the Ottoman Public Debt Administration to arbitration. I have spoken on this subject to my colleagues the French and Italian High Commissioners, who have informed their Governments which His Majesty's Government have taken the step of referring the matter to arbitration. They have expressed to me their appreciation of the consideration shown to the views of their Governments in the matter.

I have &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 1093/1093/44] No. 76

Mr. Lindsay to the Marquess of Crewe (Received March 28)

No. 156

His Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a report upon the visit of His Majesty's Ship "Iron Duke" to Samsun in November 1925.

Constantinople, February 18, 1926.

Enclosure in No. 76

Report by Admiral Brock to Mr. Lindsay

British Mission, Constantinople,
February 12, 1925.

Your Excellency,

In accordance with your request I have the honour to make the following observations and remarks on the visit to Samsun which I paid in the "Iron Duke" from November 11th to 13th inclusive.

2. As soon as the ship arrived at Samsun Turkish officials came on board with the request that I would land and pay a visit to the Vali. I should like in the first place to record the extreme courtesy and kindness shown to me by Mr. Maltass at Samsun and Mr. Robolly at Trebizond. Not only did both of them go out of their way to make my visit pleasant for me personally but their practical help was quite invaluable.

Without it I should have felt almost completely at sea in provincial Turkey, which I was visiting for the first time under conditions totally different from those of which I had had some experience in Constantinople before the war.

3. Both these gentlemen, who are of Italian (originally Austrian) and French nationality respectively, speak Turkish fluently, and make a point of being on the best possible terms with the Turkish officials and the Turks generally. At Trebizond, Mr. Robolly, who is married to an hospitable English-speaking lady from Smyrna, even goes so far as to keep open house for the Turks on Fridays and Sundays, when there is always a crowd of them playing bridge and passing conversation and refreshments. His Consulate unfortunately, to his intense regret, but has just acquired an expensive English garden in accordance with Turkish as well as European canons as the old one has not been, and probably never will be, conducive to an appreciation of Western harmonies. The outcome of it all is that these two gentlemen have the confidence of their position and their methods. Mr. Robolly and his colleagues of the Turkish Nationalist *Emprise*, are able to penetrate into the intimacy of the Turks in a way which would hardly be possible or fitting for His Majesty's Consul. At the same time they conceive themselves members of the Anglo-French Consulate rather than officials of the Ottoman Bank of the country and discuss the Turks with a frankness which is startling as it is pleasing to an Englishman. In any case a foreigner in a foreign land is better advised to know the people with whom they are in business and social relations every day of their lives.

4. We were by arrangement at Samsun 11 hours as to when it would be convenient to the Vali to receive my visit, but was informed that his Excellency could not attend at such short notice that day. The day after it became known that his health had indeed improved, I accordingly went to his private house to present my compliments and offer my friendship. After the usual delay signalled by numbers of coffees and cigarettes the Vali's secretary appeared and I was ushered into a whole regiment of *huissiers*. When the door was at last thrown open the Vali was just seen to disappear through a door at the other end of the room, which I followed with extreme politeness myself, and arrived in the centre of the floor to find a very large writing table between us. Coffees and cigarettes were then served while I returned the compliment of the Vali's secretary who had entered with me. As soon as the latter had departed with the tray of coffee cups, the Vali began to converse with me in French, which he speaks very well. I explained that I had been prevented from calling on him earlier by the fact that I had been in quarantine for the last 12 days, and that I had been unable to land before owing to the weather. He replied that he was sorry to hear that I had been ill, but that he had been in bed himself with influenza for the last 10 days. He then asked me how long I intended to stay in Samsun, and I replied that I hoped to leave the following day, as I had to be back at Constantinople by the 15th. He then said that he would like to show me round the town, and that he would send his motor car for me at 2 p.m. I thanked him and left.

5. Punctually at 2 p.m. the Vali's car arrived at the Consulate, and I was driven round the town for about an hour. The Vali explained the various points of interest to me, and I was impressed by the cleanliness of the streets and the general appearance of prosperity which the town presented. He told me that the population was 30,000, of which 5,000 were Greeks, 1,000 Armenians, and the rest Turks. He also told me that the Greeks had been given the option of remaining in Turkey or of emigrating to Greece, and that the majority had chosen to remain. He said that the Greeks were a peaceful and industrious people, and that he had no trouble with them. He also told me that the Armenians were a very small community, and that they were all engaged in trade. He said that he had no trouble with them either. He then asked me if I had any complaints to make about the way in which I had been treated, and I replied that I had none. He then said that he would like to show me round the town, and that he would send his motor car for me at 2 p.m. I thanked him and left.

6. During my visit I was told by the Vali that he had received information that Enver Bey was at Sinop, a small town on the north coast of Asia Minor, about 100 miles from Samsun. He said that he had received information that Enver Bey was at Sinop, a small town on the north coast of Asia Minor, about 100 miles from Samsun. He said that he had received information that Enver Bey was at Sinop, a small town on the north coast of Asia Minor, about 100 miles from Samsun.

7 Ma Bey [illegible] works of the Salonica-Vardar Railway was disposed for the first week [illegible] but at his house he would be was still keeping [illegible] and spoke [illegible] out [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

the consulate at Trebizond rather than transferring it to Samsoun at the present juncture. There is no question of there being any other consular establishment in the latter town, where even the Americans with their large interests closed down their consulate some months ago.

I have &c.
W. I. C. KNIGHT

No. 80

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. — *Received February 24.*

(No. 36.)
Telegraphic. *Constantinople, February 23, 1925.*

ATHENS telegram of 22nd February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs's speech said little that had not been said before, three main points being (1) that no intervention by foreign Powers could be admitted, (2) that Greece has requested answer from Turkey cannot admit competence of League in this purely internal question. Tone of speech was indeed vigorous and even uncompromising, and this may be due to declaration by Lord Curzon which aroused very reassuring effect on public opinion here.

Turkish delegate informed Chargé d'Affaires very many negotiations are still in progress here on basis of electing a Patriarch from amongst non-exchangeable Metropolitans, though he could not give precise details.

(Repeated to Athens No. 9.)

No. 81

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. — *(Received February 24.)*

(No. 37.)
Telegraphic. *Constantinople, February 23, 1925.*

MY despatch No. 134. Kurdish unrest.

According to telegrams from Angora movement is more serious than was at first represented.

Attempt on life of Ibrahim has led to resignation of Vali of Ghenj, 20 miles west of Mush. Sheikh Said is reported to have sent out two columns each consisting of 1,000 men to the two towns Piran. These columns are stated to have been attacked by Turkish forces sent to protect Drakhe, where they are at present besieged. Turkish reinforcements sent against rebels are expected to arrive on the scene of fighting.

Kurdish grievance is that Shaikh Said has proclaimed that he has divine mission to establish Muslim religious law (the Sheri) in Turkey. According to other reports he has set up a British and Greek affairs merely as sequel of Hekkari incident of last autumn.

Ismet Pasha who succeeded Fethi as Premier on the 20th instant is reported to have conferred on the situation with President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the Grand National Assembly and the Minister of the Interior. Last night (22nd) a Council of Ministers was held at which talk of proclaiming martial law.

(Repeated to Bagdad No. 12.)

No. 82

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. — *(Received February 25.)*

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 24, 1925.*

MY telegram No. 37.

In accordance with article 86 of Organic Statute martial law has been declared in all south-eastern vilayets, including Mardin, Hakkiari, Bitlis and Van as well as in two sanjaks of Vilayet of Erzerum.

(Addressed to Foreign Office, No. 40. Repeated to Bagdad No. 14.)

[E 779/498/44] No. 83

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

(No. 706.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, February 26, 1925.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 154 of the 12th January I transmit to you the accompanying copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's representative at Constantinople regarding the possibility of a joint appeal to the Council of the League of Nations in the matter of the non-Moslem minorities in Turkey, under article 44 of the Treaty of Lausanne. I shall be glad if your Lordship will take an early opportunity to discuss this matter with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and report his views on the whole question to me at an early date.

2. Pending an expression of the views of the French and Italian Governments in this matter His Majesty's Government are reluctant to take any final decision as to the policy which should be adopted. But on the whole, I am inclined, notwithstanding the arguments brought forward in Mr. Lindsay's despatch and in the enclosure therein, to question the desirability of bringing the matter before the Council at its next meeting.

3. The four principal counts of the proposed indictment against the Turkish Government are (1) the forced exodus of non-Moslems, mainly Armenians, from South Eastern Anatolia in 1923-24, (2) the enforcement of the Abandoned Property Laws as regards the property of Christian refugees and the exclusion from Turkey of non-Moslem Turkish subjects who have temporarily left that country by a construction of those two measures. Armenians and other non-Moslem Turkish subjects are both permanently excluded. Turkey is deprived of all their property in that country, (3) the forced dismissal of non-Moslem employés in Turkey, and other measures in railway, mine concession and agreement cases, (4) certain disabilities of Turkish subjects on account of their religion, and (5) general persecution against non-Moslem minorities on account of their religion and other matters.

4. Against all these counts the Turks can adduce a variety of more or less plausible explanations or excuses. It is well nigh impossible to make an overwhelming case against the Turks. Less than a second Armageddon could not bring about the complete overthrow of the Turkish Government which the non-Moslem minorities in Turkey desire. The fact appears to be that the Turks have now practically achieved their object, which is the elimination of all non-Turkish elements in Anatolia. The process of what they would call racial purification or simplification seems almost complete. Its effects however are at length beginning to make themselves felt. In these circumstances a gradual reversal of the policy appears more likely than an immediate change for the worse.

5. Should His Majesty's Government be right in anticipating such a gradual reversal of this policy, it appears that any publicity attendant on an appeal to the League or any pressure on the Turks in connection with their policy would probably have the effect of postponing any mitigation of the policy by arousing Turkish resentment and suspicion. A further question is whether the League, even if it succeeded in obtaining permission for a commission to visit the territories concerned could obtain any reparation for the wrongs of the past.

6. It seems to be all that remains are left of the Armenians and Greeks will begin to flatter and ask to Turkey since the fact that they are essential to the economic life of that country is becoming apparent. As that fact is realised their treatment may be expected to improve, and economic necessity may even induce the Turks to afford some compensation for past wrongs.

7. The Turkish policy of "racial purification" is largely a result of European interest in and intervention on behalf of the minorities, and it is open to question whether this interest and intervention has hitherto been anything but a curse rather than a benefit to the minorities concerned. Further intervention at the present moment when the bulk of the damage has been done seems unlikely to prove more effective than in the past either in helping those who have suffered or in protecting the few remaining potential victims. On the other hand it seems likely to reawaken all the suspicions of the Turks, and to confirm them in a policy which there is reason to hope they may be about to abandon.

8. Before however definitely abandoning a project of an appeal to the League, His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn the considered views of the French and Italian Governments on the whole question.

9 A similar despatch (No 252) has been addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome

I am, &c
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No 84

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received February 26.)

(No 41.)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople, February 25, 1925*

My telegram No. 36

Local authorities yesterday unexpectedly learned that Greek Legation had addressed a few days ago to the Exchange Sub-Commission to prepare passports of three Metropolitans. I hear from some source that at a meeting with all available members of Sub-Commission yesterday Mr Vlitter offered Somali bargain at Turkish Government's request, but after prolonged discussion Exchange Commission agreed that no Metropolitan could in Turkey be exchanged, and that election of these Patriarchal Synod has been given to think matter over, but I understand that M Fotiadis's views is that Greeks should wait for meeting of League of Nations, the hope that even if some delegation then accepted it will receive modified strength of Angora's disinterest. Outrage Turkish attitude is no doubt due to Kurdish rising.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 10.)

No 85

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received February 26.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople, February 25, 1925*

My telegram No. 40

Rebels are now reported to be in possession of Ataraput, Dartekran and Dersim.

(Repeated to Baghdad, No. 15.)

No 86

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received February 27.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople, February 27, 1925.*

My despatch No. 42

Khoja's statement reported in last paragraph of my despatch No. 40 to Baghdad, No. 16.)

No 87

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received February 27.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople, February 27, 1925*

I called on Nusret yesterday and asked what truth there was in the press and even in official statements that the relief was withheld by British agency. He did not know what the press statements complained of, but he would refer to the Minister of Interior's statement that Turkish relief to British subjects only the amounts and terms were settled with absolute disagreement and refusal to have recourse to Western authorities began to master the insurrection they would doubtless get restitution of tax statement from interrogations of prisoners.

Nusret thanked me for the statement, and said that he personally had not believed the reports of British instigation and did not think the Turkish Government credited them.

No 88.

Sir W Chetham to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received March 1,)

(No 51
(Telegraphic) *Athens, March 1, 1925*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No 41

I have similar information from official source, that Greeks apparently knew nothing about exhibition at Patriarch should be restricted to technically exchangable persons. I learn however that Turkish authorities have now demanded that Greek Government should withdraw their appeal to the League of Nations and that negotiations have consequently broken down. It is supposed that they were merely intended to gain time to estimate strength of Kurdish movement.

Disappointment here is marked as Greeks hoped that Turkish behaviour would be suppressed by commission and some international guarantee. It is also noted that Constantinople Greeks were anxious to save bad bargain in spite of fact that it did not ensure permanence of patriarchal institution as opposed to immediate destruction. If that they would have been only too content to trust to the future.

No 89

Memorandum respecting Greek Metropolitans and Turkish Minority in Western Thrace

At the 31st session of the Council of the League of Nations on the 31st October, 1924 when a dispute in regard to the interpretation of the Exchange of Populations Convention was being discussed, the Greek delegate made allegations regarding the maltreatment of the Greek Minority in Constantinople which the Turkish delegate denied, basing himself on the treatment of the Turkish population in Western Thrace. He also stated that his Government would welcome any inquiry by the League of Nations into the treatment of these two Minorities. The Resolution which was passed by the Council on the subject contained the following reference to the Greek Minority in Constantinople and the Turkish Minority in Western Thrace:—

> As to the question of the treatment of Minorities, the Council has taken note of the statements that the two parties agree to an inquiry being undertaken, if necessary, by a Committee of the League as to the position of the Minority of Greek race in Constantinople and the Minority of Turkish race in Western Thrace.
>
> "But the treatment of these Minorities has only been brought before the Council as an incident, and the Council cannot hastily take a decision on a matter of such importance without a knowledge of the facts.
>
> "They would therefore ask the representatives of the two Governments to send to the Secretary-General a full statement to enable them to consider the question at their next session in December next.

The allegations made by the Greek delegate on this occasion were that the Turkish Government were preventing the return of Ottoman subjects of Greek extraction to Constantinople contrary to the Minorities clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne, were confiscating the property of those who were pursuing their studies in Greece, and were persecuting those still in that country. The allegations brought by the Turkish delegate as regards the treatment of Moslems in Western Thrace were that the Moslem refugees from Anatolia and Eastern Thrace and that these Moslems had been subjected to grave ill-treatment.

The treatment to be accorded by Greece to the Moslem Minority in Western Thrace is laid down in the following instruments :—

1 The Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria (the 27th November 1919), of which ARTICLE 49 reads as follows :—

"Greece accepts and agrees to embody in a treaty with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by these Powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of that State who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion."

2 The treaty to which reference was made in the above article was signed at Sèvres on the 10th August 1920, and ratified by certain of the signatories together with the Treaty of Lausanne at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923. While the latter peace conference, based on principles similar to those of the Greek treaty, secured adequate safeguards for the Moslem minority in Turkey, it left the other Greek obligations with regard to Western Thrace practically where they were under the Sèvres Treaty. The relevant articles of the latter treaty (Section III) read as follows :—

"ARTICLE 11

"Within a period of six months from the coming into force of the present treaty, Greece undertakes to introduce any modifications necessary in her existing legislation in order to ensure to the inhabitants of Greece under the Turkish Government, who become nationals of Greece under the terms of Article 14 of the Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923, the same rights as are enjoyed by Greek nationals in fact and in law, including the right to establish, manage and control at their own expense charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.

"In accordance with Article 39 of the Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923, Greece undertakes not to introduce any measure which will restrict the free exercise by any person under the jurisdiction of Greece, irrespective of race, language or religion, of any trade, profession or industry on the ground of the conditions governing the grant or exercise of any licence, permit or authorisation, or the keeping open of any establishment, except in so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of public order and public health.

"Greece undertakes that all persons under the jurisdiction of Greece shall be entitled to have recourse, either personally or through an agent, to the courts of justice in Greece for the protection of their rights, without any distinction as to race, language or religion, and irrespective of their political or other status, and that they shall enjoy before the said courts equality of treatment with Greek nationals. In particular, Greece undertakes that the differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Greek national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

"No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Greek national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

"Notwithstanding any establishment by Greece of an official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Greek nationals of non-Greek speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts."

3 On the 10th July, 1923, a Protocol to the Treaty of Lausanne of that year was signed by the present Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Politis, on behalf of Greece, and by Ismet Pasha, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, on behalf of Turkey. Under the terms of this Protocol the Greek Government undertook to grant to the Moslem minority in Western Thrace the same rights as were granted to the Moslem minority in Turkey under the Lausanne Treaty, and the Turkish Government undertook to grant to the Greek minority in Turkey the same rights as were granted to the Moslem minority in Western Thrace under the Greek Treaty. The Protocol further provided that the Mixed Tribunal set up under the Treaty of Sèvres should be maintained in Western Thrace for the settlement of disputes between Moslems and Greeks, and that the Greek Government should pay to the Turkish Government the sum of £T.500,000 in respect of Moslem property in Western Thrace which had been sold by the Greek Government before the signature of the Lausanne Treaty.

4 Article 14 of the Treaty of Lausanne reads as follows :—

"The rights conferred by the provisions of the present section on the non-Moslem Minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem Minority in that country."

The treatment to be accorded to *non-Moslem Minorities in Turkish territory* forms the subject of articles 37 to 44 inclusive of the Treaty of Lausanne. Article 44 contains the same provisions as article 16 of the Treaty of Sèvres with Greece, which is quoted above *in extenso*.

The Greek inhabitants of Constantinople and the Turkish inhabitants of Western Thrace were excepted from compulsory exchange by the following article of the Exchange of Populations Convention :—

"ARTICLE 2

"The following persons shall not be considered as exchangeable under the provisions of Article 1 :—

"(a) The Greek inhabitants of Constantinople.
"(b) The Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace.

"All Greeks who were already established before the 30th October, 1918, within the area comprising the prefecture of the city of Constantinople, as defined by the Law of 1912, shall be considered as Greek inhabitants of Constantinople.

"All Moslems established in the region to the east of the frontier as laid down in the Treaty of Lausanne shall be considered as Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace."

On the 8th November 1924 the Greek Government forwarded a memorandum to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, in which they stated that :—

1 Reasons which had arisen in Turkish Thrace prevented the immediate exchange of populations foreseen in the Treaty of Lausanne. This necessity was accentuated by the fact that the Moslem population of Western Thrace, which in 1922 had driven the Greek forces from Eastern Thrace, consequently the refugees from that province had to be accommodated in short notice, the influx of the large number of refugees from Asia Minor which had to be settled on the lands of Greek Thrace. The Greek authorities were obliged to settle refugees in Western Thrace. As it was necessary to leave these refugees there for a time, it was necessary to regulate all matters relating to their support thereafter. Western Thrace was not included in the same way as the rest of Greece, and the refugees on the land settled or formerly settled there, even if they left the land, were not free to sell it. Refugees have not been allowed to leave Western Thrace, but as the Moslem population has been free to dispose of its property in Western Thrace and to emigrate, the Greek Government has been obliged to allow Greek refugees to settle on the vacated lands and houses. Moslems have emigrated from Western Thrace since the signature of the Lausanne Treaty, and the Greek Government has been obliged to allow Greek refugees to settle on the vacated lands and houses. Moslems have emigrated from Western Thrace since the signature of the Lausanne Treaty, and the Greek Government has been obliged to allow Greek refugees to settle on the vacated lands and houses.

2 By the Convention of Lausanne of July 24, 1923, the Greek Government undertook to grant to the Moslem minority in Western Thrace the same rights as were granted to the Moslem minority in Turkey under the Lausanne Treaty. The Greek Government has therefore undertaken to grant to the Moslem minority in Western Thrace the same rights as were granted to the Moslem minority in Turkey under the Lausanne Treaty. The Greek Government has therefore undertaken to grant to the Moslem minority in Western Thrace the same rights as were granted to the Moslem minority in Turkey under the Lausanne Treaty.

3 A further difficulty encountered by the Greek Government was that the Exchange of Populations Convention was signed on the 30th August, 1923, whilst the Lausanne Treaty was signed on the 24th July, 1923. Between the 30th August, 1923, and the 30th August, 1924, when the Exchange of

P[o]pulations began almost a year before that date, with the result that the Greek Government could take no proper measures as regards the[ir] tenure in Western Thrace until nearly a quarter of a century after the entry into force of that convention.

However they have endeavoured to solve the problem of the acquisition of large Turkish estates by means of direct negotiations with Turkey and offered to acquire these lands in exchange for compensation by means of commissions, which the Turkish Government would be prepared to accept, but the latter would not agree to the arrangements proposed.

The Greek contention is that whereas the Turkish Government are applying and propose to apply repressive measures to the Greek Minority at Constantinople and to drive them out of Eastern Thrace, which rose before the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, there is nothing whatever to show that they have not remained entirely unmolested and unmolested in Constantinople for many years and are not always ready to return to their homes, whilst the Greeks in Constantinople for Greeks in Constantinople, owing to the difficulties they experience in obtaining passports, which when granted are frequently stated to be withheld from return.

In August 1924 a decree was stated to have been published by the Turkish Government for the sale by auction of the property left by the Greeks of Turkish refugees from Greece. The Turkish Government are also alleged not to recognise the claims of Greek citizens for the arrangement of their property in Constantinople and property cannot apply to be sold in areas in which Greek refugees from Turkish Government officials and Greek owners are stated to be in the process of settlement. As regards schools the Turkish Government are alleged to have closed every possible Greek school, and have compelled the Greek professors and their staff to leave. Greek teachers are forbidden to give instruction in the Greek language and parents are threatened with fines if they send their children to the Greek schools. It is stated that they are prevented from buying land and that the result of the Greek Government's efforts to settle refugees in Western Thrace has been that the Turkish Government have settled Moslem refugees in districts near the Western Thrace frontier, and have also settled Moslem refugees in districts near the Western Thrace frontier, and have also settled Moslem refugees in districts near the Western Thrace frontier, and have also

hand to Nusret Bey personally, but separately, a note conveying the intentions of our Governments. I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the note which I propose to present on Tuesday next to Your Excellency's colleague.

I have &c.
(signed) R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 90.

Mr. Lindsay to Nusret Bey.

Constantinople, February 19, 1920.

M. le Délégué,

J'AI l'honneur de Mr. Austen Chamberlain m'a fait connaître la teneur de la note que vous lui avez remise le 12 courant, et dont j'ai transmis une copie à mon Gouvernement.

Je suis chargé par Sa Majesté le Roi et Son Gouvernement d'attirer l'attention de Votre Excellence sur le fait que la présence d'un Délégué Ottoman à Londres, pour y traiter directement avec le Gouvernement Britannique, est incompatible avec la position de la Grande-Bretagne en Turquie, qui est celle d'une Puissance Alliée ayant conquis le pays par les armes, et qui y maintient un Ambassadeur.

Cette mesure a été prise à Constantinople même. Toutefois, si nous nous sommes abstenus à Angora d'une démarche analogue, c'est uniquement parce que nous n'avions pas jugé nécessaire de prendre une initiative qui aurait pu être considérée comme inamicale.

Si l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté auprès du Gouvernement Turc actuellement à Angora était rappelé, il ne serait pas remplacé, et les fonctions de son poste seraient exercées par un Chargé d'Affaires.

J'ai l'honneur d'observer que l'existence d'une mission Ottomane à Londres, dont le chef aurait le rang d'Ambassadeur, précéderait à la connaissance du Gouvernement Britannique.

Veuillez agréer &c.
(signed) R. C. LINDSAY.

E 1243/544/44] No. 91

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. Received March 2.

(No. 53.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 21, 1920.*

YOU will doubtless have noted the hesitation which the commercial section has displayed, as compared with Departments of Overseas Trade during the past year, in the matter of Turkish claims for damages and contracts with enemy firms.

2. There are some who hold that a start to Allied troops at Constantinople—apart from the case of Anatolia for a moment—would facilitate the commercial penetration of the country by nationals, which it is hoped all Allied peoples after the war, as they have taken part in the struggle. Every step to Anglicise Constantinople and the Turkish business world, though this is admittedly not a function of the commercial Attaché, is considered by others to be of importance to their Allied colleagues—for instance, the opening of German-owned shops, and the sale of German-owned goods, which are now in the hands of Turkish subjects. Some of those acting as intermediaries for the sale of enemy goods are considered by competitors to be unscrupulous, and to have made large profits. Many of the Turks who traded with Germany before the war have, it is said, made large profits during the war, and are now in a position to buy German goods at a low price. The question of the sale of German goods is one which will require careful consideration when the Peace Treaty is signed, and it is hoped that the Turkish Government will be prepared to take steps to prevent the sale of German goods in Turkey, and to see that the proceeds of such sales are handed over to the Allied Governments.

3. No doubt the European war and the post-war economic situation are chiefly responsible for this state of things. During the war Germany dominated Turkish economic life, and the conquest of Serbia and Roumania gave her a large share of the trade of those countries. Her agents and travellers are still said to be receiving, if not actually refused admittance, by many countries with which she traded before the war. To those markets which are still accessible to her she has since the armistice manufactured goods, especially machinery, to export at prices owing to smaller overhead and other costs are at present lower than English, French or American competitors. Germans know this market well. They have been studying the wants of the people during the war, and have had time to produce articles to suit Turkish tastes. They have also had plenty of time to get thoroughly acquainted with the Turkish language, which is frequently used in their correspondence with Turkish firms. In the case of Government contracts, credit facilities are granted, although German manufacturers generally require cash against documents. There are, of course, other causes, such as the depreciation of the mark, which have contributed to the present state of affairs. Not only has Germany been able to export at prices which are difficult to meet, but she has also been able to import at a low rate of exchange. Before the war Turkish importers had to pay for their goods in gold, or its equivalent, but now they can buy German marks at a low rate of exchange, and pay for their goods in depreciated German currency. Many Turks are said to be making large profits by this means. Another factor which has contributed to the present state of affairs is the fact that Turkish importers have been unable to obtain goods from England, France, Belgium, Italy, and America owing to the high prices and the scarcity of tonnage. Many

[illegible] government [illegible] material resources [illegible] to [illegible] war. But, as [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] Turkish [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] No. 27

Press Summary, January 1 to 20

[illegible] A.M., dated [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] press [illegible] current [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

[E 1231 1231 44] No. 93

Mr. Lampson to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (Received March 2)

(No. 17)
Sir *Constantinople, February 26, 1925*

With reference to Mr. Consul-General Peck's despatch No. 1 of the 6th August regarding the interruption of the Trade Agreement negotiations between Persia and Bulgaria, I have the honour to report that I have had a conversation with Aleko Pasha Vaptzaroff, the Bulgarian Minister at this Court.

2. He had asked to see me to-day, and began by saying that the question of the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty of Friendship between Persia and Bulgaria, which had been signed at Constantinople on the 6th June, 1924, had been delayed by the Persian Government's request for the insertion of a clause providing for the settlement by arbitration of disputes arising out of the Treaty. The Persian Government had, however, now withdrawn this request, and the Bulgarian Government had instructed him to inform me that they were prepared to proceed with the exchange of ratifications.

3. He had also asked to see me in order to inform me that, in view of the fact that the Bulgarian Government had now ratified the Treaty of Friendship between Bulgaria and Persia, they were prepared to proceed with the negotiations for a Trade Agreement between the two countries. He had, therefore, been instructed to propose that these negotiations should be resumed at Constantinople, and that the Bulgarian Government would be represented at them by M. Ivan Stoyanovitch, Director of Commercial Affairs in the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, who had been appointed Bulgarian Commercial Agent at Teheran.

4. I informed M. Vaptzaroff that I would report his communication to His Majesty's Government, and that I would inform him of their decision as soon as I received their instructions.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador)
R. C. LAMPSON

No. 94

Mr. Wyndham Deedes to Austen Chamberlain (Received March 23)

No. 58 Political
(Egypt No. 1) *Port Said, March 19, 1925*

Lord Lloyd's speech at the Conference of Egyptologists on the night of March 16th, which was reported in the Arabic press, was not of a character to arouse any serious apprehension, but it was considered by many Egyptians to be unfortunate in its timing, coming as it did on the eve of the Egyptian Parliamentary elections.

2. Lord Lloyd's speech was, however, interpreted by the Egyptian Nationalist Party as a deliberate attempt to influence the elections in favour of the Liberal Constitutionalists, and the Nationalist Party Press has been unsparing in its criticisms of Lord Lloyd's speech and of his action in delivering it.

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No. 96

Mr. Lampson to Austen Chamberlain (Received March 23)

No. 49)
(Egypt No. 1) *Constantinople, March 2, 1925*

Your Reference No. 45

I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government's request that the Persian Government should withdraw their proposal for the insertion of a clause providing for the settlement by arbitration of disputes arising out of the Treaty of Friendship between Persia and Bulgaria was communicated to the Persian Government by the Bulgarian Minister at Teheran on the 20th February.

2. The Persian Government have now withdrawn their proposal, and the Bulgarian Minister has informed me that his Government are prepared to proceed with the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador)
R. C. LAMPSON

No. 97

Mr. Lampson to Austen Chamberlain (Received March 5)

No. 31
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople, March 5, 1925*

With reference to your telegram No. 16 (Egypt No. 1) of the 3rd March, I have the honour to report that I have had a conversation with Aleko Pasha Vaptzaroff, the Bulgarian Minister at this Court.

2. He had asked to see me to-day, and began by saying that the question of the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty of Friendship between Persia and Bulgaria, which had been signed at Constantinople on the 6th June, 1924, had been delayed by the Persian Government's request for the insertion of a clause providing for the settlement by arbitration of disputes arising out of the Treaty. The Persian Government had, however, now withdrawn this request, and the Bulgarian Government had instructed him to inform me that they were prepared to proceed with the exchange of ratifications.

3. He had also asked to see me in order to inform me that, in view of the fact that the Bulgarian Government had now ratified the Treaty of Friendship between Bulgaria and Persia, they were prepared to proceed with the negotiations for a Trade Agreement between the two countries. He had, therefore, been instructed to propose that these negotiations should be resumed at Constantinople, and that the Bulgarian Government would be represented at them by M. Ivan Stoyanovitch, Director of Commercial Affairs in the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, who had been appointed Bulgarian Commercial Agent at Teheran.

4. I informed M. Vaptzaroff that I would report his communication to His Majesty's Government, and that I would inform him of their decision as soon as I received their instructions.

(Repeated to Athens No. 11)

No. 98

Mr. Lindsay to Austen Chamberlain (Received March 5)

(No. 62)
(Geographical) *Constantinople, March 5, 1925*

PRIME Minister yesterday after prolonged period of waiting at which President of the Republic was present took an active part. Question was the

extend to our parts of Thrace Expressions to the like effect in treaties between Great Britain and Persia

No 99

Constantinople Sir G Buchanan (Received March 5)

(No 1)
Cipher
FOREIGN Office March 4 1925

Your telegram No 1 Saving Syria or suppression of Armenian massacres French proposal Egypt Italian Dodecanese Spain Tangier Hedjaz

Sir G Buchanan (Athens) informed

E 1388 498 44

No 100

Mr Lindsay Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received March 5)

(No 1)
Secret

Constantinople March 1 1925

With reference to Sir G Buchanan's telegram No 1 Secret of February 27 I have the honour to report that I have had a long conversation with the Vali of Constantinople in the course of which I pointed out to him the advantage which would accrue to the Turkish Government from the settlement of the Mosul question and the establishment of friendly relations with Great Britain I said that I had been informed that the Turkish Government were prepared to enter into negotiations with His Majesty's Government for the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and that I was anxious to know whether there was any truth in this report

The Vali replied that he was not in a position to say what the intentions of the Turkish Government were in this matter but that he would be glad to give me his personal opinion He was convinced that the Turkish Government would be prepared to enter into negotiations with His Majesty's Government for the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and that they would be willing to make considerable concessions in order to obtain the settlement of the Mosul question He thought that the Turkish Government would be prepared to recognise the British mandate over Mesopotamia and to enter into a treaty of alliance with Great Britain

I have &c
R LINDSAY

E [illegible] No 62

[illegible] to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received March 5, 1925)

(No 1) Telegraphic [illegible] Constantinople

[illegible] Mosul [illegible] Turkish [illegible] Constantinople

[illegible] Mosul [illegible] Constantinople [illegible]

E 1392 55 44

No 101

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received March [illegible])

No 174

Sir

Constantinople March [illegible] 1925

In my telegram No 1 Saving of the 1st instant I reported that I had had a conversation with the Vali of Constantinople in the course of which I pointed out to him the advantage which would accrue to the Turkish Government from the settlement of the Mosul question and the establishment of friendly relations with Great Britain I said that I had been informed that the Turkish Government were prepared to enter into negotiations with His Majesty's Government for the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and that I was anxious to know whether there was any truth in this report

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I have &c
R LINDSAY

[illegible] Telegram No. 6 [illegible] February [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

exile to Beirut at present forward by the Kurds as the leader of the movement or even as a prospective King of Kurdistan. Another cause of the insurrection mentioned frequently is the determination of the general staff to administrative changes by the change of system which the Nationalist government has introduced including valuable railways which they have opened up and East Anatolia has become a separate province the Valiat of which receives his orders direct from Angora. The excessive taxation which has produced causes adequate to the new type of vali is said to be responsible for the efficient and impartial manner in which he is governing the population from the Black Sea coast inland.

4. In the report of the first action the Government should proceed with the proclamation of martial law was to introduce into the Assembly new draft articles of law to treason. It would have by-elections. They would also pass a bill granting amnesty for all but twenty persons who would remain exiled for life. Active measures have also been taken to kill the possible successful rebellion amongst preachers in the mosques against the Government by instructing local religious leaders to preach in favour of the Government and some well known Ulemas have been sent to Angora and Smyrna for this purpose.

5. Reports from anywhere. Yesterday's press reports from Angora that a public meeting was held at Erzerum to discuss the Kurdish rebellion with the result that a telegram was sent to the Assembly stating that the Assembly would be called upon to pass a bill for the punishment of traitors and that the Assembly would be prepared to support the Government in the measures they would take to suppress the rebellion. It is also stated that the papers will be prohibited from publishing any news of the rebellion.

6. It is feared that the Kurdish attempt to overthrow the Government by force of arms will be successful. In spite of the desperate efforts that were made by the Government to suppress the rebellion the Kurds have succeeded in occupying the greater part of the Diarbekir vilayet and have established themselves in the Mardin sanjak. Their numbers are estimated at 15,000 men. The Government has sent large forces against them but the Kurds are said to be well armed and to have a large supply of ammunition. The Government has also sent aeroplanes to bomb the Kurdish villages but this has had little effect as the Kurds are said to have taken to the hills. The Government has also sent a force of 5,000 men to Mardin but it is doubtful whether they will be able to relieve the garrison there which is said to be in a desperate condition. The Kurds have also attacked the town of Bitlis and have succeeded in occupying the surrounding villages. The Government has also sent a force of 5,000 men to Bitlis but it is doubtful whether they will be able to relieve the garrison there which is said to be in a desperate condition. The Kurds have also attacked the town of Bitlis and have succeeded in occupying the surrounding villages. The Government has also sent a force of 5,000 men to Bitlis but it is doubtful whether they will be able to relieve the garrison there which is said to be in a desperate condition.

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accordingly handed in his resignation. This morning it is reported that Ismet Pasha has resumed the Premiership and it is supposed that he is prepared to carry the policy of repression with much more vigour than Ghazi Anwish

I have &
R. C. LINDSAY

Enclosure 1 in No. 103

Sir, *Constantinople March 4, 1925*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have received a letter from the Vali of Smyrna in which he gives the following account of the recent disturbances in that province:

1. On the 3rd instant the Vali received a telegram from the General Staff ordering the Third Corps in Constantinople to move to Smyrna.

2. Upon receipt of this telegram the Vali summoned a meeting of the local authorities and the leaders of the Opposition party, at which he informed them that he had received orders to proceed to Smyrna and that he intended to take with him a force of 150 men. He then asked them to give him their opinion as to whether the presence of this force was necessary in order to maintain order in the city. The meeting unanimously replied that the presence of troops was not necessary, and that the Vali should proceed to Smyrna without any escort.

3. The Vali then left for Smyrna with a small escort. On his arrival at the station he was met by a large crowd of people, including the leaders of the Opposition party, who had come to welcome him. The Vali then proceeded to the Konak, where he was received by the Governor and other officials. He then proceeded to the Konak, where he was received by the Governor and other officials. He then proceeded to the Konak, where he was received by the Governor and other officials.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 109

News Summary of the Press respecting the Army Revolt

February 23

General view of the news was that the revolt was thought to be a matter of negotiation between the Government and the rebels, and that a settlement was confidently expected.

Some anxiety was felt as to what Pekris's hurried return to Angora might signify, but the general view was optimistic.

February 24

Papers with the exception of the *Daily Telegraph* now refer to the situation with reference to the Articles of Mush, Aghlaka, Dersim, Dortyar, Mureh, Sert, Siverek, Surt, Bitlis, Van, and Bassorah. It is stated by the latter that Chaldean and Christian refugees have arrived in Bassorah.

It is stated that Sheikh Said has now declared himself openly to be against the Government. He has issued a proclamation to this effect, which is said to be full of violent threats against the Government.

February 25

A Cabinet meeting was held this morning at which the situation was discussed, after which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald made a statement to the effect that the Government had every confidence in the ability of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Walter Nicholl, to deal with the situation, and that Sultan Ahmed Mukhtar Pasha had not been recalled, as reported, to assume command of the operations against the rebels. It was stated that Turkish forces had already succeeded in driving the rebels from Diarbekir, and that the Government forces were now engaged in clearing the country to the north of that town. It was also stated that Sheikh Said's manifesto had been found to be a forgery.

The *Daily Telegraph* Paris correspondent says that the Government's decision to send Sir Walter Nicholl to Angora is regarded in Paris as a sign that Great Britain is determined to support Turkey in the present crisis.

February 26

Yesterday's newspapers contained reports of fighting between Kurdish rebels and Turkish troops in the neighbourhood of Diarbekir, Mardin, Urfa, Bitlis, Van, Mush, Aghlaka, Dersim, Mamakhatun, Dortyar, Mureh, Sert, Siverek, Surt, Bitlis, Van, and Bassorah. It is stated by the latter that Chaldean and Christian refugees have arrived in Bassorah.

It is stated that Sheikh Said has now declared himself openly to be against the Government. He has issued a proclamation to this effect, which is said to be full of violent threats against the Government.

February 27

Anti-British agency telegrams report that it is not true that Khartum was occupied by the rebels, but that Mustafa Aghlaka and Dr. Besim had taken part in the attack.

Jane Dieulafoy states that the Government forces will get into touch with the rebels at the beginning of March, and that in a fortnight the movement will be suppressed.

The Assembly sent a telegram to Fevzi Mehmed Bey, who, after a fight at the Volturgu, sent the poor Kurds of Khartum and drove out the rebels. This telegram offered a message of gratitude to the last effort to an Independent was not accepted by the organisation of the Republican Party. The papers say that he will be appointed to the stands again. A good deal of notice given to this is all the reports to point that the real fact that Turkey is really united when it comes to foreign affairs from outside.

February 28

The reports from Angora were encouraging. The general satisfaction was expressed in all the papers as to the evidence that there was no intention on the part of the Government of taking any drastic measures in Cornwall.

The Times, on the authority of an Angora correspondent, stated that the 1894-1902 Lassoo had succeeded to the extent that only three Kurds had been executed for the murder of Armenians.

Most papers expressed relief that the revolt was not spreading. They continue to attribute the foreign intervention to the fact that Turkey is the only country that means will be found to put its finances straight.

March

Opinion still seems to be divided. Reports of differences of opinion are denied, and all the papers express confidence in the stability of the Government.

A vote of confidence in the people against the Government was passed by £20,000,000 was allocated to meet expenses of partial mobilisation.

It was reported that the Government had agreed to the transport of troops on their way to the Bolshevik Armenian frontier, but that the rebels seized the railway at Kharput.

March 2

Papers report that severe fighting is in progress. Fighting between Government troops and rebels is reported to be going on in the neighbourhood of Diarbekir, Mardin, Urfa, Bitlis, Van, Mush, Aghlaka, Dersim, Mamakhatun, Dortyar, Mureh, Sert, Siverek, Surt, Bitlis, Van, and Bassorah. It is stated by the latter that Chaldean and Christian refugees have arrived in Bassorah.

March 3

Reports of fighting between the Republican and rebel forces. Some papers say that Kharput, Diarbekir, Dersim, Mardin, and Sert are reported to be cleared of the rebels, but others say that the rebels are still in possession.

Yesterday's Times correspondent forecasts that the Government forces will reach the rebel area at the end of March.

Enclosure 3 in No. 103.

Record of Conversation with Green, Sheikh Vali Pasha on March 3, 1925

I CALLED at the appointment to-day and told him that Air Vice Marshal Sir Sefton Brancker was on his way to England and that I proposed to go to Konia on the 5th or 6th when I was going to Constantinople.

As we passed briefly talk I did not like to start on the subject but suggested that it was better to wait a bit before leaving the Levant after the end of the Angora Conference as far from being a case of 100 disputed points as I had been led to believe, but only a suggestion that it was one of those but 5000 were left who were not to be settled. Government.

I suggested that it would be difficult to get the Turkish Government to agree with 100 grounds to which he replied that they were not grounds but were well and fighting and amongst them were a property of regular army officers, soldiers and for those grounds of hope to feel with them there were not any troops in that area as those but were there were not known to be engaged. He continued with the Armistice and Lausanne with whom we could but we are ready to start as soon as the snow clears we can get to other than the streets out from the north.

He said that he personally knew nothing of the country or the people but his chief staff officers and secretaries were very energetic they would be fighting it out to the death, which I took on account of the lack of communications and the nature of the terrain. He thought that if the present rebellion could be suppressed to its present area it would soon be found out that regular operations were undertaken

gainst the Kurds generally it was felt impossible that it would start a massacre of the Kurds.

Lieutenant-Colonel Vesse Bey has arrived at the spot. I trust I may get further news as soon as possible when there are two or three together there was no information forthcoming.

Comments

The information such as it is appears to have been derived from a French source. The concession was the subject of a Franco-Turkish agreement in 1924. It is clear that the general has given no evidence either way. It is also clear that there is something to conceal from the world. The statement of the Council of Minister that the massacres are all a fabrication is inconsistent with the statement that they are only rumours requiring confirmation.

The fact that foreign correspondents neither deny nor confirm the massacres of Kurds they are not permitted to go to is also significant.

Enclosure to No. 103

Intercepted telegram from Troop Commander in the Eastern Light

ACCORDING to information received from Erzinjan the Turkish General Staff were today issuing orders to Army Corps which will be sent by train to Erzurum. Details of Army Corps which will be sent are not known but it is believed that the 3rd Army Corps will be sent to Diarbekir.

Object of move is said to be to put down the Kurdish movement in the Diarbekir and Van districts of Eastern Anatolia.

Arrangements have been made for the transport of the Army Corps from the Black Sea ports to Erzurum by the Erzurum-Erzinjan railway.

Information received from Erzurum to the effect that Army Corps will be sent by train to Erzurum.

2. Army Corps were to have arrived at Erzurum by the 25th September but owing to delays on the railway it was considered that they had no chance of arriving in time.

3. Last two days previous to receipt of this message to the town were reported to be occupied by troops under orders to proceed to the front. The concentration of the troops was said to be large extent, and there were about 500 waggons of stores. The troops and waggons were said to be the contingent from Erzurum which was to proceed to Mersina where it was to be shipped to Diarbekir. Mersina where it was to be shipped to Diarbekir.

As far as is known there had been no movement of troop trains or stores from Erzurum.

4. Information received from Erzurum to the effect that Kaisheri and two between the strength of 15th Army Corps consisted of twenty-seven battalions with machine guns and two mountain batteries. Artillery consisted of six batteries of 75 mm. guns. There were no guns of other calibres nor did he see any machine guns.

Comments

Assuming twenty rifles per waggon for stores this would give 1,000 men per train. If these troops belong to the 15th Division for Angora and the 23rd Division from Ismid the strength of a division is 1,000 men.

Concentration of the 3rd Army Corps unless for internal security purposes has no significance in that area.

[E 1378 498 44] No. 104

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. (*Received March 6*)

(No. 389.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from M. Herriot respecting an Anglo-American mandate for Turkey.

Paris, March 5, 1925.

Enclosure to No. 104

Note communicated by M. Herriot

[illegible] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères a l'honneur de faire connaître à l'Ambassade [illegible] que le Gouvernement [illegible] ne voit pas [illegible] d'objection à ce que le Gouvernement [illegible] suggère à celui des États-Unis [illegible] pour une mission [illegible] auprès de la Turquie. [illegible] Français estime [illegible] qu'il serait [illegible] opportun [illegible] d'attendre [illegible] que la question [illegible] de Mossoul [illegible] soit réglée [illegible] définitivement [illegible] avant de [illegible] prendre [illegible] une initiative [illegible] de ce genre [illegible].

[illegible] tient [illegible] à exprimer [illegible] à nouveau [illegible] son désir [illegible] de voir [illegible] le Gouvernement [illegible] des États-Unis [illegible] participer [illegible] à la [illegible] Conférence [illegible] de Lausanne [illegible] et [illegible] il [illegible] espère [illegible] que [illegible] cette [illegible] participation [illegible] pourra [illegible] être [illegible] réalisée [illegible].

[illegible] Ministère [illegible] saisit [illegible] cette [illegible] occasion [illegible] pour [illegible] renouveler [illegible] à l'Ambassade [illegible] des États-Unis [illegible] l'assurance [illegible] de sa [illegible] haute [illegible] considération.

[illegible]

Paris, [illegible] 1925.

E 1426 544 44 No. 105

Lord D'Abernon to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. (*Received March 10*)

(No. 166.)

Sir, *Berlin, March 9, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to Mr. Lindsay's despatch No. 153 of the 27th February regarding the presence of Turkish vessels in German waters.

So far as the matter can be judged from Berlin I have had no doubt that Mr. Lindsay's statement that the affair was not serious is correct. His report was received here with relief, and the subject is now dead.

It may be of interest to point out that the Turkish representative here, General Kemal-Edin Sami Pasha, was suddenly recalled to Turkey three days ago, and it is said, but on the surface of it incredible, that the purpose of his alleged taking command of the Turkish troops against the Kurds in Kurdistan.

Sami Pasha is quite a remarkable study. He came here with a high reputation for energy, courtly and stylish as a female during the early days of his mission, a fine speech so evident that the German Government had to remind him that Germany was a democratic country and would not tolerate any abuse of diplomatic privilege.

I began therefore with a strong prejudice against Sami Pasha but I must confess that personally he is a very agreeable character. He is extremely popular in Berlin. He is characteristically a brave soldier who by his own statement—has

been wounded innumerable times and has shown conspicuous bravery on many occasions. He is most certain not only because Germany is the only great European country of which Turkey is not afraid. England and France are mainly for political and other reasons represented by merely instruments of power. With German industrials there is no political bargain in the background. Should Ismet Pasha accede a great deal of business in mining and industrial institutions and existing factories. What his particular purpose in this was on Turkish principle of reciprocity may be I could not say but he is reported to have given extensive orders for war material from Germany. This however is somewhat rather than ascertained fact.

Sarre Pasha views the future of Asia Minor now that it has been cleared of Greeks and Armenians with the most optimistic and appears to underrate the grave disadvantage from the commercial point of view which the absence of these trading elements and creates. He is convinced that Turkey will enjoy at one and the same time the enormous advantages of a centralized Asiatic State and the solid advantages of prosperous distributive elements. It has poignant theories about the possibilities of development which a country has been treated to [illegible] of Christian domination.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have &c.
DAB[illegible]RON

No. 106

Sir R. Graham (Constantinople) Report that [illegible] and Refer to Mr. Clerk's No. [illegible]

(No. 85)
Telegraphic [illegible] R. March 10, 1925.
[illegible]

Your despatch No. 220
[illegible] Government [illegible] British view that [illegible] recall [illegible] during [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

April 1922. Was recalled from being very pro-Bolshevik Minister of Economy and Public Works, May–July 1922; Turkish financial expert at Lausanne Conference, 1922–23; again Minister of Economy September 1923–March 1924 and Minister of Commerce March–November 1924. Speaks French fairly well; is a man of private means and is well-versed in financial matters.

Mr. Jeremy Ley (Commerce).

Uncharged. Was a Member of Parliament for Long accused of having taken part in the various massacres. Is one of the leading businessmen of the Vatan area. In business is considered honest and straightforward. His record since the Armistice: 1920 Became Minister of Commerce in the first Bolshevik Cabinet in November 1924.

Kemal Ey Dellecourt.

Elected Deputy for Constantinople in 1923. Was Minister of Health and Public Assistance in several Cabinets from October 1921 to November 1924.

Ibrahim Mardin.

Urologist and one of the extremists of the Young Turk party. Was a member of Mustafa Kemal's personal entourage. Was elected deputy for Erzerum in 1923. Was a member of the Bolshevik Party. Was appointed Director of Health for the Army of Constantinople in 1920. Became first Vice-President of the Council in December 1924.

Hamdullah Suphi Tanrioevdi (Education).

[illegible] Member of the Committee of Union and Progress. Was a member of the Young Turk Party. Was elected deputy for Erzerum in 1923. Was appointed Minister of Education in November 1924. Was President of the Turkish Hearth Society. Was President of the Turkish Geographical Society. Was President of the Turkish Historical Society. Was President of the Turkish Linguistic Society. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Sciences. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Fine Arts. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Letters. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Music. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Dancing. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Painting. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Sculpture. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Architecture. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Engineering. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Medicine. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Law. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Economics. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Commerce. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Agriculture. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Forestry. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Mining. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Petroleum. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Chemistry. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Physics. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Mathematics. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Astronomy. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Geology. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Meteorology. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Oceanography. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Hydrography. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Cartography. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Surveying. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Navigation. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Aeronautics. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Astronautics. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Space Science. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Space Technology. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Space Medicine. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Space Biology. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Space Chemistry. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Space Physics. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Space Mathematics. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Space Astronomy. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Space Geology. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Space Meteorology. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Space Oceanography. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Space Hydrography. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Space Cartography. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Space Surveying. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Space Navigation. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Space Aeronautics. Was President of the Turkish Academy of Space

After examining this document it appears, however, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that, although the above-mentioned Commission has fulfilled its task in the best manner possible, it has drawn up a considerable number of documents exposing the acts committed by Turkey in contravention of the guarantees given to Mussulman minorities residing in her territory it would not be impossible for the Turkish Government to adduce reasons which would, in the exceptional circumstances which I have repeatedly expressed at length elsewhere, namely that it was in the interest of Eastern pacification to leave to the Mussulman minorities residing in Turkish territory of Thrace a certain freedom of action in Turkish political affairs, which would inevitably lead to grave conflicts, and therefore might have harmful repercussions on the relations between Turkey and the European Powers.

This is the reason why a political character recently guided Turkish defence in her work of moral protection at which His Britannic Majesty's Embassy justly observes may now be regarded as almost complete.

In view of this state of affairs the Royal Government are disposed to the view of His Britannic Majesty's Government—

1. That the reproaches for the restitution of any property arising from the restitution of Eastern Thrace to Turkey, which is now being liquidated at Constantinople, should be addressed by the Angora Government to Turkey, which will be responsible for the general security of the country and for the interests of the inhabitants of Eastern Thrace, and which would not probably be able to prevent by its own resources any political movement of a country by the Greek element which appears to be sooner or later inevitable, at the instigation of the Greek element by Turkey in the event of the latter's refusal to accept the proposal of the Council of the League of Nations; and

2. That the Council of the League of Nations will be glad at the difficulty which has arisen between Mussulmans and Christians in Turkey.

The pressure which might be exercised by the Council of the League of Nations would be in addition to that which the Turkish Government would have to bear from the Angora Government in the event of the latter's refusal to accept the proposal of the Council of the League of Nations.

It would therefore be highly desirable that the present policy which is now being followed by the League of Nations should be continued by the League of Nations in the same manner as it has been followed at the present session.

His Majesty's Government would be glad to receive the opinion of the Council of the League of Nations on the above-mentioned questions, and would be prepared to support the Council's opinion at the forthcoming session of the Council of the League of Nations.

I have, &c.
(For the Secretary of State)
R. C. LINDSAY

[E 1610 58 44] No. 1

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. (Received March 15)

(No. 105.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 1, 1924.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1 of the 5th January last, I have to forward herewith the budget estimates for the financial year 1924, prepared by the Ministry of Finance.

I have also to transmit herewith copies of the Budget Law in the form in which it was drawn up by this Ministry together with the law as modified after revision by the Budget Commission.*

In this connexion I have the honour to report that the budget estimates of the Ministry of Finance contain no data with regard to the revised estimates of the eighth report of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, which, as your Excellency is aware, is of considerable interest.

It has to be observed in the first place, that the Budget Commission estimates the total of the ordinary expenditure at £T 98,012,212 as compared with the Finance Ministry's estimate of £T 107,388,945, whilst the income has been assessed by the Commission at £T 105,165,134 as against the Ministry's estimate of £T 95,300,078.

4. The budget for 1924-25 has been prepared by the Ministry of Finance, as I have already reported, on the revised estimates of £T 98,012,212.

5. As regards the new taxes which I observed by reference to the attached Act, it appears that such taxes do not form part of the Budget Law, but are to be dealt with by a special law. The Budget Law will provide for a general increase in the salaries of officials.

6. The Commission of the Budget has, I understand, been informed by the Ministry of Finance that the sources of foreign exchange available for the payment of the Ottoman Debt coupons have been reduced by the Ministry to the Budget Commission.

7. According to the Ministry of National Defence the sum required by the latter for the payment of its arrears of pay to the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, which is now under consideration by the Budget Commission, is £T 14,312,000. The Ministry of National Defence has also asked for £T 1,000,000 for the purchase of new aeroplanes, and £T 1,000,000 for the purchase of new warships. The Ministry of Finance has refused to grant the above-mentioned sums, but has agreed to the payment of £T 600,000 for the purchase of new aeroplanes and £T 600,000 for the purchase of new warships.

8. The expenditure under the vote for the Ministry of Public Works has been reduced by £T 10,000,000 in the Budget as compared with the previous year's estimates, for the following reasons:—

The large economies which have been effected by the Budget Commission under the various heads have been dealt with in detail in the note of the Finance Ministry to which Annex 2 of the despatch under reference does not require any further explanation.

This despatch is intended chiefly to serve as a record of the past history and present position of the question, and may be useful for future reference.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

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* Not printed.

[E 1613/1613/44] **No 112.**

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain Received March 10

(No. 19
Sir *Constantinople March 11 1925*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Turkish authorities have now taken over the administration of the Regie des tabacs, the monopoly of which was conceded to the Regie in 1883 for a period of thirty years, and extended by special convention at a later date for a further period of fifteen years.

2 The execution of the provisions for the expiration of the renewed grant of the rights secured to the Regie has been rendered difficult by the fact that the delegation has never been ratified by the Assembly at Angora, secondly, by disagreement which arose between the Regie concerning the compensation which the latter claimed from the Administration of the Regie for certain articles not mentioned in the Regie's inventory.

3 In accordance with this agreement the Turkish Government handed over the Regie warehouses and factories on the 1st March, 1925, on that date the Director-General of the Regie, Monsieur Chesterton, drafted an inventory of the stocks which were taken over by the Turkish Government. This inventory was submitted to the Regie Council in Paris for approval.

4 Meanwhile the Turkish Government has issued a decree forbidding the sale of tobacco and cigarettes to the Regie, and has arrested a number of the Regie employés who refused to hand over the Regie stocks in their possession. The Regie Council in Paris has refused to approve the inventory drafted by Monsieur Chesterton, and has appointed a new delegate to Constantinople with instructions to endeavour to arrive at a settlement with the Turkish Government. The Regie Council has also instructed its delegate to refuse to hand over the Regie stocks in his possession to the Turkish Government unless the latter agrees to pay the Regie the sum of £T.1,000,000 as compensation for the loss of the Regie's rights.

5 The Turkish Government has refused to accept the Regie's demand for compensation, and has declared that the Regie has no claim to any compensation whatsoever. The Turkish Government has also declared that the Regie has no right to sell the stocks in its possession, and has threatened to confiscate any stocks which may be found in the possession of the Regie.

6 The Regie has appealed to the Turkish Government to withdraw its threat to confiscate the Regie stocks, and has declared that it will refer the matter to the Council of the League of Nations if the Turkish Government does not withdraw its threat.

7 The Turkish Government has refused to withdraw its threat, and has declared that it will not allow the matter to be referred to the Council of the League of Nations.

8 The Regie has appealed to the Turkish Government to withdraw its threat, and has declared that it will refer the matter to the Council of the League of Nations if the Turkish Government does not withdraw its threat.

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sent Your Lordship to take up his duties a brief and discreet one. What a wonderful new world has opened itself to the report from Angora, and any contact to this Embassy which I owe the honour to transmit to your Lordship."

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

E 1616/55/44 No. 114

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (Received March 20)

(No. 208)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 11, 1925.*

SINCE I had the honour to report post haste on the 6th instant the patriarchate last week's despatch No. 194 of the 4th instant), Turkish papers have supplied encouraging gossip as to the official policy of the Ankara Government. It was about to be accepted in principle that the Vatican would resign their spiritual rights over the Turkish Orthodox Church, and that another metropolitan would be elected to replace the Greek Government too, so far as I hear, would be glad to settle the question in this sense, in the hope that the Greek Orthodox Church might prove a useful instrument for the Hellenization of Asia Minor.

2. The reasons for this suggested change of policy are a profound difference of opinion between the Greek Government and the Greek Orthodox Church, which is most acutely represented by the Patriarch himself. The Greek Government no less than the Turkish Government is anxious to see the Greek Orthodox Church of Turkey become an autocephalous Church. The Patriarch, on the other hand, considers that he would be betraying the Orthodox Church if he were to agree to any such proposal. The Greek Government, on the other hand, are anxious to get rid of the Patriarch himself. The Turkish Government is most anxious to get rid of the Patriarch himself. The Turkish Government is most anxious to get rid of the Patriarch himself. The Turkish Government is most

Both my Italian colleague and I have spoken very strongly to the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs protesting against this pressure with threats. I have pointed out that in constructional Turkish opinion is to blame but that our position is that of an Ambassador's duty is to support British subjects and interests and to examine the circumstances of each case and give instructions according to what I obtain to be the conclusion to be drawn from the arguments confirmed as that embassies here must be received to negotiations.

Effect of [illegible] is but not as almost certain will not been presented at Constantinople without instructions and unauthenticated was handed to Secretary for Foreign Affairs by Ministry for Foreign Affairs. We think it very likely that [illegible] will be true representative without that Turkish Government will withdraw Franklin Bouillon and serious [illegible] by Italy. I agree with Italian colleague in having to urge Turkish Government to carry out present offensive. We therefore return to instructions that Government be informed urgently of what [illegible] and pass [illegible] to resist pressure as we have done.

E 1727 175 44 — **No. 28**

Note du Gouvernement britannique au Roi d'Irak (20 mars 1925)

Traduction de la Légation britannique à Londres

le 19 mars 1925

Mon Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-jointe l'exemplaire définitif du traité d'amitié et de bon voisinage que nous avons préparé ensemble et qui a été paraphé par les représentants de nos deux pays à Angora le 2 décembre dernier. Les deux gouvernements sont persuadés que les dispositions de ce traité répondent aux désirs et aux intérêts bien compris des deux pays.

En me référant à votre lettre du 4 décembre dernier, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que mon gouvernement a pris acte avec satisfaction de l'engagement que le gouvernement irakien a pris de ne pas exiger, pendant une période de quatre ans, le paiement des droits de douane sur les marchandises importées en Irak par les sujets britanniques, à l'exception des droits prévus par le tarif douanier actuellement en vigueur.

Mon gouvernement a également pris acte avec satisfaction de l'engagement que le gouvernement irakien a pris de ne pas exiger, pendant une période de quatre ans, le paiement des droits de douane sur les marchandises importées en Irak par les sujets britanniques, à l'exception des droits prévus par le tarif douanier actuellement en vigueur.

Je serai heureux de recevoir votre lettre confirmant que votre gouvernement est disposé à agir de la même manière à l'égard des sujets britanniques.

Je saisis, etc.

ZIKI AL

No. 29

Traité d'amitié et de bon voisinage entre l'Irak et la Grande-Bretagne

Signé à Angora le 2 décembre 1925

Ratifications échangées à Londres le 14 juin 1926

Enregistré par le Secrétariat de la Société des Nations le 30 juin 1926

I. *Partie politique*

ARTICLE 1er

La frontière entre l'Irak et la Turquie sera définitivement fixée comme suit :

La frontière commencera à un point à déterminer à 30 kilomètres au sud de Dohouk, passera par Dohouk, Zakho, Amadia, Sheikhan, Aïn Sifni, Sindour, Tor Ali, Tor Ali Ater, Tor Ali Gara, à 10 kilomètres au sud de Zakho, et continuera vers l'est le long du parallèle jusqu'au point de rencontre de la rivière de Khabour avec la rivière Tigre. La frontière remontera la rivière Khabour jusqu'au point de rencontre des frontières de l'Irak, de la Turquie et de la Syrie. Cette frontière sera indiquée sur la carte et pourra être marquée par des bornes intermédiaires à la commission d'enquête prévue par l'article 3 du présent traité. Les Hautes Parties contractantes s'engagent à reconnaître cette frontière définitivement fixée dans un délai de trois mois à partir de la date de la signature du présent traité.

ARTICLE 2

Le Gouvernement turc s'engageant à reconnaître l'intégrité territoriale de l'Irak déclare n'avoir aucune vue politique particulière sur les territoires situés au sud de la frontière précédemment décrite.

II. *Partie économique*

ARTICLE 3

La concession de l'exploitation des gisements de pétrole se trouvant dans la partie du vilayet de Mossoul située au nord de la frontière définie ci-dessus sera accordée par la Turquie à un groupe d'intérêts qui sera approuvé par le Gouvernement britannique. Les taxes prévues par la loi turque de l'exploitation des pétroles ainsi que toutes formalités et obligations y relatives, à l'exception de toutes questions d'ordre financier ou économique, y prévues dans le présent article, concernant la concession seront également applicables à la concession. Il est entendu que la quote-part du Gouvernement turc sur les produits de l'exploitation [illegible] de la taxe proportionnelle ne sera pas inférieure à 12,5 pour cent. La Turquie aura un droit de participation supplémentaire de 25 pour cent dans le capital de l'exploitation des mines.

ARTICLE 4

Les parties contractantes s'engagent à ne pas entraver la construction et l'ouverture à l'exploitation d'un chemin de fer reliant le réseau ferroviaire de l'Irak à un port de la Méditerranée. Le choix du port sera laissé au Gouvernement irakien, sous réserve de l'approbation du Conseil de la Société des Nations, si le port choisi est situé sur le territoire d'une puissance mandataire. Le Gouvernement turc s'engage à ne pas entraver la construction d'un chemin de fer reliant le réseau ferroviaire de l'Irak à un port de la Méditerranée. Le choix du port sera laissé au Gouvernement irakien, sous réserve de l'approbation du Conseil de la Société des Nations, si le port choisi est situé sur le territoire d'une puissance mandataire.

ARTICLE 5

Le Gouvernement turc s'engage à ne pas entraver la construction par un groupe anglais reconnu par le Gouvernement britannique d'un chemin de fer d'une longueur de 3 000 kilomètres environ reliant la gare de Nisibine à un port de la Méditerranée. Le choix du port sera laissé au Gouvernement irakien, sous réserve de l'approbation du Conseil de la Société des Nations, si le port choisi est situé sur le territoire d'une puissance mandataire. Les travaux de construction devront être commencés dans les trois ans qui suivront la ratification du présent traité. Le délai de cinq ans prévu pour l'achèvement des travaux de construction de la voie ferrée pourra être prolongé par le Conseil de la Société des Nations, si le Gouvernement turc le demande. Les travaux de construction devront être commencés dans les trois ans qui suivront la ratification du présent traité. Le délai de cinq ans prévu pour l'achèvement des travaux de construction de la voie ferrée pourra être prolongé par le Conseil de la Société des Nations, si le Gouvernement turc le demande.

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ARTICLE 6

Les concessions de construction et d'exploitation des ports de Yarmouth, Haifa, Saint-Jean-d'Acre et Tripoli seront accordées à des groupes anglais reconnus par le Gouvernement britannique. Le Ministère des Travaux publics turc et les groupes intéressés concluront les arrangements nécessaires pour la construction et l'exploitation des ports. Les concessions seront accordées à des groupes anglais reconnus par le Gouvernement britannique. Les travaux d'aménagement des ports seront achevés dans un délai de cinq ans à partir de la date de la signature du présent traité. Les concessions seront accordées à des groupes anglais reconnus par le Gouvernement britannique. Les travaux d'aménagement des ports seront achevés dans un délai de cinq ans à partir de la date de la signature du présent traité.

ARTICLE 7

Les groupes anglais qui se chargeront des travaux mentionnés dans les articles 5 et 6 pourront exercer l'option prévue dans les sous-articles, dans le cas où ces groupes n'auraient pas commencé ces travaux dans les six mois à dater de la signature du présent traité. Les délais et finalités désignées dans ces deux articles

ARTICLE 8

La Commission [illegible] droit de participation de 2 [illegible] groupe [illegible] lignes ferrées et un [illegible] 50 [illegible] groupes qui construiront et exploiteront [illegible]

ARTICLE 9

[illegible] offres [illegible] l'arbitrage [illegible] faculté [illegible]

ARTICLE 10

[illegible] développement [illegible] conditions [illegible]

ARTICLE 11

Les [illegible] seront [illegible] pendant la [illegible] les [illegible] les [illegible]

ARTICLE 12

[illegible] Grande-Bretagne [illegible] Londres

N° 113

[illegible] Secrétaire d'État de Sa Majesté [illegible]

Rédigé

N° 91

[illegible] *Foreign Office, March 20, 1925*

Monsieur le Ministre,

Par [illegible] M. Hoesch [illegible] vous [illegible] Votre Excellence [illegible] Gouvernement [illegible] Grande-Bretagne [illegible] Turquie [illegible] Irak [illegible] Mossoul [illegible] Turquie [illegible] Irak [illegible] Mossoul [illegible] Turquie [illegible] Irak [illegible] Mossoul

[illegible] Embassy [illegible] Treaty [illegible] Ottoman Empire [illegible] Treaty [illegible] Ottoman Empire [illegible] Treaty [illegible] Ottoman Empire

No. 123

The Marquess of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received March 25)

(No. 110) By Bag

Telegraphic *Paris, March 24, 1925.*

Your Telegram No. 91

Embassy Despatch No. M. Herriot morning of 21st March.

Draw-back of 4. Mr. Hughes's warning to effect that French Government would not enter into definite undertaking with His Majesty's Government to the detriment of Greece without previous consultation with *Quai d'Orsay*. Mr. Hughes's statement of 1st March. Great importance. Draw attention to His Majesty's Government's declaration of 4th February. Turkey inclined to make further concessions to Angora. Possible consultation between Ambassadors of France, Italy and Japan. Arrest of Greek officers and officials. Resignation and that the Turkish Government have refused to receive the present Greek Minister. Latest news to effect that Venizelos will go to Angora. Whatever assurances Poincaré may receive from there.

French Government not to consider it to be to their present interest to hinder relations between Angora and Athens.

Repeated to Belgrade, Bucharest, Constantinople, Rome, Sofia, Vienna No. 721.

No. 121

Sir E. Crowe (Constantinople) to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received March 25)

No. 60

Telegraphic. *Constantinople, March 24, 1925.*

My Telegram No. 2 (Near East).

No. 1. Reference was made to the Treaty of Lausanne, Articles 1 to 4 of which deal with the Straits. Article 1 provides that the Straits shall be open to the vessels of all nations. Article 2 provides that in time of war Turkey shall not be belligerent if she considers herself threatened with imminent danger of war. Article 3 provides that in the event of Turkey considering herself threatened with imminent danger of war she has the right to demand the assistance of the High Contracting Parties in accordance with Article 4. Article 4 provides that in the event of a breach of the provisions of Article 2 or in the event of an unprovoked act of war against Turkey, the High Contracting Parties will immediately come to the assistance of Turkey.

2. Under the Treaty of Sèvres the Straits were demilitarised and placed under the control of the Straits Commission. The Treaty of Lausanne restored to Turkey the sovereignty over the Straits, including the right to fortify and garrison them. The Straits Commission has been abolished and the Straits are now under the sole control of the Turkish Government.

3. Actually I am not sure of the date of last year when I was away from Athens. I talked Russbridge had a series of conversations with his colleague on the Embassy Corps in connection with the subject of a possible *détente*. Nothing came of these discussions but M. Roussos, who was Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time, was strongly in favour of an arrangement with Turkey. I understand that Ismet Pasha showed some friendly disposition at the time but in any case nothing came of it. If the facts are correctly stated it would be of interest to know whether the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has now any recollection of these discussions and if so the proper treatment would be to renew them.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

C 4458 3066 62 No. 1.

Sir H. Chilton (Athens) to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received March 30)

No. 101

Sir, *Athens, March 18, 1925.*

THE Semi-official Messager d'Athènes published yesterday a telegram from Belgrade stating that M. Gabrinovic was known in the capital had declared in a letter that he was specially late to ask for admission to the Little *Entente*. A Belgrade newspaper further points out the telegram is saying that the question of admission of Roumania, Greece and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State will form a distinct group in the Council of the League of Nations, and that the Little *Entente* will, after the Bucharest Conference, be extended to Greece.

2. In my despatch No. 752 of the 24th December last I had the honour to report the strong stand which M. Pangalos took on the necessity for a Balkan understanding, to which Roumania would be invited as well as his conviction that M. Pasic would discourage any such character to any renewal of the Serbian alliance with Greece.

3. I have no information which would give the slightest support to the allegation attributed to M. Gabrinovic as to the admission of Greece into the Little *Entente* a question which so far as I know has not been discussed at all in responsible circles here. The greatest importance is attached by the Royalist press with which the Messager d'Athènes is closely identified to the difficulty which the Greek Government find in their alleged efforts to arrange for the entry of Greece into the Little *Entente*. M. M. also points out that there were two reasons open to Greece if she seek to join the *entente*, namely a Balkan alliance (which Roumania would welcome) the Greek Government would have to consider maturely any opportunity

which might be offered to them at a later date, and they could form no opinion at present, but they were certainly not in a position to undertake distant responsibilities. The debt incurred by M. Venizelos on account of the participation of Greece in the Ukrainian campaign and the betrayal of Serbia in 1915 by the Government of the late King Constantine are precedents which no future Greek Government can ignore.

4. The French Minister M. de Chambrun referred to this matter in general conversation with me this morning. He gave his view that a Balkan combination would be the best policy for Greece and he was inclined to think that Turkey should be included so far as Eastern Thrace was concerned a thing in principle so far as my knowledge goes. M. de Chambrun went on to suggest that as soon as the question of the Mytilene Islands had been settled our respective Governments should endeavour to promote better relations between Greece and Turkey, which he thought might be done if the two Governments were approached. He hoped that we might be able to work together with this object in view.

I agree that it would be very central if some method could be found of getting the two countries more friendly terms. The Greeks are afraid of a Turkish attack. Western Thrace and pride save at the same time lost Turkey [illegible] Greek Government [illegible] with the result Greco-Turkish [illegible] two countries would be frequently expressed [illegible] M. Venizelos's policy of coming to terms with Turkey. See my telegram No. 44 (Near East) of February. No steps have certainly been taken [illegible] Greek Government [illegible] view to render more cordial [illegible] Turkish ships were [illegible].

4. Actually I am not sure of the date of last year when I was away from Athens. I talked Russbridge had a series of conversations with his colleague on the Embassy Corps in connection with the subject of a possible *détente*. Nothing came of these discussions but M. Roussos, who was Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time, was strongly in favour of an arrangement with Turkey. I understand that Ismet Pasha showed some friendly disposition at the time but in any case nothing came of it. If the facts are correctly stated it would be of interest to know whether the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has now any recollection of these discussions and if so the proper treatment would be to renew them.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

E 1932 109 44 No. 12.

Sir Austen Chamberlain (Received March 30)

(No. 117) Sir

Geneva, March 25, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that I arrived here on the afternoon of the 23rd instant and was received on the following day by the President of the Council for the presentation of the usual letters of credence. I was subsequently introduced to the Secretary-General and to the Chief of the Political Section of the Secretariat. I had a short interview with Monsieur Motta, the Swiss Federal Councillor, who is acting as President of the Council during the absence of Monsieur Ador, and I expressed to him the pleasure which it would give me to observe the traditional attitude of Switzerland in the Council of the League. I also had an interview with the President of the Assembly, Monsieur Nintchitch, in which I made a similar observation. The President has since been kind enough to call upon me, which I returned. I also had an interview with Monsieur Avenol, the Secretary-General of the League, who has been kind enough to call upon me, which I returned. I have also had an interview with Monsieur Loudon, the Netherlands Minister, who is acting as President of the Council during the absence of Monsieur Ador, and I expressed to him the pleasure which it would give me to observe the traditional attitude of Switzerland in the Council of the League. I also had an interview with

2 On the morning of 6th March Ismet Pasha had an interview with the Turkish Prime Minister, Fethi Bey, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Rushdi Bey, at which the Turkish Government's decision to refuse the Allied demands was communicated to him. The text of these decisions was conveyed to you by my despatch No. 208 of the 8th March.

3 The afternoon was spent in visiting various points of interest in the city, and in the evening Ismet Pasha was entertained at dinner by the Prime Minister, Fethi Bey, at which the principal members of the Turkish Government were present. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is apparently the only Turkish Minister who has had any experience of dealing with foreigners, was absent from Constantinople, having left for Angora on the previous day. The Chief of the General Staff, Fevzi Pasha, was also absent. Among those present were the Minister of Marine, Admiral Bristol, Major-General Harington, Mr. Lindsay, Mr. Crosthwaite, and myself. The dinner was a very friendly affair, and the conversation was chiefly confined to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ismet Pasha, and myself. The Prime Minister, Fethi Bey, spoke little French, and Ismet Pasha, who is a very shy man, appeared to be somewhat embarrassed at finding himself the guest of honour at a dinner-party. He was, however, very amiable, and, as the evening progressed, he became more at his ease. He spoke with great moderation of the Turkish reply to the Allied demands, and said that he hoped that the Conference would not break down on this question. He was sure that a solution could be found which would be satisfactory to both sides. He was very anxious to avoid a rupture, and he thought that the Turkish reply would be found to contain many concessions. He was ready to discuss the matter with us at any time, and he hoped that we would not leave Constantinople without coming to see him. He was sure that a solution could be found which would be satisfactory to both sides.

4 On the morning of the 7th March I had a conference with Ismet Pasha, at which Major-General Harington was present. Ismet Pasha was very anxious to avoid a rupture, and he thought that the Turkish reply would be found to contain many concessions. He was ready to discuss the matter with us at any time, and he hoped that we would not leave Constantinople without coming to see him. He was sure that a solution could be found which would be satisfactory to both sides.

I have, &c.
H. G. LINDSAY

E 1931 1231 44 No. 17

Mr. Crosthwaite (Constantinople) to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (Received March 30)

(No. 210)
Sir,

Constantinople, March 12, 1927.

I have the honour to report that Major-General Harington and I left Constantinople by the Orient Express on the evening of March 9, and arrived at Angora on the morning of March 11. We were met at the station by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tewfik Rushdi Bey, and by the Chief of the General Staff, Fevzi Pasha, who is apparently the only Turkish Minister who has had any experience of dealing with foreigners. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is apparently the only Turkish Minister who has had any experience of dealing with foreigners, was absent from Constantinople, having left for Angora on the previous day. The Chief of the General Staff, Fevzi Pasha, was also absent. Among those present were the Minister of Marine, Admiral Bristol, Major-General Harington, Mr. Lindsay, Mr. Crosthwaite, and myself. The dinner was a very friendly affair, and the conversation was chiefly confined to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ismet Pasha, and myself. The Prime Minister, Fethi Bey, spoke little French, and Ismet Pasha, who is a very shy man, appeared to be somewhat embarrassed at finding himself the guest of honour at a dinner-party. He was, however, very amiable, and, as the evening progressed, he became more at his ease. He spoke with great moderation of the Turkish reply to the Allied demands, and said that he hoped that the Conference would not break down on this question. He was sure that a solution could be found which would be satisfactory to both sides. He was very anxious to avoid a rupture, and he thought that the Turkish reply would be found to contain many concessions. He was ready to discuss the matter with us at any time, and he hoped that we would not leave Constantinople without coming to see him. He was sure that a solution could be found which would be satisfactory to both sides.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM ERSKINE.

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arrangement had been come to. His excellency replied that in this matter, as in others, he looked forward to receiving further proposals.

I subsequently learnt that the object of his visit to Angora was to ascertain the Turkish Government's reply to the Allied demands, and that the Turkish authorities appeared to be prepared to make considerable concessions in order to avoid a rupture. It is understood that the Turkish Government will shortly send a delegation to London to discuss the matter.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM ERSKINE.

E 1927 1786 44 No. 18

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (Received March 30)

(No. 210)
Sir,

Constantinople, March 23, 1927.

During the course of a conversation which I had with Ismet Pasha on the 21st instant, he informed me that he had received a telegram from Angora stating that the Turkish Government had decided to refer the matter in dispute between Turkey and the Allied Powers to the League of Nations. He added that he had already telegraphed to the Turkish Delegate at Geneva to inform the Secretary-General of the League of Nations of this decision. He also informed me that he had received a telegram from the Turkish Delegate at Geneva stating that the Secretary-General had replied that he would be glad to receive the Turkish case as soon as possible.

I have the honour to report that the Turkish Government's decision to refer the matter in dispute between Turkey and the Allied Powers to the League of Nations is a very important one, and that it will undoubtedly have a very great effect on the future of the Near East. It is understood that the Turkish Government will shortly send a delegation to London to discuss the matter. It is also understood that the Turkish Government will shortly send a delegation to London to discuss the matter.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM ERSKINE.

[illegible] may say that Is[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

sequel Signor Venigiat thinks that the French desire that the Powers should not interfere with the Angora question, and that the French Government would allow things to go on as they are, which would mean the abrogation of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1838. Mr. Rumbold's view is that the French Government would not dare to abolish the Legation at Constantinople, but that they would refuse facilities to the Embassy at Angora. For instance, a ruling that they may only correspond with officials in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Tevfik Bey) would practically mean the closing of the Embassy, as Tevfik Bey would be quite unable to get access to Ministers, and in the present situation would be most almost completely interpreted as a refusal. It is impossible to say how long under such circumstances the Allied resistance would continue to be maintained.

Mr. Rumbold's best attempts to secure a decision have failed to elicit any communication of the March 16th last giving us the offer of land at Angora for the Embassy. He has, however, received an expression of acknowledgments stating that the Powers have not yet arrived at a definite decision, but expressing a willingness to negotiate with us. Mr. Rumbold's instructions are to the effect that he is to avoid any obligation, either express or implied, placing us in the position of the Ambassadors who have left Angora, and to resist any suggestion that we should be content with a decision in principle, but should insist on a definite decision as to the site of the Embassy before we withdraw from Constantinople

ect She was rought p m branc for tdlar tax s lee r ikish cas s general a Marseilles s she speaks Aglist m r h N s tracking forwar t ca g Angor ar s bewig turs ff pre t now frocks s ars

I send g c p of s es a t H s M s vs A bassa lor at Paris
Lave, &c
R C LINDSAY

E 1910 109 44] No 1

Memorandum by Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received March 26)

No
Sir

Foreign Office, March 24, 1925

HEREWITH the copy of a despatch from Sir R Lindsay giving his impressions of recent experiences in Angora

I spent several hours with Ismet Pasha on the 21st, but I regret to say that the whole of that time was occupied in a discussion of the Mosul question, and I was unable to obtain any information as to the internal situation in Turkey, or to form any opinion as to the probable attitude of the Government towards the Straits question

I found Ismet in a very friendly mood, and he himself opened the subject of Mosul, which I had intended to avoid for the present, as I thought it would be premature to enter into discussion with him on this question before the Council of the League of Nations had come to a decision

Ismet began by saying that he had been disappointed at the result of the Council meeting at Geneva, as he had hoped that the question would be settled there by direct negotiations between Turkey and Great Britain, and that the League would merely register the agreement arrived at He had come to Geneva in the belief that this was the intention of His Majesty's Government, and he had been surprised to find that the question was to be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations

I replied that I was not aware that His Majesty's Government had ever given any undertaking to Ismet that the question would be settled by direct negotiations between Great Britain and Turkey, and that I was sure that he must have misunderstood anything that I had said to him on the subject I had, however, always made it clear to him that His Majesty's Government could not admit the claim of Turkey to Mosul, and that there could be no question of direct negotiations between Great Britain and Turkey on the subject

Ismet then said that he had been under the impression that I had given him to understand that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to recommend to the Council of the League of Nations that Mosul should be assigned to Turkey, and that he had been disappointed to find that I had not done so

I replied that I had never given him any such impression, and that I had always made it clear to him that His Majesty's Government could not support the claim of Turkey to Mosul, and that I was sure that he must have misunderstood anything that I had said to him

[illegible] considered investments in Anatolian railways very doubtful [illegible] would suggest that the utmost [illegible] required [illegible] should offer [illegible] existing [illegible] companies [illegible] special [illegible] questions [illegible] Council [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

No. [illegible]

[illegible]

No. 10
[illegible] Telegraphic [illegible] *[illegible]* April 3, 1925
My telegram No. 62 [illegible] Prime Minister. Lord [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
Repeated to Paris No. 10 [illegible]

No. 154

[illegible]

(No. 100) [illegible]
Diplomatic *[illegible]* April 3, 1925
Your despatch No. 721 [illegible] Mosul [illegible]
Please explain [illegible]

No. 53

[illegible]

No. 62
Telegraphic [illegible] *[illegible]* April 3, 1925
Your telegram No. 224 and 241. Mosul. Diplomatic representation from Turkey.
Yesterday's [illegible] Turkish [illegible] Chatham House [illegible] possible [illegible] League [illegible] suggesting [illegible] in the sense of paragraph [illegible] [illegible] words [illegible] Foreign Secretary's [illegible] Mosul.
You ought [illegible] Prime Minister [illegible] Angora [illegible] Ismet [illegible] Mosul [illegible] Angora [illegible] [illegible] Turkish Government [illegible] [illegible] would be responsible.
Repeated to Paris No. 102 [illegible] Zone No. 161.

E 2027 1786 44 No. 176

Mr. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain. Received April 4

(Private)
Dear Sir Austen, *Constantinople, March 23, 1925.*

I AT [illegible] HANUM [illegible] Minister of Economy [illegible] great to [illegible] the new armament [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] refrain [illegible] private letter. Sorry [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] this is considered rather [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] the Greeks, private estate [illegible] Lausanne meeting that we [illegible] Nansen [illegible] Mr. Howard in asking for this [illegible] suggested we should [illegible] and if we do not get the [illegible] grievance [illegible] our grounds [illegible] affairs [illegible] such matters [illegible] the Turks [illegible] Greece [illegible] Works [illegible] Private estates [illegible] Greece [illegible] the Great War Office would have [illegible] Venizelos [illegible] Angora [illegible] Mr. Howard [illegible] Works [illegible] Greece [illegible] Mr. Howard [illegible] Works [illegible] Greece [illegible] Angora [illegible] Greece [illegible] Angora [illegible] Greece [illegible] Angora

Art 5 La banque s'engage à porter au moins à 60 pour cent à la fin d une période de cinq ans, à compter de l échange de la convention le nombre des employés turcs musulmans mentionnés à l article 11 de la convention du 10 mars 1340 1924, et à porter le total des appointements de ces employés à 40 pour cent de la totalité des appointements non compris ceux du directeur général et de son adjoint

Art 6 La banque tiendra en turc, au plus tard dans le délai d une année, les registres et documents relatifs à ses opérations et comptes afférents au Gouvernement et aux particuliers résidant en Turquie Si elle le désire elle peut les tenir séparément en français aussi

La présente convention additionnelle faite en double a été signée et échangée à Angora

Le Directeur général adjoint
de la Banque ottomane,
A H REID
Le Directeur général de la
Banque ottomane,
L STEEG
Le Commissaire aux Finances,
HASSAN HUSNI

Le 22 mars 1341 1925

[E 2076/194 44] No 138

Mr. Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received April 6)

(No. 258.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 31, 1925*

IN continuation of my despatch No 199 of the 10th March I have the honour to report that the political situation in Turkey during the past three weeks has remained in a state of subdued inertia The Grand Assembly at Angora continues debating principally the budget the Opposition as usual shows practically no signs of life either in the Chamber or in the country and if it has not been absolutely crushed it certainly has been reduced to silence The movement discernible last winter towards the development of a real parliamentary régime has received a distinct check, and with the predominance in the State of one individual less disguised than ever it is not easy to see how it could now resume its progress without a recourse to violence, itself the very antithesis of constitutionalism However sceptically one may have regarded the strivings towards political development in the past, it is impossible to withhold sympathy in contemplating the hopeless blind alley into which Turkish politics have now entered

2 The Angora Independence Tribunal has set to work and has had offenders brought before it from various regions in Turkey, but so far chiefly from Cilicia Two newspapermen from Adana have been sentenced to several months to three years imprisonment for reactionary language and for disloyal propaganda among the Kurdish soldiers, while the Vali, for remissness in producing witnesses, was fined £T 250 The tribunal for action in the eastern vilayets has not yet been started on its journeys but not time be lost, once possibly Islam's point was settled this week at a meeting of the People's party viz that sentences of death pronounced by courts martial in the area of the rebellion may be executed on approval by the army corps and divisional commanders

3 In the stifling atmosphere of serious comment on public affairs the press has welcomed away Hussein Jahid in the "Tanin" keeps silence even from good words, and fills his columns with reminiscences of his banishment at Malta which I am sorry to say consist mainly of rather bitter complaints against the restrictions imposed on the island on himself and his fellow prisoners. Other papers write about aviation, the Turkish theatre Ramazan fasting, anything but internal politics Even the Prefect of Constantinople employs an innocuous topic from attack

4 As to the actual revolt in Kurdistan I enclose herewith two reports* from Major Harenc summarising such information as to the course of events as is now available There are certain indications that things are not proceeding quite as well as official communiqués would have us believe There has been fighting at Varto, in the north east, and at Siwas, north east of Diarbekr, there seems to have been a considerable killing of loyalists by rebels. Melazgird was reported one day in the

* Not printed

papers to be in the hands of the Kurds and the telegraph between Mush and Bitlis to have been cut Malta my colleague yesterday received a telegram from his consular agent at Tiflis recounting reports to the effect that the revolt has spread to Erzerum and Van, and that Russian troops were being moved to the frontier to help the Turks The agent expressed the view that Bolshevik Armenians were not unconcerned in the Kurdish revolt In order to show the necessity of rectifying the Turco Russian frontier" These are but rumours of uncertain credibility, more serious is an article in the "Hakimiet i Milliye" the semi-official organ printed at Angora The article regrets that as the telegraphs cannot yet be spoken of The rebels are active between Diarbekr and Severek there is strong propaganda in the area Mush and Varto, Dersim is worked by religious chiefs, and the situation remains uncertain The republic has taken all necessary measures to suppress the revolt and will succeed but it must not neglect the further duty of getting at the root of the evil by introducing wise measures of administrative and social reform on the heels of the armies of repression, and doubtless it has already taken steps to that effect This article could not have been written without approval by the Government and is a certain importance. In contrast to the many communiqués, which always imply that, the necessary concentrations having been effected, the revolt will now be suppressed a pessimistic note is struck and the public is prepared for reports even perhaps of successes to local movements, the nature of which must be sought in the "Hakimiet i Milliye" and not in any other paper

5 There is a little doubt that the revolt is serious and that it is constituting a serious strain on the Turkish State A credit of £T 1, 000 000 has been voted for its suppression which enlarges the deficit in the budget for 1925 up to the acknowledged figure of £T 3 000 000 and I fear that many urgent public works, such as railway construction may be delayed or curtailed If the revolt can not be mastered quickly the strain must scarcely be exceeded, if it is mastered and reforms are introduced as suggested at Hakimiet Milliye further expenditure yet will be necessary These financial difficulties with the consequent military effort to effort must surely have weakened the effect and it becomes impossible to believe that the revolt could have been fomented or precipitated by the Government to serve its own purposes As I said at the outset I think it is hardly necessary to seek for it any explanation but the Russian one to the argument of *cui bono?* but the only confirmation I have received is to the effect that one of the Italian telegraphists from Tiflis quoted above.

6 Now that the revolt has broken out the Turks have exploited it promptly to crush the opposition that was growing throughout the country against the radical and secular tendencies of the present régime and to strengthen the *de facto* autocracy of Mustafa Kemal, this is the incidental advantage arising out of an otherwise bad situation Would they exploit this still further to the point of turning their troops round once the revolt is crushed, and invading the north eastern frontier of Irak, or even, as Major Harene suggests in the concluding paragraph of his despatch, No. 5 enclosed herewith " to the point of attempting a coup against Mosul " I am not aware of these threats but will be necessary for Turkey first to crush completely the revolt in Kurdistan, pretty precisely are our information at present is so scanty and so uncertain both as to the extent of the revolt and as to the efficacy of the measures taken against it that I hesitate to pronounce a decided judgment Granted the complete suppression of the revolt by the time the League renders a Mosul verdict thoroughly adverse to Turkey and granted that the necessary concentrations had then been effected I imagine that a coup against Mosul would from the military point of view be possible, and therefore may require consideration beforehand All political aspects of the question are against any such recourse, for it would be necessary for Turkey to set the League of Nations at defiance and to undertake hostilities against Great Britain, a diplomatic movement which as she knows she would not only sympathy from Russia only and that of a few deserters but from Europe and India Turks may find some satisfaction from talking big for such purposes, I cannot however persuade myself that the governors of the country will seriously contemplate incurring such formidable risks

I have, &c.
R C. LINDSAY

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* Not printed.

[E 2077 55 44] No 139

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 6.)

(No 259)
Sir, *Constantinople April 1, 1925*

WITH reference to my despatch No 200 of the 11th ultimo, I have the honour to report that on the 28th ultimo it was announced in the press here that with the authority of the Soviet Government, the Russian Synod had invited the Œcumenical Patriarch to take up his residence in Russia From enquiries which I have made I understand that the Patriarch has in fact received such an invitation but that he has no intention of accepting it

2 M Exindaris, the Greek delegate on the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Populations has just returned here I am told that he has every hope of reaching a compromise on the lines mentioned in the first paragraph of my despatch under reference The Patriarch's intention according to my information is still to convoke the Œcumenical Synod in Greece and I believe he still has the support of the large majority of his Metropolitans in his determination not to resign

3 I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens

I have &c
R C LINDSAY

[E 2058 471 89] No 140

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 6.)

(No 805)
Sir, *Paris, April 2, 1925*

IN my telegram No 102 of the 14th March I had the honour to report the departure of M Franklin Bouillon for Angora Since that date there has been a plentiful crop of rumours as to the nature of M Franklin Bouillon's activities in Turkey Yesterday a report appeared in the 'Sans Fil' to the effect that an arrangement had been reached for the retrocession to Turkey of Alexandretta Antioch and Aleppo

It was probably in consequence of this report that the French Government issued a *dément* to the effect that English newspapers had announced that M Franklin-Bouillon had been entrusted with negotiations in the name of the French Government regarding the cession of certain Syrian territories to Turkey These reports were without any foundation It should be observed, moreover that M Franklin Bouillon had gone to Angora in a purely private capacity and that in no way whatever had he received a mandate to carry on negotiations on behalf of the French Government

This *dément* is commented on in one or two of this morning's newspapers The 'Petit Parisien' for instance after noting the *dément* states that it must be observed on the other hand that the various questions outstanding between the two Governments are in a fair way of settlement With regard to the reported cession of Antioch and Alexandretta the 'Petit Parisien' writes that there was never any question of their return to Turkey There had however been a question of setting up an autonomous Armenian state on the confines with the Angora Agreement That Administration had now been set at rest to the complete satisfaction of the Ottoman Government With regard to the schools out of forty scholastic establishments twenty-two had adopted Turkish as their principal language including the *lycée* at Antioch

The 'Petit Parisien' points out that the question of the delimitation of the Turco-Syrian frontier is actually on the point of settlement Differences of opinion had only occurred on one point with a very small part of that frontier on the north eastern extremity of Syria where the Commission had examined the frontier There was no difference of opinion with regard to that portion of the frontier which lay along the Bagdad Railway As regards the Ottoman debt there were hopes of an early agreement regarding the payment of coupons Negotiations with regard to these various matters were nevertheless within the competence of M Sarrant the newly appointed French Ambassador

The 'Sans Fil' in publishing the *dément* also refers to various information which it has received tending to show that M Franklin Bouillon's conversations

have in fact, touched upon the special regime to be given to the Vilayets of Antioch, Alexandretta and Aleppo and states that the Turks are very anxious to see the terms of the Angora Agreement put into force in this connection

I have, &c
CREWE.

C 4458/3066 62 No 141

Mr Austen Chamberlain to Sir M Cheetham (Athens.)

(No 200)
Sir *Foreign Office April 7 1925*

I HAVE received your despatch No 101 of the 18th March, on the subject of the possible admission of Greece to the Little *Entente* and of the relations of Greece with her Balkan neighbours, and more especially with Turkey

2 In the fourth paragraph of your despatch you report that the French Minister suggested to you the possibility of the British and French Governments joining in an effort to promote better relations between Greece and Turkey, and you ask for instructions for your guidance

3 I am desirous that in all spheres the representatives of this country and of France should co-operate as closely as possible and I imagine that M de Chambrun should have consulted you But I find it difficult to believe that he had any authority or encouragement from his Government for the suggestion which he made My own experience leads me to think that M Herriot would desire to act with the greatest circumspection in all that concerns questions in dispute between Greece and Turkey and that he would be very unlikely to volunteer any interference unless he had previous reason to suppose that his action would be welcome to both parties

4 This is a sound attitude of His Majesty's Government I see the advantage and run the risk of volunteering advice It is extremely doubtful whether any advice that we might offer would be agreeable to both parties it would in fact, be followed by either If one party accepted the advice and the other refused we might find ourselves responsibly and perhaps unnecessarily engaged and very probably our influence and authority seriously prejudiced

5 I recommend you therefore to abstain from volunteering any advice If such a policy as to succeed it must proceed from the spontaneous determination of the Greeks themselves meeting a like desire for a rapprochement on the side of the Turks I need not say that such a movement would be in full accord with the desires of His Majesty's Government who wish nothing better than the appeasement of all feuds and the sweet fraternity of former enemies If your opinion is sought you can so express yourself but you will avoid becoming committed in any way to particular proposals engaging to act as intermediary and you will for the reasons which I have explained take no initiative and volunteer no expression of opinion

I am &
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

E 2139 109 44, No 142

Sir C Eliot to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received April 8)

(No 90)
HIS Majesty's representative at Tokyo presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note for the Japanese Government, dated the 27th February, respecting the appointment of an Ambassador to Turkey

Tokyo March 5, 1925

Enclosure in No 142

Baron Shidehara to Sir C Eliot

Sir

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's note of the 17th February, in which under instructions from His Britannic Majesty's Government, you inform me that His Britannic Majesty's Government, after previous

arrangements with the French Government have sent instructions to the British representative in Constantinople to announce to the representatives of the Turkish Government the appointment of a British Ambassador to Turkey that the French Government also have sent similar instructions to the French representative in Constantinople, and that the Italian Government are being invited to send instructions in the same sense to their representative there that this notification of the appointment of Ambassadors will be made alike by the representatives of the three countries, Great Britain, France and Italy, on the 1st March, provided that they have received similar instructions by that date, that the notification will not be by joint action, but that the representatives of the three Allied countries will, on the 1st March, simply make a similar notification reporting the decisions of their respective Governments. Your Excellency further informs me that the French Government have instructed the French representative to add that the French Ambassador will reside ordinarily at Constantinople and will proceed to Angora when necessary at any time, and that a permanent official will be appointed to act for him at Angora.

I have the honour to notify your Excellency that the Imperial Government also, as a result of considération of the various circumstances, are now engaged in arranging the facilities necessary under the laws of this country, with a view to the appointment of an Ambassador resident in Turkey. Until such appointment is made, they have decided to appoint the representative of the Imperial Government now resident in Turkey to be Chargé d'Affaires and have instructed him to notify the representative of the Turkish Government to that effect on the 1st March.

I avail, &c.

KIJURO SHIDEHARA,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[E 1727, 175, 44] No. 143

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Zekiai Bey.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 9, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 10th March communicating proposals for the direct settlement of the question of the Turco-Irak frontier and thereafter for economic collaboration between Turkey and Great Britain.

2. In forwarding these proposals you refer to our conversation of the 21st January regarding the relations between our two countries. On that occasion you spoke of the advantages of economic collaboration between our countries and enquired whether it was not possible to remove the sole political obstacle to such collaboration by a direct settlement of the outstanding issue of the Turco-Irak frontier. To this I replied that His Majesty's Government cordially reciprocated the desire for friendly political relations and would be glad to see the commercial and economic relations developed. But I felt bound to add that much as I regretted the failure to obtain a settlement of the frontier question by direct negotiations at an earlier time and the necessity for referring it to the decision of a third party, His Majesty's Government could not now withdraw the question from the cognisance of the League of Nations, to whom the two Governments had remitted it, and I expressly informed you that His Majesty's Government would be obliged to refuse any proposals based upon the surrender of the rights of Irak in Mosul.

3. I had hoped that I had thus made clear the position of His Majesty's Government, but it appears from the contents of your present communication, that you failed to appreciate my declaration. I therefore repeat it to your Government. For on examination of the present Turkish proposals I find that they are, in fact, based upon the handing over to Turkey of a considerable portion of the Mosul Vilayet.

4. I must therefore repeat that His Majesty's Government cannot consider any arrangement by which the rights of Irak would be surrendered in exchange for the grant of economic advantages to British subjects. After the fruitless discussions at Lausanne in 1923 and at Constantinople in 1924 the issue was referred to the League of Nations for decision in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne. The Commission appointed by the League has now completed its enquiries on the spot and is engaged in preparing its report to the League. Both the

British and Turkish Governments are pledged to accept the League's decision. In these circumstances not only is the British Government precluded by its duties as mandatory from transferring away the rights and interests of the people of Irak, but it would appear to be a marked discourtesy to the League of Nations itself to withdraw from the matter at this stage the decision which we have invited, and for which the Council has received the preliminary enquiries.

5. His Majesty's Government must therefore decline to proceed with the proposed agreement, but I shall be glad if you will inform your Government of our hope that when the frontier question has been settled in accordance with the decision of the League of Nations and the stipulations of the Treaty of Lausanne our common interests may find their full and natural expression in cordial political relations and renewed financial and commercial intercourse.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

E 2179 1091 44 No. 144

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (Received April 14.)

(No. 258.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 3, 1925.*

HERR NADOLNY, the German Ambassador, is one of those who repeated to me the rumour referred to in paragraph 6 of my despatch No. 258 of the 31st ultimo, that the troops entrusted for the suppression of the Kurdish revolt might be turned and used as a menace to Irak. He returned a couple of days ago from Angora, where he had presented his credentials as Ambassador, and I asked him if he had gathered from further impressions as to these reports. He told me that he had questioned two persons about the possibility of Turkey's attempting a raid into Irak, the first the Russian Ambassador, M. Surritz, who said to him with just a touch of regret in his tone that there was no indication of the Turks having any such intention, and that he did not believe the rumours. The second person Herr Nadolny had questioned was Kemal ed-Din Sami Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador in Berlin, with whom Herr Nadolny was in good terms. Kemal ed-Din had simply scouted the idea of any attempt in the direction of Irak and had said that the Turkish Government were, however, so imprudent as to fall foul of Great Britain in such a manner.

2. Kemal ed-Din Sami, who is rated as one of the best generals in the Turkish army, was summoned by telegraph from Berlin to Angora to take command against the Kurdish rebels and left in such haste that he could only take hand baggage with him. By the time, however, that he received his destination the Turkish authorities had recovered confidence and began to think it unnecessary to pay the rebels the compliment of putting Kemal ed-Din against them. The pasha was therefore sent to Eski Shehr to settle some questions of accounts with the army corps he used to command there, and is now rather expecting to be sent back to his post at Berlin.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

E 2180 109 44 No. 145

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. Received April 14.)

(No. 269. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 3, 1925.*

M. DESSE CURELY, the French Chargé d'Affaires, called on me to-day to relate to me the circumstances in which he had made his recent journey to Paris.

2. He represents, as you may know, everything that is opposed to the Franklin Boullon Mongin school of policy and one of procedure at Turkey and, having voiced his feelings frankly in his reports, never knew quite how he stood at the Quai d'Orsay. About the middle of March he was surprised to receive a telegram from M. Herriot about his forthcoming transfer from here, but full of amicability, promises and compliments. He replied with one or two questions, and was told to come to Paris at once.

3. M. Sarraut is quite reserved but friendly. He had seen that he greatly disliked the idea of M. Franklin Bouillon coming to Turkey at all, that he had insisted that he should not be allowed to compromise the future in any way, but that all efforts to persuade him to give up the journey altogether had completely failed.

4. At the Quai d'Orsay everyone had been most friendly to M. Jesse Cowley, including M. Herriot himself, who had spoken most sympathetically about M. Franklin Bouillon and his refusal to allow a wide breach to be opened between himself and his colleagues. M. Jesse Cowley also gathered the impression that the offer of the mission to Turkey made to M. Franklin Bouillon had actually been withdrawn at the Embassy's request, and this alone accounted for the hesitation with which the Government's proposal was received by the opposition. M. Albert Sarraut, like a man who, after expecting for months past the recall of an unpopular colleague, suddenly finds himself floated into a sea of troubles, is the victim of conflicting pressures with which he himself has had nothing to do.

5. As to M. Franklin Bouillon's colleagues and future opposite. He returned from Angora on the 2nd and left again for Paris on the 3rd. M. Jesse Cowley was on the point of leaving Constantinople on the 4th when he hastily ordered the launch to be got ready to proceed to the Piraeus.

6. The interpretation, however, to be drawn from all this is that M. Franklin Bouillon has had no official instructions to enter into negotiations whatever with the Turkish Government during his visit to Angora.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 2192/109/44 — No. 14

Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople) to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (*Received April 14*)

(No. 285.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 7, 1925*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 269 of the 3rd instant I have the honour to report that M. Franklin Bouillon on the 4th instant received the journalists of Constantinople and gave them an interview. His declarations were lengthy and consisted largely of what is already known. In particular he declared that he had no mission to fulfil at Angora and the object of his journey was to explore and to examine himself for a possible return to Turkey. This, he said, was due to the situation of politics in France where the question of security so much overshadowed every other that he could not remain away from Paris. For this however reason offers to Turkish friends and consolations. He trusted that a reason would be found to bring Parisian interests in touch with Turkish *rapprochement* as he considered that Turkey and the Soviet Union would be replaced here by M. Sarraut, whose character he pointed out would be put forward for the post, and who had been one of the first to raise his voice in opposition to the Treaty of Sèvres. To safeguard Franco-Turkish relations and to also congratulate himself on leaving behind him two friends, General Mougin and Colonel Sarrou.

2. That same evening M. Franklin Bouillon left for Paris direct. He had intended to proceed via Bucharest, but gave out that M. Briand had summoned him to France by telegram in connection with the political crisis.

3. I learn on good authority that while at Angora M. Franklin Bouillon's activities were seriously curtailed by illness. He was considerably troubled by an attack of angina. He saw the Ghazi, Fethi on each of his departure and he had several talks with Tewfik Rushdi Bey, but with Ismet Pasha only once. I have heard a tale that at Midania M. Franklin Bouillon became insane and committed suicide by jumping from the train, but I cannot vouch for the truth of this.

4. It remains to be seen whether General Mougin and Colonel Sarrou will form part of M. Sarraut's staff. For the pensions of the former it is to be doubted whether he will consent to sacrifice his present position of independence and subordinate himself entirely to his Ambassador in Constantinople, and it is equally hard to believe that M. Sarraut, an ex-Minister, coming out as Ambassador, can allow the present state of affairs to continue. If Mougin leaves, French policy in Turkey may be loyal or disloyal to His Majesty's Government, but at any rate, it will lose some of its present ambiguity.

5. As to Colonel Sarrou, I understand that he is being put forward for the post of military attaché, which General Mougin declines on the ground that he already practically has the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary. Colonel Sarrou, I believe, is of a somewhat unsavoury reputation in connection with concession hunting schemes and he does not possess the high technical qualifications which the French Ministry of War usually requires from the officers it nominates for military attachéships abroad.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 2196/109/44 — No. 147

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (*Received April 14*)

(No. 866.)

His Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of correspondence with M. Herriot respecting the place of residence of the Allied representatives in Turkey.

Paris, April 9, 1925.

Enclosure in No. 147

Memorandum communicated to M. Herriot

His Majesty's Ambassador is directed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to enclose a copy of M. Herriot's note of the 24th March, regarding the unsatisfactory position of the Ambassadors of the three Allied Powers at Constantinople. His Majesty's Ambassador is instructed to express to the Government of the Republic the thanks of His Majesty's Government for the assurances contained in that note.

His Majesty's Government presume that the French representative at Constantinople has received from the Turkish Government a note similar to that which has been received by Mr. Lindsay. Mr. Lindsay has suggested a reply which might be given to the Turks, and His Majesty's Government have referred it to the Ambassadors of France, Italy and Japan for their observations. The suggestion by Mr. Lindsay is to the effect that similar answers should be returned by the French and Italian colleagues. The proposed reply is to the following effect:

"His Majesty's Government have noted with sincere satisfaction the impending offer of land at Angora for construction of an official residence. They do not, however, think the existence of any kind of compulsion should be exercised to force representatives of foreign Powers to reside any longer at one rather than another of their official residences. It will always be for the foreign representatives to reside at that place where the interests of their Governments and their relations with Turkey require."

His Majesty's Ambassador is requested to urge that the Government of the Republic may instruct their representative at Constantinople to return a reply in similar terms.

In addition to the above reply it is being suggested to Mr. Lindsay that he should express His personal conviction on any occasion that may present itself that while a British Ambassador would when necessary proceed to Angora as he has just done, yet the Turkish Government were to persist in their intimation that the Ambassador should reside permanently at Angora it is probable that the whole question of British representation in Turkey would be reconsidered.

A similar representation is being made to the Italian Government.

British Embassy, Paris, April 4, 1925.

Enclosure 2 in No 147

M Herriot to the Marquess of Crewe

A la date du 4 le soussigné Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique a bien voulu transmettre au Ministère des Affaires étrangères les remerciements du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté pour les assurances données par le Département des Affaires étrangères en date du 24 mars relative au désir exprimé par le Turquie de transférer les Ambassades des trois Puissances alliées de Constantinople à Angora

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté présumant que le représentant français à Constantinople a reçu du Gouvernement turc une note similaire à celle adressée à Mr Lindsay, a chargé son Ambassadeur à Paris de communiquer au Ministère des Affaires étrangères la réponse que Mr Lindsay a été autorisé à faire à la note turque et pour laquelle des instructions ont été adressées aux représentants français et italien

L'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté a reçu également instruction d'insister auprès du Gouvernement de la République pour qu'il veuille bien donner au représentant français à Constantinople des recommandations identiques à celles suggérées par Mr Lindsay Il a été également spécifié dans cette occasion que si le représentant de l'Ambassadeur de Angleterre se rendrait à Angora aussi souvent qu'il serait nécessaire pour consulter son Gouvernement sur les questions qui se présenteraient pour régler le transfert des Ambassades à Angora et que pendant son absence un représentant britannique en Turquie pourrait être chargé de ces questions

Le Président du Conseil a été prié par l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté de remercier le Gouvernement turc de la courtoisie avec laquelle il avait accueilli les suggestions françaises Il a répondu à Mr Lindsay qu'il avait transmis la note turque au Gouvernement français et qu'il ne pouvait encore se prononcer sur la réponse à y faire Il a ajouté qu'il ne supposait pas que le représentant français à Constantinople s'opposerait à ce que le représentant turc à Paris remette à Mr Lindsay la réponse écrite Il n'a pas fait d'autres observations sur les suggestions générales de celle-ci qui ont été faites par Mr Lindsay au représentant de la Turquie à Constantinople

Le Gouvernement français serait heureux de connaître le plus tôt possible le sentiment du Gouvernement britannique à ce sujet

(HERRIOT)

Paris, 9 avril 1925

Enclosure 3 in No 147

Proposed Reply to Nusret Bey

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de la note que Votre Excellence, en réponse à la mienne du 23 mars qu'il est très sensible à l'offre que le Gouvernement turc a bien voulu me faire à sa disposition un terrain à Angora pour la construction de la résidence de l'Ambassadeur de France

Le Gouvernement français tient à vous dire qu'il se réserve entièrement la liberté de prendre en temps voulu la décision qu'il estimera être la plus conforme à la dignité du Gouvernement turc et aux intérêts de la France

Le Gouvernement français tient également à vous faire connaître que, comme il a déjà eu l'occasion de le faire savoir à Votre Excellence, il a l'intention de maintenir à Constantinople un Ambassadeur de France

Le Gouvernement français tient à vous dire qu'il se réserve entièrement la liberté de prendre en temps voulu la décision qu'il estimera être la plus conforme à la dignité du Gouvernement turc et aux intérêts de la France

Le Gouvernement français tient également à vous faire connaître que, comme il a déjà eu l'occasion de le faire savoir à Votre Excellence, il a l'intention de maintenir à Constantinople un Ambassadeur de France

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l'Ambassadeur de la République française se rendra à Angora aussi souvent et y demeurera aussi longtemps que sa présence y sera nécessaire, il y sera représenté d'une manière permanente, par un agent ayant toute sa confiance et toute qualité pour parler en son nom

Le Gouvernement d'Angora peut être assuré que le Gouvernement français, en agissant ainsi, n'a en vue que de rendre la mission de son représentant en Turquie aussi fructueuse que possible pour le plus grand bien des deux pays

(HERRIOT)

E 2356/2356/44] No 148

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received April 20)

(No 301)

Sir *Constantinople, April* 15, 1925

WITH reference to your predecessor's despatch No 832 of the 28th July last, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note which I have addressed to Nusret Bey regarding the appointment by the Turkish Government of sanitary counsellors in accordance with the declaration made by the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne Conference on the 24th July 1923.

2 My Italian colleague on his return from Angora recently informed the Grand Vizier's Private Secretary that he had learnt while there that the Turks were hoping to collect the appointment of these counsellors until the Sanitary Exposition had passed its first sessions work. They intend to take advantage of the absence of the International Powers and no longer any hurry in sanitary matters to avoid linking the appointments together. In these circumstances we decided to address identical notes on the subject to Nusret Bey. The enclosed note shows the form agreed upon.

I have &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

Enclosure in No 148

Note communicated to Nusret Bey

AUX termes de la déclaration relative aux questions sanitaires signée à Lausanne le 24 juillet 1923, les délégués turcs s'engagent en vertu de leurs pleins pouvoirs et de leur part du Gouvernement turc à nommer pour être reçus auprès trois hauts fonctionnaires spécialistes compétents, connus sous le nom de Conseillers sanitaires des Frontières. Ces fonctionnaires sont indépendants des Turcs et dépendent du Ministère de la Santé. Ils seront choisis parmi la liste de six noms établie et soumise par le Comité d'Hygiène de la Société des Nations et par l'Office international d'Hygiène publique. Leur traitement ainsi que les autres conditions de leur engagement seront fixés d'un commun accord entre ledit Gouvernement et les dits organes internationaux susmentionnés.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a l'honneur de signaler à la haute attention du Gouvernement de la République turque l'intérêt qu'il y aurait à la prompte désignation desdits conseillers, afin qu'ils puissent, le plus tôt possible prêter leur concours à l'Administration sanitaire turque pour l'établissement et le règlement définitif de l'organisation sanitaire des côtes et frontières de la Turquie dont l'état actuel a été réglementé par la déclaration précitée.

Mr Lindsay se félicite de reconnaître à son Excellence Nusret Bey de vouloir bien se mettre en rapport avec le Gouvernement turc pour l'exécution des dispositions adoptées par le Gouvernement turc pour l'accomplissement de l'engagement qui a été ainsi pris par lui.

Ambassade d'Angleterre, Constantinople
le 7 avril 1925

E 2368 1231 44] No. 59

Mr. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (*Received April 21.*)

(No. 302.)
Sir,

Constantinople, April 14, 1925.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 145 of the 24th February last, the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegate in this city informs me that the question of establishing diplomatic relations between Soviet Russia and Serbia is in a good way to be settled. On the Serb side, Belgrade consents to grant an independent diplomatic status to the Turkish representative there, which hitherto has worked only as a functionary in the Polish Legation; and I received from the Turkish Government through whom public reference concerning Turkish rights in regard to the partition of the debt. On the other hand, the Turkish Government insists to negotiate a treaty of peace and friendship on a simple basis similar to those which they have recently concluded with other States. This course is the most expeditious, as the other one, of concluding first a consular agreement, is open to objections when they are not necessary; and in view of the small direct relations between Serbia and Turkey, M. Gyzikoff does not attach the necessity of insisting on these negotiations. Furthermore, Turkey has agreed that the negotiations of the Treaty of Friendship may take place either at Angora or at Constantinople, a proviso which was made by the Turkish Government to take effect only after peace had been settled. Hitherto, while Serbian interests in Turkey have been looked after by the Italian Embassy, Turkey has left the country for abroad, she has not been allowed to do so. The Turkish authorities have now admitted that this opposition was based on an erroneous interpretation of the law.

2. This settlement, if observed, will constitute for Serbia a victory all along the line, though it is said that M. Gyzikoff insists that the telling attitude of Turkey in the event in Kurdistan and the consequent desire of Angora to be in normal and correct relations with Belgrade during recent critical events in which the Croat-Serb-Slovene Government took a hostile part, are responsible for the agreement.

3. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Belgrade.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

E 2358 194 44 No. 60

Mr. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (*Received April 20.*)

No. 304.
Sir,

Constantinople, April 15, 1925.

I REPORTED in my despatch No. 258 paragraph 2 that the People's party had approved a resolution to confirm the first sentences passed by courts-martial in the case of the rebels, could be executed only on approval by corps or divisional commanders. On the very eve of the 31st March this proposition came before the Assembly in the form of a Bill and was opposed by the members of the Progressive party, who, like Nuri Bey, the Minister of Defence, made a vehement speech against the opposition. The latter, with some courage, questioned the constitutionality of the Bill, and pointed out that under the present exceptional circumstances the Government would have at its power by executing martial law to alter even the verdict of acquittal in part a large part of the jurisdiction of the courts-martial while the proper guarantee that the power of capital punishment would not be abused. The law was voted by 120 odd votes to 21.

2. Since then the papers have reported several executions, especially at Diarbekir. To-day it is stated that at Bitlis the executions have taken place of Yussuf Ziya, ex-Deputy of Bitlis, of Feizi, Halid Djirli, of his brother-in-law Lutfi Mevlut, and of one Abdi Ratip. There is now sitting the Tribunal of Independence for the eastern vilayets having yet begun operations that at Angora its activities have been somewhat restricted, and none of its cases appear to be of great importance. It could also be a deterrent effect on the wayward.

3. At the beginning of the week the police of Constantinople raided the offices of the Progressive party and seized a number of papers. Reouf Bey, one of the most prominent members of the party, declared in the press that the Government was acting within its rights, and was quite at liberty to see anything that the party had nothing to conceal from anybody. This is doubtless true, and the Government must know well that even if the Progressives ever had had any compromising documents in their premises, they would long ago have made away with them. The Government's object is partly to suggest that ever through the recent nearly master political repression is not going to cease, their action will also have the effect of frightening people from joining the Opposition party, for there is nothing an Oriental dislikes so much as that the police should have its nose in deed in a political list.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

E 2359 362 65 No. 151

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received April 20.*)

(No. 305.)
Sir,

Constantinople, April 15, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a further report from Major Harone, military attaché to this Embassy, on the progress of the operations against the rebels in Kurdistan.

2. It is always worth while remembering that all the information received from Government offices at Angora and may therefore be open to suspicion. For more than a fortnight now it has recorded a series of successes, and place after place has been occupied by the Government troops. I imagine there is more to it than those facts, for the rebels are without transport or commissariat services and cannot maintain concentrations long enough to oppose organised forces, who must therefore be made to proceed slowly from village to village. The right command may even thus talk. The interesting question was whether the rebels will maintain their energy and determination to carry on a guerilla warfare and if they do, how much they will thereby embarrass the Government. On this point I have no precise information. The newspapers have made one or two mentions of guerilla warfare, and Ismet Pasha in his declaration to the Assembly a week ago (my despatch No. 289 of the 8th April) said that operations were not over, and foreshadowed the transfer of the warfare to the mountains.

3. The point of interest to His Majesty's Government is on it turns the question whether the Turks will be able to turn their troops round and use them as a menace to Iraq, a question which I discussed in my despatch No. 298 of the 31st March (paragraph 6). It was always known that many arms of the Turks have had such a movement in mind, and it seems to be a current topic of conversation among officers. In the last fortnight the tone of this talk would have been more abusive and perhaps more threatening. There has for some days been quite a little anti-British campaign in the press mainly about Mosul. Perhaps it is due to the return from Irak of Feyad Pasha, assessor to the League's commission, who has given pressure material for talk, possibly for the papers and to discuss internal politics, or to let themselves go in diatribes against our imperialism. The campaign has not been very violent, but it has been fed by a stream of telegrams from Angora of an irredentist nature describing repressive measures against pro-Turks in Mosul. It is also stated that various agents are being recruited for stirring up discontent and sent to the area of the rebellion there or Irak, and that Nestorians from Irak are being allowed to make attacks in the neighbourhood of Chi.

4. Reuf Bey's reasoning to Commandant Nevrone (see Major Harone's despatch, enclosure 1, paragraph 5*) is interesting. Reuf is in the inner circle of Government, of which he is a most responsible and authoritative. At the same time he would be well aware of the people's duty that his words will be reported to the British Embassy, and from the fact of his having spoken as he did one can only

* Not printed.

for that the Turkish authorities are not unwilling that His Majesty's Government should know that they are thinking of a retreat to Irak

It is significant that it is worth while remembering the offer made by Zekiai Bey for a retreat settlement of the Irak frontier question It can hardly be supposed that the offer was seriously made as it is precisely of the nature which would commit Turkey most before and after Zekiai was the main issue The Turkish Government may have argued to themselves that it could do no material harm to themselves to put the offer forward and that it would be useful for them with public opinion at Angora to publish the facts of their offer if later on they did what to carry out an aggressive policy with regard to Mosul The news of the offer having been made as appeared here in telegrams from London as having been published in the Daily Mail I presume it was given out by the Turkish Embassy in London

6 Finally Paris will remember that last autumn they successfully stamped a demarche of Angora in the Chaldaean affair that they kept the greater part of their loot in defiance of the League of Nations and of something like an intimation from His Majesty's Government This recollection cannot fail to encourage those who are so inclined to meditate on a policy of adventure once more

7 These possibilities are worthy of grave consideration Still even if serious Turkish thinking of their eventually playing a minor counter part with a view to them will not necessarily follow that they have yet made up their minds to attack or even seriously to menace Iraq I do think they are toying with the idea but the country is not in a condition to be a prey of perilous adventure and I doubt if a display of Jesperate aggression against Irak would meet discontent more than the sullen acquiescence to the support of the Government

I have &c
R C LINDSAY

E 2370 175 44] No. 52

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (Received April 25)

Translation of Republique Turque
Excellency *Angora, le 30 mars* 1925

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence et sur les instructions de mon Gouvernement très exactement les quelques points de désaccord qui subsistent encore entre la Turquie et le Conseil de la Société des Nations

Mon Gouvernement a toujours exposé très objectivement et à la suite de chacune des séances du Conseil de la Société des Nations à laquelle il a participé les différents points de vue exprimés au cours des discussions et contenus dans les rapports et résolutions qui ont été adoptés Il a également fait connaître à plusieurs reprises son désir de voir régler définitivement et dans le plus bref délai possible la question de la frontière turco-irakienne Il a également fait connaître à plusieurs reprises son désir de voir régler définitivement et dans le plus bref délai possible la question de la frontière turco-irakienne Il a également fait connaître à plusieurs reprises son désir de voir régler définitivement et dans le plus bref délai possible la question de la frontière turco-irakienne

Le Gouvernement de la République turque a toujours manifesté son désir de voir régler définitivement et dans le plus bref délai possible la question de la frontière turco-irakienne Il a également fait connaître à plusieurs reprises son désir de voir régler définitivement et dans le plus bref délai possible la question de la frontière turco-irakienne

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Dans la note du Gouvernement turque en date du 19 mars 1925 [illegible] Votre Excellence trouvera sous pli ci-joint les documents nécessaires à la solution pacifique très prochaine de ces différends

Je saisis &c
ZEKIAI

[E 2506 301 44 No. 153

Sir H. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (Received April 27)

No. 135)
Sir *Athens, April 17, 1925*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the appointment of M. Pericles Argyropoulos as Greek Minister at Angora has been officially announced in the press and is attributed by engaged at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs though I do not believe that it *quite* the Turkish Government as yet has secured M. Argyropoulos has held the post of secretary general of the Foreign Office for seven months Though a Greek of Egypt he is partly Irish on his mother's side and has resided much in Paris so that his manners are somewhat imperfectly Greek However that is certainly less unfortunate than if he had been entirely Greek and had been selected from the Diplomatic world of Athens

2 The appointment of M. Argyropoulos as Angora has been made with the object of developing the gently more cordial relations which have recently been established by conversations between M. Argyropoulos and the Turkish Government and he is generally said to be very well pleased at his appointment as he considers it better than to remain permanently in Athens It was expected that the negotiations pending between the two countries would be settled but it is understood that Zekki Bey and M. Venizelos have come to a good deal of the ground and that the results have not been satisfactory

3 More substantial grounds for these comparisons have reached His Majesty's Government from Constantinople I gather that the question of the Patriarchate and the relations of M. Venizelos with the Patriarch are the chief causes of the present strained relations between the Turkish Government and the Ecumenical Patriarchate

4 Meanwhile it is currently stated that the Patriarch is showing great moderation and tact The situation however is not clear I am not for the moment in a position to forward any report

I have &c
MILNE CHEETHAM

E 2492 313 44 No. 51

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (Received April 27)

(No. 316.)
Sir *Constantinople, April 21, 1925*

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Paul Boyer, administrateur of the Paris School of Oriental Languages, arrived here on the 12th instant accompanied by his wife and left again on the 18th for Angora on the first stage of his journey to Konia and Brussa

2. During an interview which I gave to him, M. Boyer stated that the French Government would defray the expenses necessary to make the building loaned from the Turkish Government suitable for its new purposes as well as the expenses of staff and material The Institute would be essentially a place for French scholars who would devote themselves to acquiring knowledge of the Turks and of things Turkish It would differ from the French schools at Athens and Rome in not sanctioning itself to matters of history and archæological interest alone It would welcome French men of learning of every kind provided that their studies related to Turkey He mentioned that Turkish architectural art for example had not been studied as it deserved although it was quite original and distinct from Arab or Persian art There were also numerous Turkish funerary inscriptions, the collation of which was incomplete and would be impossible unless prompt action was taken

3 With regard to the arrangement of the building M Rouet stated that in addition to four or five flats for persons who came to work in the institute they would require a library and a lecture room He pointed out that the French Government had during the last two years been exchanging professors as was also occurring at present between the members of the institute and their colleagues of the University of Constantinople A place would be kept for the Turkish professors in the works which the institute would publish periodically and it depended on them how large that place would be He stated in conclusion that the institute would not fail to make a valuable contribution to knowledge of the East in general and of Turkey in particular and would consequently bring together all those connected with it because of ties sometimes distinct sometimes always unites

4 It was then that at the last moment difficulties arose in connection with the handing over of the barracks Sari Kishla assigned by the Turkish Government for the use of the institute, and that Nusret Bey was obliged to write to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Public Instruction asking that steps might be taken for the transfer to be effected

I have, &c
R C LINDSAY

E 2493 109 44] No 15

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain - (Received April 27)

(No 317)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 22, 1925*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Baron de Villenfagne le Sourdines the Belgian Minister to Turkey was received in audience by the President of the Republic on the 20th instant and presented to him his letters of credence

2 I have the honour to enclose herein a translation from the Turkish of the speeches exchanged on this occasion As you will observe particular stress was laid on the commercial relations between the two countries The Belgian Minister hints in somewhat veiled fashion at the desirability of concluding a commercial convention the President in his reply, while assuring that wheat and cotton abound in Turkey a statement which is entirely untrue adopts a very reserved tone towards the substance of M le Villenfagne's suggestions

3 Now the Belgians claim to have a commercial treaty with the Turks M German Netherlands Hungarian Swedish and other colleagues have recently endeavoured to persuade the Turkish Government to negotiate but quite in vain The Turks have always maintained that they are quite willing to accord to the subjects the treatment stipulated in the Commercial Convention attached to the Lausanne Treaty in favour of Allied subjects but Angora although it has signed similar treaties with Austria and Poland has recently refused to commit itself further by signatures even of this nature, stating that a gentleman's agreement is sufficient and forgetting that a formal agreement was one to which they are pledged

The Turkish Ministers state quite openly that the Commercial Convention of Lausanne was wrung out of them as the price of peace that they intend to denounce it at the earliest permissible moment and thereafter accord all foreign Governments on the same footing

I have, &c
R C LINDSAY

Enclosure in No 15

Extract from the Hakimiet i Millieh of April 15 1925

(Translation)

His Excellency the President of the Republic received the Belgian Minister M Villenfagne at Cran Kavak with the customary ceremonial The Minister presented his letter of credence and read the following speech

Mr President,

"I feel highly honoured in presenting the letter of credence by which the King, my august Sovereign accredits me to your Excellency (literally the

As one of the Presidency You are the head of a nation which we esteem greatly for its seventy years' constancy and tragic unity Under your enlightened administration the Turkish nation is adopting to-day with the zest of *élan* of progress which astonishes Belgium

I beg your permission to say that the following are the principal points Our interests to-day lie in developing our industries our geographical situation which increases our desire and right to see that we may be able to procure the necessary wheat for our food the necessary cotton for our clothes and so forth Our country, which is the seat of many of the most famous battlefields of the world, is also a country of peace and enjoys the benefits of freedom and tranquillity Belgium is a country which has always been open to all spheres of human endeavour

As representative of your Excellency's country we have greatly desired to create with Turkey relations as friendly as those which exist between Turkey and other [illegible]

I trust that I shall be able to fulfil my task to the satisfaction of both countries

His Excellency the President of the Republic made the following reply

[illegible] Majesty the King of Belgium [illegible] Upon the establishment of the Turkish Republic [illegible] Turkish nation, under the new régime, [illegible] with the Belgian nation [illegible] Belgium [illegible] Turkey [illegible] Belgium [illegible] Turkey [illegible] Belgium [illegible] Turkey

...wering to regard the British authorities to penetrate to Kurdistan from the south.

3. It was hoped for shortly to receive an expression of opinion from Turkey as to the matter, but on the 10th March a statement was published in the Turkish Press to the effect that the Turkish Government had been informed by the British Government that they were prepared to withdraw their troops from Kurdistan, and that they were only waiting for the Turkish Government to make arrangements for the withdrawal. No official confirmation of this statement has been received, but it is believed that the Turkish Government have in fact given orders for the withdrawal of their troops from Kurdistan.

4. The Turkish Government have also been informed that His Majesty's Government are prepared to withdraw their troops from Mosul, provided that a satisfactory settlement is arrived at between Turkey and Iraq, and that the League of Nations is prepared to undertake the duty of supervising the execution of the terms of such settlement. It is understood that the Turkish Government have agreed to this proposal, and that they are now awaiting the decision of the League of Nations.

5. It is hoped that the Council of the League will be able to arrive at a decision on the question of the Mosul vilayet at its session which opens on the 12th March, and that the decision will be accepted by both parties. It is, however, impossible to foretell what the decision will be, and it is quite possible that the Council may find it impossible to arrive at a unanimous decision. In that event the question will be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, and it may be many months before a decision is given.

6. The Turkish Government have been informed that, pending the decision of the League of Nations, His Majesty's Government are prepared to withdraw their troops from Mosul, provided that the Turkish Government undertake to withdraw their troops from the neutral zone, and to refrain from any military action against the Kurds. It is understood that the Turkish Government have agreed to this proposal, and that they are now awaiting the decision of the League of Nations.

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8. The Turkish Government have been informed that, pending the decision of the League of Nations, His Majesty's Government are prepared to withdraw their troops from Mosul, provided that the Turkish Government undertake to withdraw their troops from the neutral zone, and to refrain from any military action against the Kurds. It is understood that the Turkish Government have agreed to this proposal, and that they are now awaiting the decision of the League of Nations.

9. It is hoped that the League of Nations will be able to arrive at a decision on the question of the Mosul vilayet at its session which opens on the 12th March, and that the decision will be accepted by both parties. It is, however, impossible to foretell what the decision will be, and it is quite possible that the Council may find it impossible to arrive at a unanimous decision. In that event the question will be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, and it may be many months before a decision is given.

10. The Turkish Government have been informed that, pending the decision of the League of Nations, His Majesty's Government are prepared to withdraw their troops from Mosul, provided that the Turkish Government undertake to withdraw their troops from the neutral zone, and to refrain from any military action against the Kurds. It is understood that the Turkish Government have agreed to this proposal, and that they are now awaiting the decision of the League of Nations.

11. It is hoped that the League of Nations will be able to arrive at a decision on the question of the Mosul vilayet at its session which opens on the 12th March, and that the decision will be accepted by both parties. It is, however, impossible to foretell what the decision will be, and it is quite possible that the Council may find it impossible to arrive at a unanimous decision. In that event the question will be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, and it may be many months before a decision is given.

12. The Turkish Government have been informed that, pending the decision of the League of Nations, His Majesty's Government are prepared to withdraw their troops from Mosul, provided that the Turkish Government undertake to withdraw their troops from the neutral zone, and to refrain from any military action against the Kurds. It is understood that the Turkish Government have agreed to this proposal, and that they are now awaiting the decision of the League of Nations.

13. It is hoped that the League of Nations will be able to arrive at a decision on the question of the Mosul vilayet at its session which opens on the 12th March, and that the decision will be accepted by both parties. It is, however, impossible to foretell what the decision will be, and it is quite possible that the Council may find it impossible to arrive at a unanimous decision. In that event the question will be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, and it may be many months before a decision is given.

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15. It is hoped that the League of Nations will be able to arrive at a decision on the question of the Mosul vilayet at its session which opens on the 12th March, and that the decision will be accepted by both parties. It is, however, impossible to foretell what the decision will be, and it is quite possible that the Council may find it impossible to arrive at a unanimous decision. In that event the question will be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, and it may be many months before a decision is given.

16. The Turkish Government have been informed that, pending the decision of the League of Nations, His Majesty's Government are prepared to withdraw their troops from Mosul, provided that the Turkish Government undertake to withdraw their troops from the neutral zone, and to refrain from any military action against the Kurds. It is understood that the Turkish Government have agreed to this proposal, and that they are now awaiting the decision of the League of Nations.

17. It is hoped that the League of Nations will be able to arrive at a decision on the question of the Mosul vilayet at its session which opens on the 12th March, and that the decision will be accepted by both parties. It is, however, impossible to foretell what the decision will be, and it is quite possible that the Council may find it impossible to arrive at a unanimous decision. In that event the question will be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, and it may be many months before a decision is given.

18. The Turkish Government have been informed that, pending the decision of the League of Nations, His Majesty's Government are prepared to withdraw their troops from Mosul, provided that the Turkish Government undertake to withdraw their troops from the neutral zone, and to refrain from any military action against the Kurds. It is understood that the Turkish Government have agreed to this proposal, and that they are now awaiting the decision of the League of Nations.

19. It is hoped that the League of Nations will be able to arrive at a decision on the question of the Mosul vilayet at its session which opens on the 12th March, and that the decision will be accepted by both parties. It is, however, impossible to foretell what the decision will be, and it is quite possible that the Council may find it impossible to arrive at a unanimous decision. In that event the question will be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, and it may be many months before a decision is given.

20. The Turkish Government have been informed that, pending the decision of the League of Nations, His Majesty's Government are prepared to withdraw their troops from Mosul, provided that the Turkish Government undertake to withdraw their troops from the neutral zone, and to refrain from any military action against the Kurds. It is understood that the Turkish Government have agreed to this proposal, and that they are now awaiting the decision of the League of Nations.

21. It is hoped that the League of Nations will be able to arrive at a decision on the question of the Mosul vilayet at its session which opens on the 12th March, and that the decision will be accepted by both parties. It is, however, impossible to foretell what the decision will be, and it is quite possible that the Council may find it impossible to arrive at a unanimous decision. In that event the question will be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, and it may be many months before a decision is given.

22. The Turkish Government have been informed that, pending the decision of the League of Nations, His Majesty's Government are prepared to withdraw their troops from Mosul, provided that the Turkish Government undertake to withdraw their troops from the neutral zone, and to refrain from any military action against the Kurds. It is understood that the Turkish Government have agreed to this proposal, and that they are now awaiting the decision of the League of Nations.

23. It is hoped that the League of Nations will be able to arrive at a decision on the question of the Mosul vilayet at its session which opens on the 12th March, and that the decision will be accepted by both parties. It is, however, impossible to foretell what the decision will be, and it is quite possible that the Council may find it impossible to arrive at a unanimous decision. In that event the question will be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, and it may be many months before a decision is given.

24. The Turkish Government have been informed that, pending the decision of the League of Nations, His Majesty's Government are prepared to withdraw their troops from Mosul, provided that the Turkish Government undertake to withdraw their troops from the neutral zone, and to refrain from any military action against the Kurds. It is understood that the Turkish Government have agreed to this proposal, and that they are now awaiting the decision of the League of Nations.

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E 2634 194 44

Mr. Lindsay to the Earl of Balfour (Received May 4)

(No. 551)

Sir,

Constantinople, April 28, 1925.

With reference to Article 22 of the Treaty of Lausanne, I have the honour to report that the Vali of Smyrna has informed the Turkish authorities that Ottoman Government has decided to withdraw consent to the Greek Government's proposal for the establishment of a Greek Consulate at Smyrna.

2. The Vali of Smyrna has also informed the Turkish authorities that the Ottoman Government has decided to withdraw consent to the proposal of the Greek Government for the establishment of a Greek Consulate at Aivali.

3. I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

E 2634 194 44

Mr. Lindsay to the Earl of Balfour (Received May 4)

(No. 552)

Sir,

Constantinople, April 28, 1925.

With reference to Article 22 of the Treaty of Lausanne, I have the honour to report that the Vali of Smyrna has informed the Turkish authorities that Ottoman Government has decided to withdraw consent to the proposal of the Greek Government for the establishment of a Greek Consulate at Aivali.

2. I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

E 2636 109 44

Mr. Lindsay to the Earl of Balfour (Received May 4)

No. 553

Sir,

Constantinople, April 28, 1925.

With reference to previous correspondence ending with your despatch No. 818 of 20th November last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a note which Mr. Ford addressed to the Turkish Government on the subject of the Mosul question.

2. The Embassy have always known, and Mr. Ford's instructions were to the effect, that the Turkish Government would never agree to the cession of Mosul to Iraq. Nevertheless, it was thought desirable that the Turkish Government should be given an opportunity of stating their case in writing, and Mr. Ford's note was drawn up with this object in view. The Turkish reply, which is now awaited, will be carefully studied, and I will report to you further on receipt of it.

3. I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

Treaty of Lausanne and the Treaty of Ankara in order to demonstrate the said breach of the Treaty and Protocol.

I shall be glad if you will bring the above matter to the notice of the Turkish Government and I shall be grateful for an early reply to this letter.

I have &c.
(For the Ambassador)
R. H. HOARE.

No. 161

Mr. Lindsay to Nusret Bey

Ambassade d'Angleterre,
Pera, le Dimanche *Constantinople, le 26 avril 1925*

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre lettre de ce jour, dans laquelle Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire connaître que les pêcheurs anglais ne seront pas autorisés à pêcher dans les eaux territoriales de Sa Majesté britannique sans avoir obtenu préalablement les permis nécessaires du Gouvernement de la République turque. Votre Excellence a bien voulu me demander de transmettre cette information à mon Gouvernement, ce que je m'empresse de faire par la présente.

Si vous le désirez, je suis prêt à vous donner, dès maintenant, des assurances formelles que les pêcheurs anglais ne pêcheront pas dans les eaux territoriales de la République turque sans avoir obtenu préalablement les permis nécessaires. Je suis également prêt à vous donner l'assurance que les autorités britanniques compétentes prendront toutes les mesures nécessaires pour empêcher les pêcheurs anglais de pêcher dans les eaux territoriales de la République turque sans avoir obtenu préalablement les permis nécessaires.

Veuillez &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 162

Note from the Italian Ambassador to Nusret Bey

Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence que le Gouvernement du Roi, ému par les très sérieuses difficultés que la Grande Assemblée Nationale d'Angora a suscitées à l'Ambassadeur d'Italie auprès d'elle, a décidé de rappeler immédiatement son Ambassadeur à Angora.

En prenant cette décision, le Gouvernement du Roi a tenu à bien préciser que le retrait de son représentant auprès du Gouvernement d'Angora ne devait pas être considéré comme un acte d'hostilité envers la Turquie, mais comme une mesure de caractère purement local, motivée par le désir de ne pas laisser plus longtemps sans représentant un poste aussi important que celui d'Angora, où la présence d'un Ambassadeur d'Italie est nécessaire pour la défense des intérêts italiens.

Le Gouvernement du Roi a également tenu à ce que son Ambassadeur ne quitte pas la Turquie sans avoir pris congé du Gouvernement de la République turque, auquel il a fait part de la décision prise par le Gouvernement du Roi.

Je suis chargé par mon Gouvernement de prier Votre Excellence de vouloir bien porter ce qui précède à la connaissance du Gouvernement de la République turque.

Veuillez &c.
L'Ambassadeur d'Italie.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angora, pendant tout le temps qu'il a résidé à Angora, a été l'objet de la part du Gouvernement turc de toutes les attentions et de toutes les prévenances. Le Gouvernement du Roi a tenu à lui témoigner sa satisfaction et sa gratitude pour la manière dont il a rempli sa mission.

Le Gouvernement du Roi a également tenu à ce que le départ de son Ambassadeur d'Angora ne fût pas considéré comme un acte d'hostilité envers la Turquie, mais comme une mesure de caractère purement local, motivée par le désir de ne pas laisser plus longtemps sans représentant un poste aussi important que celui d'Angora, où la présence d'un Ambassadeur d'Italie est nécessaire pour la défense des intérêts italiens.

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Je suis chargé par mon Gouvernement de prier Votre Excellence de vouloir bien porter ce qui précède à la connaissance du Gouvernement de la République turque.

Veuillez &c.
L'Ambassadeur d'Italie.

No. 163

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople)

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic) R. *Foreign Office, May 18, 1925.*

YOUR Telegram No. 72 [of] 14th May. Turkish Ambassador in London.

Turkish Chargé d'Affaires has been informed of the King's *pleasure*.

No. 164

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain (received May 6)

No. 68.
Telegraphic. R. *Constantinople, May 5, 1925.*

YOUR Telegram No. 194 [of] 1924.

Note from Telegraphic Ministry for Foreign Affairs states that Nestorians who took refuge with inhabitants of villages around Jelu were ordered to assemble in Rowanduz district with help of Royal Turkish Air Force preparatory to transfer to Tigris Hamidieh Serris.

Note adds that Turkish Government have always endeavoured to ensure respect for rights of Christian minorities in Turkish Empire.

Nusret Bey asks to be informed.

Repeated to Bagdad, No. 22.

No. 164

Mr. Kennard to Mr. Austen Chamberlain. Received March 24.)

(No. 5)

Foreign Office, R.

SIR, *Athens, March 23, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I have had a conversation with Colonel Nathaniel, the United States Military Attaché, who has been attached to the Greek Army of Asia Minor during the recent campaign, and who has been in charge of the Military Mission to Zeki Pasha. He has now returned to Athens, and I have had an opportunity of hearing from him what has been the attitude of Zeki Pasha and his staff towards the Greek Army of Asia Minor.

2. The Military Mission was sent to Zeki Pasha's headquarters at the request of His Majesty's Government, who wished to have reliable information as to the military situation. When the Mission arrived at Zeki Pasha's headquarters, Colonel Nathaniel was at once received by Zeki Pasha, who told him that he had been expecting him for some days, and that he had been instructed by Mustafa Kemal to give the Mission every facility for visiting the front. Zeki Pasha also told Colonel Nathaniel that he had been instructed by Mustafa Kemal to treat the Mission with the greatest courtesy, and to show it everything it wished to see. Zeki Pasha then proceeded to explain the military situation as it appeared to him, and Colonel Nathaniel was struck by the fact that Zeki Pasha's views were identical with those which had been expressed to him by General Papoulas, the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army of Asia Minor, during the latter's visit to Athens in January last.

3. Colonel Nathaniel gathered the impression that Zeki Pasha was anxious to show the Mission as much as possible, and that he was not in the least afraid of the Greek Army. Zeki Pasha also told Colonel Nathaniel that he had been instructed by Mustafa Kemal to treat the Mission with the greatest courtesy, and to show it everything it wished to see. Zeki Pasha then proceeded to explain the military situation as it appeared to him, and Colonel Nathaniel was struck by the fact that Zeki Pasha's views were identical with those which had been expressed to him by General Papoulas, the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army of Asia Minor, during the latter's visit to Athens in January last.

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I have &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

E 3004 175 44

Mr. Austen Chamberlain. Received March 25.)

(No. 164)

Foreign Office, March 25.

SIR, I HAVE the honour to report that I have had a conversation with General Nathaniel, the United States Military Attaché, who has been attached to the Greek Army of Asia Minor during the recent campaign, and who has been in charge of the Military Mission to Zeki Pasha. He has now returned to Athens, and I have had an opportunity of hearing from him what has been the attitude of Zeki Pasha and his staff towards the Greek Army of Asia Minor.

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I have &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

E 3005 32 65

Sir A. Chamberlain. Received May 11.)

(No. 5)

Foreign Office, May 11.

SIR, I HAVE the honour to report that I have had a conversation with General Nathaniel, the United States Military Attaché, who has been attached to the Greek Army of Asia Minor during the recent campaign, and who has been in charge of the Military Mission to Zeki Pasha. He has now returned to Athens, and I have had an opportunity of hearing from him what has been the attitude of Zeki Pasha and his staff towards the Greek Army of Asia Minor.

2. The Military Mission was sent to Zeki Pasha's headquarters at the request of His Majesty's Government, who wished to have reliable information as to the military situation. When the Mission arrived at Zeki Pasha's headquarters, Colonel Nathaniel was at once received by Zeki Pasha, who told him that he had been expecting him for some days, and that he had been instructed by Mustafa Kemal to give the Mission every facility for visiting the front. Zeki Pasha also told Colonel Nathaniel that he had been instructed by Mustafa Kemal to treat the Mission with the greatest courtesy, and to show it everything it wished to see. Zeki Pasha then proceeded to explain the military situation as it appeared to him, and Colonel Nathaniel was struck by the fact that Zeki Pasha's views were identical with those which had been expressed to him by General Papoulas, the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army of Asia Minor, during the latter's visit to Athens in January last.

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I have &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

Iraq. He did not think that Jevdet was a very strong character and certainly no propagandist. Fahry sent a message to the papers on the Turkish Government.

3. I reported that the appointment was not relevant but I hope it would not be necessary to trouble me further in the interest of both parties.

4. In connection with Ismet Bey's visit to Russia, I refer to the last paragraph of my despatch No. 362 and would add that there was a good deal of unfounded speculation and rumour as to the object of the visit. As the statement made by Ismet Bey to the Turkish Press on his return to Turkey was published in full, it is unnecessary to enter into further details at present.

I have &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 3015 3015 44 No. 17

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Neville Chamberlain — Received May 5

(No. 38)
Secret

Constantinople, May 18, 1939.

SIR, I have the honour to report that Mr. Ismet Inönü left Ankara on the 15th instant for Afyon Karahissar, the point of junction of the Anatolian and Baghdad railways, where he is to meet the Prime Minister.

2. No official announcement has been made as to the object of Mr. Ismet Inönü's journey, but it is generally supposed that he will discuss with the Prime Minister the results of his recent visit to Russia. The Prime Minister is expected to return to Ankara on the 19th instant, and it is thought that Mr. Ismet Inönü will proceed to Smyrna to meet him there.

3. When Mr. Ismet Inönü arrives at Afyon Karahissar he will find awaiting him there a telegram from the Turkish Ambassador at Moscow containing the latest news of the negotiations between Turkey, France and Great Britain and Russia, and the Prime Minister will no doubt wish to discuss with Mr. Ismet Inönü the reply which is to be returned to the Soviet Government.

4. It is not clear as yet what the next step in the negotiations will be, but it is thought that Mr. Saracoglu will visit Moscow in the course of the month of June, and that Mr. Ismet Inönü will proceed to Smyrna on the 20th instant.

I have &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 3020 194 44 No. 18

Mr. Lindsay (Angora) to Mr. Neville Chamberlain — Received May 27

(No. 39)
Secret

Constantinople, May 20, 1939.

SIR, WITH reference to my despatch No. 22 of the 22nd April, I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum* by the Counsellor of the Embassy on the attempt made against Hasan Ali Bey by the editor of the Tan, his second and the second's brother-in-law, in the case has drawn attention to the hostile press which Hasan Ali Bey's outspoken attacks on the Government have aroused. On the contrary, Hasan Ali Bey's courage and outspokenness have won him many admirers, and he is looked upon by many as the leader of the Opposition. The Government, however, have not yet given any sign that they intend to grant him the official Opposition. The Government have apparently decided to ignore him, which is the best course, as it will give Hasan Ali Bey a striking example of the power to deal with recalcitrant subjects.

2. The immediate cause of the Tan's attack appears to have been the press campaign which the Progressive Republican Party, the Opposition party, had been conducting, but which was not

* Not printed.

printed or described by other papers as political party. The second part of the article consisted of political leaders which he wrote as a protest against new restrictions. Hasan Jamil was unable to get the authority of the Government to arrest the Kastamonu deputy, but he was able to get the assistance of the State Police to arrest Tan's editor-in-chief and Hasan Ali Bey gave his support to the Government, represented the struggle as being against him and seems to be largely responsible for the publication of the article.

3. In connection with Ismet Bey's visit to Russia, I refer to the last paragraph of my despatch No. 362 and would add that there was a good deal of unfounded speculation and rumour as to the object of the visit. As the statement made by Ismet Bey to the Turkish Press on his return to Turkey was published in full, it is unnecessary to enter into further details at present.

I have &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

E 3132 175 44 No. 20

Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople) to Sir E. Ludlow-Hewitt (Constantinople)

No. 434
Secret

Angora, May 27, 1939.

THE Turkish Chargé d'Affaires called this morning to pay his respects on the occasion of a visit by him to the tomb of the late Lord Ypres which he had carried out in company with the Consul-General at Smyrna.

2. He then referred to my recent interviews with Zeki Bey saying that he took a most favourable view of what had occurred, and he suggested that I might depute the Counsellor of the Embassy to Angora to offer him my congratulations. I expressed the view that, in the short time during which he remained Chargé d'Affaires until the new Ambassador arrived, these calls might be removed and observations applied about more satisfactory footing.

I regret that I find here [illegible] puzzled by the conduct of the Turkish Government in recent conversations about sporting matters but that until that was necessary to be satisfied at this stage both how and through what [illegible] first was [illegible] to propose to act to enter into anything more definite. At present [illegible] only serious conflict of interests between Greece and Turkey in regard to the fisheries is that which exists between the Greek Government and the Government of Northern Greece. It is not the first time that undertakings to erect [illegible] fisheries [illegible] of people in the Greek islands. Apart from [illegible] which [illegible] roots [illegible] and matters between Greece and Turkey [illegible] which [illegible] the Greek [illegible] provisions [illegible] more [illegible] contrary to the terms of which we are [illegible] great [illegible] of [illegible] which [illegible] to [illegible] Her Majesty's Government [illegible] to [illegible] Greece [illegible] happy [illegible] understanding [illegible] Hague [illegible] stating [illegible] this [illegible] behalf [illegible] assistance [illegible] President [illegible] Greek [illegible] Mr. [illegible] Stark

Note: Before [illegible] Despatch [illegible] to the Foreign Office [illegible] Chamberlain [illegible] suggested [illegible] the [illegible] of the Greek [illegible] proposed [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Enclosure No 1

Lord De Vesci to Lord Curzon

(No 9 Confidential)

Sir *Thorpe Hall May 28 1921*

IN submitting for the information of His Majesty's Government the following report of the proceedings of the Commission appointed by the Supreme Council to inquire into the future of Smyrna and the surrounding districts, I have the honour to state that the Commission has held 14 meetings in Smyrna, 2 meetings in Constantinople, and 1 meeting in Paris, and has examined 32 witnesses, of whom 15 were Greeks, 5 Turks, 5 Armenians, 3 Jews, 2 Americans, 1 Italian and 1 Frenchman

Military Situation

2 The Commission has had before it a number of reports from the Allied Military Authorities in Smyrna, and has received from the Greek Commander-in-Chief, General Papoulas, a statement of the military situation, and a request that the Greek Army might be allowed to occupy the Smyrna area for a period of 25 years

3 The Greek Army has been engaged for the last 14 months in a campaign against the Turkish Nationalist forces in Asia Minor, and has advanced from Smyrna to a point about 100 miles to the east of Smyrna, and 50 miles from the Sea of Marmora

4 The Turkish Nationalist Army is reported to consist of about 60,000 men, with 30 guns, and is opposed to the Greek Army of 100,000 men with 200 guns

5 The Greek Army has been engaged in a campaign of a very arduous character, and has suffered considerable losses in officers and men, and in material

6 The Greek Army is now in possession of a line of railway from Smyrna to Afium Karahissar, a distance of 200 miles, and of a line of railway from Smyrna to Aidin, a distance of 80 miles, and of the country on both sides of these railways to a depth of 30 miles

Political

7 The Greek Government has declared its intention of withdrawing its troops from Asia Minor, and of handing over the administration of the country to the Greek civil authorities, as soon as the Treaty of Sèvres has been ratified by the Powers, and has been accepted by the Turkish Government

8 The Greek Government has also declared its intention of withdrawing its troops from Asia Minor, and of handing over the administration of the country to the Greek civil authorities, as soon as the Treaty of Sèvres has been ratified by the Powers, and has been accepted by the Turkish Government

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Local Administration

11 The Commission has had before it a number of reports from the Allied Military Authorities in Smyrna, and has received from the Greek Commander-in-Chief, General Papoulas, a statement of the military situation, and a request that the Greek Army might be allowed to occupy the Smyrna area for a period of 25 years

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Non Turkish Elements

7 The report received from the following gentlemen, who, although Armenians by race, are already representatives of the West European Thrace

a) *Jews* Probably about 20,000 Jews in the Smyrna district, of whom 15,000 live in Smyrna itself. They are mainly engaged in trade, and have always been on friendly terms with the Greeks and Turks. During the Greek occupation they have suffered considerably from the Greeks, and have been subjected to various indignities. They have not, however, suffered to the same extent as the Armenians, and have been able to carry on their business with comparative freedom. They have not, however, suffered to the same extent as the Armenians, and have been able to carry on their business with comparative freedom. They have not, however, suffered to the same extent as the Armenians, and have been able to carry on their business with comparative freedom. They have not, however, suffered to the same extent as the Armenians, and have been able to carry on their business with comparative freedom.

b) *Armenians* Probably about 60,000 Armenians during the Greek occupation. Many of them were massacred by the Greeks and Turks, and many have been subjected to various indignities. They have not, however, suffered to the same extent as the Armenians, and have been able to carry on their business with comparative freedom. They have not, however, suffered to the same extent as the Armenians, and have been able to carry on their business with comparative freedom. They have not, however, suffered to the same extent as the Armenians, and have been able to carry on their business with comparative freedom. They have not, however, suffered to the same extent as the Armenians, and have been able to carry on their business with comparative freedom.

c) *Bulgars* There are also a few Bulgars in the district, but they are not of any importance. They are mainly engaged in trade, and have been able to carry on their business with comparative freedom. They have not, however, suffered to the same extent as the Armenians, and have been able to carry on their business with comparative freedom. They have not, however, suffered to the same extent as the Armenians, and have been able to carry on their business with comparative freedom. They have not, however, suffered to the same extent as the Armenians, and have been able to carry on their business with comparative freedom.

d) *Italians* There are also a few Italians in the district, but they are not of any importance. They are mainly engaged in trade, and have been able to carry on their business with comparative freedom. They have not, however, suffered to the same extent as the Armenians, and have been able to carry on their business with comparative freedom. They have not, however, suffered to the same extent as the Armenians, and have been able to carry on their business with comparative freedom. They have not, however, suffered to the same extent as the Armenians, and have been able to carry on their business with comparative freedom.

I have &c.
J Mcd DAWKINS

E 3345 55 44 No 171

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received June 8)

(No 134)

Sir *Constantinople June 2 1921*

With reference to previous correspondence ending with your despatch No 38 of the 5th May relative to the Greek occupation of Smyrna, I have the honour to state that a telegram has been received from the Patriarch stating that the Greek Government has given instructions for the withdrawal of the Greek troops from the interior of Asia Minor to the coast, and that the evacuation is to be completed by the 15th July. This news seems to be confirmed by a telegram from Mr Hoy, Consul at Aidin, reporting that the Greek troops are withdrawing from the interior towards the coast.

2 It is difficult to say how far this statement can be relied upon, but it is certain that the Greek Government has been under pressure from the Allied Powers to withdraw its troops from the interior of Asia Minor, and that the withdrawal has been ordered. It is also certain that the Greek Government has been under pressure from the Allied Powers to withdraw its troops from the interior of Asia Minor, and that the withdrawal has been ordered. It is also certain that the Greek Government has been under pressure from the Allied Powers to withdraw its troops from the interior of Asia Minor, and that the withdrawal has been ordered. It is also certain that the Greek Government has been under pressure from the Allied Powers to withdraw its troops from the interior of Asia Minor, and that the withdrawal has been ordered.

I have &c.
R C LINDSAY

E 3346 1091 44 No 75

Mr Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received June 9)

(No 44)

Sir *Constantinople June 2 1921*

IN continuation of my despatch No 38 of the 5th May, I have the honour to report that I have had an interview with the Patriarch at Angora on the 25th May. He stated that the Greek Government had given instructions for the withdrawal of the Greek troops from the interior of Asia Minor to the coast, and that the withdrawal was to be completed by the 15th July. This news seems to be confirmed by a telegram from Mr Hoy, Consul at Aidin, reporting that the Greek troops are withdrawing from the interior towards the coast. It is difficult to say how far this statement can be relied upon, but it is certain that the Greek Government has been under pressure from the Allied Powers to withdraw its troops from the interior of Asia Minor, and that the withdrawal has been ordered. It is also certain that the Greek Government has been under pressure from the Allied Powers to withdraw its troops from the interior of Asia Minor, and that the withdrawal has been ordered. It is also certain that the Greek Government has been under pressure from the Allied Powers to withdraw its troops from the interior of Asia Minor, and that the withdrawal has been ordered.

I have &c.
R C LINDSAY

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

talk to the Turkish press of Franco-Turkish entente between Great Britain and Italy, and he expected, he replied, that the first question he should be addressed on that head the moment he had an opportunity of seeing the Turkish Ministers that the solidarity between the French and British Governments was stronger than ever, and that the co-operation in Asia was close and cordial. He gave me the same assurance as I expressed to him that our two Embassies might be able to work closely together in all matters where it was desirable.

3. His first and last words to the President too that he had come to Turkey to attend to the settlement of the various outstanding Franco-Turkish questions, and he set about it with a business-like and considerable respect for the engagements taken. He thought that it would be very desirable on reaching agreements on all points which had remained in abeyance to sign them without delay, and he was anxious to do so before the Ministers left Angora. It was pointed out to him that the Ministers who had been in Angora last year might not be there now, and that a matter of complete personal discretion and tact was required in dealing with Turkey. These remarks were received by him with expressions of good intentions on the part of Turkey.

4. M. Sarrail has not yet had time to enter into contact with Turkish Ministers and he has not yet met Angora. The negotiations were carried on in the palace that covers his roof was recently completed. The walls are thick and cold, and the new Chief Minister was suffering from a bad chill. He proposed to return to other questions at a later date, when he was not so much engaged with the Turkish Government.

5. General Mougin is still a part of the Ambassador's staff but I understand he will shortly join the Turkish Staff. Some other personal French military attachés may follow, and as soon as I get to know what is decided on the part of the French War Office with regard to the appointment of a military attaché I will report to you. M. Sarrail's military attaché may be very useful to him, as he asked that I should think, with a view to the maintenance of good relations between the French and British Missions in Turkey.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

E 3384/3384/44 No. 177

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 160. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 2, 1925.*

I HAD a visit to-day from the new Italian Ambassador, who has succeeded Marquis Garroni at the post of Ambassador to the Porte. Count Pompeo Aloisi is a very agreeable young man, and I formed a favourable impression of him. He told me that he had come to Turkey to attend to the settlement of the various outstanding Franco-Turkish questions, and he set about it with a business-like and considerable respect for the engagements taken. He thought that it would be very desirable on reaching agreements on all points which had remained in abeyance to sign them without delay, and he was anxious to do so before the Ministers left Angora. It was pointed out to him that the Ministers who had been in Angora last year might not be there now, and that a matter of complete personal discretion and tact was required in dealing with Turkey. These remarks were received by him with expressions of good intentions on the part of Turkey.

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I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

and a war must ensue. With Oriental nationalism still rampant everywhere, the war would have sprung into one of Asia versus Europe, in which every effort would be made to inflame every Asiatic and subject race against the European from Manchuria to Turkey and even to Morocco, but the danger of this Yellow Peril would be of a much greater and more pressing character than any previous manifestation of it. I think that Russia, who had seen that a vague goal of Europe would now set from up the wind of her interest would be opposite scale. In these circumstances it behoves England and France to detach Turkey from any association or leanings she might have towards Oriental solidarity. He was encouraged to read in the newspapers telegrams to the effect that M. Briand was contemplating a visit to Angora at the latest during the month of September, as after the end of October, I pointed out to him that the question of the Straits would be before Parliament, and that Turkey's weak stand at present in the matter of fortifications of the Straits would be severely criticized by French opinion. She was well aware of this, and would be anxious to be able to point to the fact that she had come to an agreement with France before the question of the Straits was brought before Parliament. She was well aware of the danger from the Asiatic combination to which she would be exposed by a breach with France, and would surely not take any step which would be displeasing to France after the latter had given such a proof of friendship to Turkey as the withdrawal of her troops from Cilicia. I pointed out that the Russian Ambassador had been exceedingly active during the last few months, and that he had succeeded in obtaining the signature of the Turkish Government to a treaty of neutrality and non-aggression, which was to be initialled on the 7th June. M. Sarrail was not aware of this, but said that he would ascertain the facts at once. He would then see the Russian Ambassador, and would inform me of the result. I told him that I had no desire to be informed of the details of the negotiations, but that I should be glad to know whether the Russian Ambassador had succeeded in obtaining the signature of the Turkish Government to the treaty of neutrality and non-aggression which was to be initialled on the 7th June. M. Sarrail was not aware of this, but said that he would ascertain the facts at once. He would then see the Russian Ambassador, and would inform me of the result. I told him that I had no desire to be informed of the details of the negotiations, but that I should be glad to know whether the Russian Ambassador had succeeded in obtaining the signature of the Turkish Government to the treaty of neutrality and non-aggression which was to be initialled on the 7th June.

I have, &c.
RONALD LINDSAY.

E 3535/52/44] No. 178.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 15.)

No. 160.

Sir, *Constantinople, June 8, 1925.*

THE German Ambassador gave me yesterday a short account of his dealings with the Turkish Government over the tariff. I have, which affords some confirmation and some explanation of the note given to you in my despatch No. 157 of the 2nd April.

The Turkish Government, he told me, had begun by saying that they were unwilling to negotiate commercial treaties. Germany, they were willing to allow German goods to enter the country under the tariff of the Lausanne Treaty. In practice, however, it was clear that in various respects the Turkish authorities were applying higher rates than that regulation allowed. Herr Nadolny had made representations against this, and had urged strongly the necessity of a modus vivendi by which each

country shall ensure to the other most favoured nation treatment, but the net will be so close Of the specific questions letters were complied only three remain problems of them port of Corfu (as military measure of general application not of special significance) which the Turks refused to think [illegible] favoured nation clause They say that it was created exclusively in favour of a vanished State they themselves also wish to grant it as the price of peace at Lausanne, and even the remaining [illegible] proposal on the French to the Treaty of Frankfort Any suggestions for modifications which Numa may wish to make in observations made by various countries, as for instance the Turkish Foreign Minister was negotiating treaties with other States and had in the time to attend to treaty [illegible] to inform his government how matters stood in this respect Angora to the effect that [illegible] the 1st March Turkey would grant favoured nation treatment to certain ports [illegible] Turkish ports to the current ordinary [illegible] tariff Hamdi Bey Numa said that in response to Turkish requests a formal reply was granted, but [illegible] the three months [illegible]

3 At first it had been my effect to see to have taken [illegible] at Angora together with the Greek Government, and these discussions were to take the form of the conversations which Greek visits are now about to undertake Constantinople [illegible] Hamdi Bey to go to Angora to [illegible] Numa [illegible] Hamdi Bey is returning to Angora to get [illegible] treaty with [illegible] keep us telegraphing to [illegible] Angora [illegible]

Hamdi Numa says that the [illegible] treaty, and that [illegible] to accept [illegible] and to [illegible] to their [illegible] Numa [illegible] Hamdi Bey hopes also to [illegible] Eastern [illegible] but I expect the Turks [illegible] to [illegible] Its real [illegible] appears to [illegible] affairs [illegible] to be by [illegible] and [illegible]

I have, &c
R C LINDSAY

E 3537 58 44 No 119

Sir R Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received June 15)

(No 463)
Sir, *Constantinople, June 8, 1925*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith printed copies of the Turkish budget* for the year 1341 (March 1925–26), together with an explanatory memorandum* furnished to me by Sir A Block. It will be observed from the latter that with receipts at £T 153 millions and expenditure at £T 283 millions the ostensible deficit of £T 130 millions is anticipated but that this can in reality be reduced to about £T 200 thousand. It is however worth while remembering that in this latter figure is included a sum of £T 7 millions for interest on foreign debt in Turkish currency, and it is probable that the Turkish Minister of Finance when he included this provision in his estimates hardly expected that he would have to disburse the money.

2 I venture to repeat the warning often uttered before that the figures furnished in the budget must be accepted with caution and that, during the whole course of any budget year, it is almost impossible to ascertain with any fullness of detail the position of Turkish finance. On the side of the receipts it is generally supposed that the Turkish Government will have great difficulty in realising as to the £T 20 millions from sale of state land (Chapter 30) that the largely increased revenue from the land tax is very speculative as no cadastral survey as an existence (Chapter 1), and that the loss of revenue entailed by abolition of tithe is put down at £T 13 millions in Chapter 6, is rather guess work. On the other hand I am told that revenue from tobacco is coming in very well. With the abolition last March of the Regie, the work of suppressing contraband was entrusted to the ordinary police and gendarmerie, who so far have performed their duties efficiently, while the smugglers have not yet organised themselves. At a

* Not printed.

moment like the present when repression is in the air, secret associations of any kind are at a discount.

3 Sir A Block tells me that he bears on good authority that Ismet Pasha has ordered the Minister of Finance to procure him a sum of £T 100 millions by the end of the year. Hassan Bey, the Minister of Finance, says he proposes to do what he can in this direction by creating Government monopolies of petroleum and sugar, by introducing a stamp tax and death duties and by further increasing consumption taxes on certain classes of imports. It is to be presumed that none of these measures can be enacted without legislation and that the realisation must therefore wait till the end of the year.

I have, &c
R C LINDSAY

E 3541 1091 44 No 120

Sir R Lindsay to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received June 15)

(No 465)
Sir, *Constantinople, June 9, 1925.*

SINCE the [illegible] date of my despatch No. 435, the most striking event in Turkey has been the decree [illegible] which the Grand National Assembly has taken [illegible] its session [illegible] June was prolonged [illegible] to enable the two people's [illegible] Progressives [illegible] themselves [illegible] the [illegible] Press Bureau [illegible] respect [illegible] and persons," has been [illegible] Letters. These were [illegible] by agents of the Sublime Porte [illegible] are [illegible] Ministers [illegible] Progressive [illegible] Government [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible] of the [illegible] Progressives [illegible] which [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

No 181

Mr Hoare to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received Jan 18)

No 87 Secret
(Telegraphic) *Constantinople June 17, 1925*
MY Despatch No 69

Members of Bolshevik staff mission arrived at Kerki on 2nd June saw about 800 demobilised Central Asian troops received with cheers by Bolshevik officials en route for Kirghistan. Troops were stated to be first batch of return to Kuban.

No Xenophobic or anti-British feeling found in course of journey to Kirghistan two trucks of demobilised men from Kirghistan had complimentary rifle.

Facts of above telegram communicated.

Secret

Colonel Mayfield, formerly British Consul at Bitlis, was murdered at Viranshehir 14th June by Turkish soldiers. Affair is said to have originated in 76th Infantry Division which was returning to Viranshehir from Mardin. Most of its officers were on the right flank

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[E 3666/362/65] No 182

Sir K Lee Warner to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received June 22)

(No 289)
HIS Majesty's Consul-General at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a report from the Trust Commissioner at Turkish enclave in Kurdistan

Constantinople June 8, 1925

Enclosure in No 182

Turco-Iraq Frontier Neutral Zone

Excellence

Constantinople le 9 juin 1925

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre note du 6 courant. D'après renseignements fournis par le Gouvernement Irakien la route directe entre Amadia et Dohouk traverse la zone neutre. En prévision de cette circonstance Son Excellence Monsieur Franklin-Bouillon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, a entamé à Angora avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Perse des négociations amicales relatives à la délimitation définitive de la frontière Turco-Persane. Ces négociations ont abouti à un règlement complet de toutes les questions pendantes entre les deux pays. Il est donc à prévoir que la Société des Nations n'aura pas à se prononcer sur la question de la zone neutre. Dans cette éventualité le Gouvernement Turc désire que les relations actuelles avec le Gouvernement Britannique et particulièrement les bons rapports qui existent entre les autorités locales des deux pays ne soient en rien troublés par la création d'une zone neutre. Il désire également que les mesures prises par le Gouvernement Irakien contre les tribus rebelles ne soient pas entravées par la création d'une zone neutre.

Veuillez agréer, Excellence, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Excellence

Constantinople, le 9 juin 1925.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note of the 6th instant. According to information furnished by the Iraq Government the direct road between Amadia and Dohuk traverses the neutral zone. In view of this circumstance His Excellency Monsieur Franklin-Bouillon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, has entered into friendly negotiations at Angora with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Persia for the delimitation of the definitive frontier between Turkey and Persia. These negotiations have resulted in a complete settlement of all questions pending between the two countries. It is therefore to be foreseen that the League of Nations will not have to pronounce upon the question of the neutral zone. In this eventuality the Turkish Government desire that the present relations with the British Government and particularly the good relations existing between the local authorities of the two countries should not be in any way disturbed by the creation of a neutral zone. They also desire that the measures taken by the Iraq Government against the rebellious tribes should not be hampered by the creation of a neutral zone.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my high consideration.

June cause inconvenience or other serious prejudice necessitate removal of these effects from the premises in question I have the honour to declare that the Government of the Republic will consider themselves responsible for any claim which may be brought against them in connection therewith by the Power concerned

Veuillez &c.
MUSTAFA

No 183

Mr Hoare to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received June 23)

(No 89
(Telegraphic) R *Constantinople June 23, 1925*
MY despatch No 382
Turco-Greek Agreement signed yesterday
(Repeated to Athens No 13)

No 184

Sir W Erskine to Mr Austen Chamberlain (Received June 26)

No 108
(Telegraphic) R *Athens June 26, 1925*
CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No 89

I refer to two agreements. The first deals with property owned in Turkey by Greek citizens and the second with property owned in Greece by Turkish citizens. Compensation is to be given by the Government in cases where land cannot be restored to owners. Where property is to be restored within two months of exchange lists of such properties are to be prepared by two Governments

The second agreement does not specify that transit passes through the Greek channel and more really through Greek territory are to be submitted to mixed commission for exchange of populations for approval. It contains interpretation of articles 16 and 16 of Exchange of Populations Convention, with particular reference to movable and immovable properties of persons exempted through exchange namely Greek inhabitants of Constantinople and Moslem inhabitants (Greek subjects of Western Thrace

Despatch follows

Repeated to Constantinople No 20)

E 3822/3822/44 No 185

Mr Hoare to Mr Austen Chamberlain—(Received June 29)

(No 489 Confidential)
Sir *Therapia, June 22, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum by Mr Edmonds on general questions in Arabia and Mesopotamia, together with a note by Arabia Mr Lawrence and I have also written.

2. Some light on the situation further east, at Mardin, has been thrown by Captain McCallum who has just passed through there. We are told that the two American missionaries who are the only people still allowed from the rest of the world. Through them relations with the local authorities are quite friendly they are not allowed to send or receive communications in any language. The object of these restrictions is, I presume, to prevent the leakage of news regarding the rebellion and its repression and regarding the movement of troops.

3. It would have been of great value if at the present moment a trained British observer like Arabia or Mesopotamia we could have reported on military movements. I venture to suggest that it would be an act of gross stupidity to send there in case the Turkish Government should be disposed to indulge in military demonstrations before the Mosul award in September

4. For the reasons put forward by Mr. Edmonds and by Colonel Woods (in another despatch), I would recommend that the consular officer should be appointed for Adana and Mersina, and that, subject to any observations which he may make after his arrival, he should reside at Mersina.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

Enclosure in No. 185.

Memorandum by Mr. Edmonds.

ADANA AND MERSINA.

ADANA is dirty and ramshackle. The Christian quarters remain largely destroyed; but the town is busy. Everyone thinks about cotton. It seems to be the one place in Turkey which is making real progress. As the population which fled from the French occupation re-establishes itself, and as agricultural machinery comes into use, the area of cultivation increases. This year's cotton acreage will, it is hoped, be 30 or 35 per cent. more than last year's, which again was more than that of 1923. Everyone is said to put into cotton everything he makes, and this in a measure explains why houses are short and repairs not done.

Population.

2. No one knows what the population is, but it seems to be about as follows:—

Adana and Mersina vilayets	...	...	...	125,000
Adana town (included above)	...	...	...	30,000
Tarsus ,, ,,	...	...	...	10,000
Mersina town ,, ,,	...	...	...	10,000

The pre-war Moslem population of the Adana and Mersina vilayets (then sanjaks) was, according to the best figures, 165,000. The ravages of war the Turks admit to have been heavy. The French occupation, they also admit, drove large numbers of Moslems out of the district. These are now trickling back again, and the knowledge that almost any fool can make money in the district is bringing down settlers from Erzerum, Sivas, Kharput and other distant parts where it is harder to get a living. The above figures, although the Turks would make them higher, are probably near the mark.

3. A large number of labourers—put by the Turkish authorities at 100,000—come into the district every year for the cotton season. They make about £T. 5 (say, 12*s.*), a week, *plus* keep. They are nearly all Kurds.

4. The Greeks have been exchanged to a man. About 15,000 Moslem immigrants have come in their place and have given the Government a lot of trouble The Vali was away at a conference called by the Minister of the Interior for discussing the difficulties which have arisen in settling the immigrants here and in certain other districts. In Cilicia the immigrants have suffered from the heat and malaria. The mortality has been heavy. Those who have been dumped in country places—*e.g.*, Yemurtalik—have often refused to stay there and trekked back to Adana. Those in Adana have wanted to go back to Smyrna. Many are Cretans, who only speak Greek, and are in consequence looked askance on by the good Moslems of the place.

5. The true Turkish population is small, but perhaps not much more so than it has always been. It includes the official class and the better town class, and some villagers. But most of the peasants are Arab fellahs more or less Turkised according to the strength of the Turkish influences to which they have been exposed.

6. There are 100 Armenian men left in Adana, and more women and children and a bishop. They are in a poor way; but in Mersina there is one unobtrusive Armenian merchant who is doing well.

7. The Jews have naturally stepped into many of the Greek and Armenian businesses, but stories of the arrival of numbers of Jews proved untrue. One has certainly come from Rhodes and is doing well in Mersina. But not many Jews have come into the district. They seem to be a little less worried by the authorities than at Constantinople or Smyrna, but conscription drives a number of them away.

8. In Mersina there are a few Orthodox Syrians and a priest. They speak Arabic and are of Turkish nationality. The Turks at first wanted to send them to Greece—as, from the text of the Exchange Convention, they appear entitled to do—but, after discussion, they desisted. There are also a few Maronites in Mersina.

9. There are a good many Germans in Adana. Some have got good work in partnership with Turkish merchants or as clerks or artisans. Others find little to do, and wander on. In some cases German workmen have been glad to accept less than the native. There are also Hungarians about.

Politics.

10. With the suppression of the "Tok Seuz" and the arrest of its editor, Abdul Kadir Kemali Bey, early this year, all approach to active opposition seems to have been stopped. There is plenty of discontent with the Government, but it is mute. The Ghazi's claim to have rid the place of the French is recognised, but met with the rejoinder that most of the population helped too. The people are religious to the point of fanaticism, and, although the policy of secularisation and the restrictions on the hojas are disliked, the Government is probably more in favour than elsewhere, because times are good, and people have less leisure and inclination for carping. Mustafa Kemal's personal popularity does not seem to have been great enough to give him the ovation he recently expected—that, at any rate, is the local explanation of the Vali's summons before the Independence Tribunal. Nor was the Ghazi confident enough of his reception to dispense with the usual precautions for his safety.

11. The Valis of Adana and Mersina—each called Hilmi Bey—are little more than cyphers. The real power in Adana is the representative of the Popular party—an evil-looking blackguard called Fazil Barki Bey. He was sent to the place when the "Tok Zeus" was closed down and the policy of repression and delation started. He has commandeered rooms at the hotel and seems to live there gratis. His great occupation at present is dunning all and sundry for subscriptions for the Aeroplane Association. The total is already £T. 160,000. Donors of £T. 1,000 have their photos posted up; donors of smaller amounts their names; foreigners who refuse to give as much as they are asked look out for trouble.

12. In the same way the correspondent of the "Jumhuriet," a renegade Syrian Christian, named Faruk, seems to be the power behind the Vali of Mersina, an anodyne official of the older school.

13. At Adana, as elsewhere, the members of the old C.U.P. had begun to come to the front before the present policy of repression was started. Remzi Pasha, a deunmeh, who was a leader of the revolution at Monastir in 1908 and commanded an army corps on the Caucasus front after Enver's defeat there in 1915, has retired to a farm at Jeihan, a big village near Adana. He remarked that as a Unionist he was naturally out of things; but he expressed a hope for British support and financial co-operation, and alluded to the early flirtations of the Turks with the Bolsheviks as folly. Like so many other Turks (if he may be called a Turk) he asserted that Turkey had abandoned all aspirations outside her present frontiers.

14. A man more likely to speak the mind of the Government was the son of Sadik Pasha of Tarsus, the big landowner of the Mersina vilayet, with whom the Ghazi recently stayed. The son is a good specimen of the modern Turk—active in business, intelligent, anxious to learn and to make something of his country. The great task of the Government, he said, was consolidation. They had given up the Caliphate and other ideas of thirteen centuries ago, which only led them to spend their strength. They had forgotten the war and the armistice period. They wanted friends and support. He quoted Fevzi Pasha, the chief of the General Staff, as saying: "Now we have to conquer the whole of Turkey," *i.e.*, to win it over to modern ideas.

15. The same man—who is agent at Mersina for the Seiri Sefain—spoke of the good work being done by two colonels, Behij Bey, manager of the Anatolian Railway, and Saadullah Bey, manager of the Seiri Sefain. The Turks are very proud of having these two services tolerably run by themselves. The national railway policy, which is Ismet Pasha's hobby, has in view not merely strategic and economic purposes, but also apparently the spreading of modern ideas by encouraging intercourse. An official who was Under-Secretary of Finance in the early days at Angora said that the Government knew quite well that they must have a foreign loan to make the railways they wanted. The Government seem to be no less keen on making a system of roads which would be tributary to the railways.

16. The Adana paper is now the "Turk Seuzu," and is run by Ferid Jelal Bey, a young man of obviously Arab origin, but genuine Turkish aspirations. He is the

mouthpiece of the Government. In one leading article he reminds the farmers and peasants of the boon the Government has given them in the abolition of the tithe. In another he assures them that the Progressive party was bent on designs fraught with danger to the peaceful development of the country, and that its suppression was essential if prosperity was to be maintained. Another article is addressed to the religious who may be inclined to sympathise with Sheikh Said. It asks what sort of a religion the Sheikh's was who was maintained by British money. His religion was not true Islam. If he had come into Adana he would have set all the church bells ringing.

17. The Mayor of Adana is Ali Munif Bey, who was Under-Secretary for the Interior before the war, Governor of the Lebanon during it and a Malta deportee. He is an Adana man and, judging by the dirt and disrepair of the town, a very bad mayor. He was friendly.

18. The Adana population is old-fashioned enough for the men, like the women, to go to the theatre by themselves. It is commonly said to be fanatical, but the few European women there go about the town freely.

19. Mersina has a much larger Levantine element and, after Adana, a clean, tidy and civilised air. Foreigners are more at home there. There is not the same attempt as at Adana to squeeze out the Levantines. The place is prosperous. Houses are not much destroyed. The Greek church has been changed into a mosque without being damaged. The houses vacated by Greeks have been more than filled by incomers from up-country and from Greece. The different races are friendly, but the Mosul question causes some uneasiness and holds things back. The town reads the Adana paper, and is as discontented and dare say as little about it as Adana. The Government house was burnt down the other day. They say the Defterdar thought it better than having his books audited.

20. Discussions over the proposed Franco-Turkish Frontier Convention are still going on at Aleppo and Angora. There have been no incidents on the Turco-Syrian frontier for some time. The Turks are dissatisfied with the way the French run the Mersina–Nusseibin Railway, allowing material and service to deteriorate in order to extract the last sou from it. The Turks talk of taking it over at the first opportunity unless the French improve things. Foreign capital is wanted—on Turkish terms, for the Turks are scared of foreign penetration; but apparently it is possible for foreigners to do good business in cotton, at any rate—in spite of the Turkish terms. The Turks seem particularly anxious to interest British capital. The British forces have left a good name, and the French a bad one.

21. Of the Italians the Turks are not seriously afraid, because they think they could dispose of them as they did the Greeks; but they feel that they have to beware of Italian penetration, and are on the look-out. Even in Adana an impression has been made by reports of Mussolini overhauling the Ministry of War and by the interest in Anatolia displayed by Italian Deputies.

22. Aintab is said to be little more than a heap of ruins. Marash, Sis, Hajjin, and other towns north of Adana are reported to be still in a bad state as the result of hostilities.

Education.

23. As elsewhere, the Turk ojaghi is the great instrument for spreading modern ideas. Its chief member is the above-mentioned Ferid Jelal of the "Turk Seuzu," who is a disciple of the Minister of Education, Hamdullah Subhi Bey, the leading spirit of the whole movement. Ferid Jelal explained that members were now selected with care. Formerly anyone had been admitted, including many undesirables who were after their own good rather than the country's. Now quality rather than quantity is sought. Prospective members are put up by several old members, their antecedents are enquired into for a couple of months, and their final election is by decision of the local committee. The Adana ojak has three main lines of activity. Firstly, it promotes lectures, lanterns and cinema shows; secondly, it promotes games; thirdly, it attempts practical hygienic measures. The ojaks get occasional grants from the Ministry of Public Instruction. They raise funds by lotteries, subscriptions, flag days. They get buildings given them by the Government. (The Angora ojak is the Greek archbishop's house.)

24. Ferid Jelal Bey confirmed what a schoolmaster told me, viz., that the Government is alive to the danger of education turning out a lot of boys who want to wear black coats and be effendis. The Government mean to avoid such a result. Schoolmasters are enabled to pick out one or two boys for higher education, but there

are strict injunctions against developing a townee class of youth. The plan is to provide as much practical education as possible, *e.g.*, at Malatia there is to be a motor school! Turkey needs 70,000 teachers, men and women, and turns out only 200–300 a year. Ferid Jelal Bey had no fears of industrialism. It was one of the things he hoped might come about in a generation. (In Adana ginning factories girls sit twelve hours a day on a machine that shakes incessantly.) He thought the profits to be made on the land would prevent too big a drift to the towns, and that industrial training was therefore an aim to pursue ardently. The industrial school at Adana is at present unedifying. Some hojas schools are said to be open on the sly. Schools are so few that they are reserved for Turks; Kurds and Arabs go uneducated.

Hygiene.

25. There is malaria all over the Cilician plain. There is a great deal of ophthalmia in Adana, and there is a lot of disease of all sorts. Three doctors have just been sent to the vilayet to tackle malaria. They have good salaries, but counting enlarged spleens and doling out quinine in one or two villages will be no use. Radical measures for draining swamps are wanted, and these are only being talked about at present. Doctors now have to put in two years' public service before private practice. A callow young doctor has been appointed to Hajjin. His wife has been so highly educated at the American Girls' College at Constantinople that she could not stay at the Adana Hotel (she wears no veil), nor face a donkey journey to Hajjin. On market day, when the villagers were in Adana, they were herded into the municipality to be vaccinated, and not allowed to cross the bridge to their homes unless they could show a vaccination mark on their arm. The efforts being made in matters of hygiene are often childish; but it may be said that, whereas ten years ago the Government were scarcely aware of the problems to be faced, now they are roused by them, but do not know how to deal with them in practice. People at Adana claim—no doubt extravagantly—that with drainage and irrigation the Cilician plain could support 10,000,000 people, and it is their dream to make it a second Egypt.

Foreign Consulates.

26. At Adana there is a salaried French consul and an Italian consular agent. No other Powers have consuls. The Turks had the Bolshevik consul (M. Platt, now at Smyrna) withdrawn, because he took rather too much interest in local affairs. The German consul-general at Smyrna recently visited Adana, and, it is said, decided against sending a consul to Adana or Mersina at present. At Mersina there is an Italian consul and a French vice-consul, and Spanish and Greek consuls-general (both the latter for mainly personal reasons). The French consuls have certain mission property (now unused) to look after, and there is a good deal of coming and going between Cilicia and Syria. The Italian consul's district embraces Adalia, but the place of residence has been changed from Adalia to Mersina, no doubt to allay Turkish suspicions. He finds that Italians who try to start small industrial enterprises meet with many difficulties, but he believes that by working unostentatiously he can achieve a good deal. The Italians are the biggest foreign colony in Mersina.

Establishment of a British Consulate.

27. There is a choice between Adana and Mersina. Until about 1908 our consul lived at Mersina; after that he was in Adana. He is to be appointed primarily for commercial reasons. The commercial secretary thinks he should reside at Mersina. I think this would be much the best place; but he should keep in close touch with Adana, as being for general purposes the most important centre. Rail communication between the two towns is easy, and he should be given an allowance for travelling to and fro once or twice a week and perhaps for keeping an office at Adana. These details could be considered finally when he has seen the district himself. It would be quite enough for a probationer or a vice-consul to be sent to act as consul, provided he had some knowledge of the ways of Turkey. But it is time we had someone in Cilicia. Every Turk, official and other, to whom the idea was mentioned welcomed it as helping commercial relations with England, and, in particular, Manchester.

28. There are two Canadian ladies at the American Mission in Adana, a Maltese family at the railway station there, and the Rickards family at Mersina. There seem to be no other British subjects. From the consul's point of view, Mersina would be the best place to live in; life there is both pleasanter and cheaper than in Adana.

ADALIA.

Population of Vilayet.

Pre-war	210,000
To-day	120,000
Greeks and Armenians gone	30,000
Moslems arrived from Greece	6,000
Adalia town to-day, say	10,000

There are no British subjects. Most of the few foreigners are Italians.

2. The Turks are said to be old-fashioned, if not fanatical, and to dislike the new-fangled ideas; but they have had a sound lesson in that one or two of them have been haled before the Independence Tribunal—for very little reason apparently—and sentenced to prison. The Government have the place well in hand therefore.

3. The Vali is Sefa Bey, a brother of Zekiai Bey, the former Turkish representative in London. He is a professional administrative official, but apparently not an enlightened one. The most striking evidence of his character is the destruction of the old city walls which is going on steadily. The stones are sold at 20 piastres for a cubic metre. (I will try to interest the director of the Stambul Museum in stopping this scandal.)

4. There is a Hungarian "afforestation expert" in Adalia. He is said to be doing nothing. He looks as if he had been a country policeman at home.

5. The Italians have a nice little hospital, with no patients at all in it. They seem to have a few out-patients. They also have a girls' school, which is open. There is an Italian consular agent; but Italian penetration is evidently up against a complete stone wall.

6. Commercially, Adalia is insignificant at present. The Lloyd Triestino and Servizi Marittimi steamers call on alternate weeks and often discharge and load next to nothing. Only raw goods from abroad can be cleared at Adalia. Manufactured goods must be cleared at Smyrna or Mersina. This is designed to stop Italian penetration from Rhodes. In any case Adalia is the distributing centre for only a very small area—the Sparta and Burdur districts.

7. A first experiment in cotton growing is being made by a Frenchman, or Belgian, in partnership with a Turk. It is hoped locally that, if the experiment succeeds, it may be an inducement for the building of a branch of the Aidin Railway to Adalia, for which the company is now making a survey at the instance of the Government.

8. It would be waste of a consular officer to send one there at present.

KONIA.

Crops are good this year. The German irrigation area is said to be worked by the Turkish authorities, but very little cultivation was to be seen from the train, which passes right through it. It has brought malaria to the neighbourhood.

2. Immigrants from Greece have been installed, but the total population is much less than before the war. The villagers are said to be thoroughly cowed by the Government.

3. The Grand Chelebi was away—they said in Constantinople. No teaching is now allowed at the Mevlevi tekkieh. There are no Moslem students there from other countries now.

MALATIA.

A director of education, who appears unusually competent, is being sent to the Malatia vilayet. He is an admirer of Hamdullah Subhi Bey, the Minister of Education and an ardent patriot. His task appears to be to make good Young Turks of the Kurds, Turks and others in his new district.

W. S. EDMONDS.

June 17, 1925.

[E 3823/301/44] No. 186.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 490.)

Sir, *Therapia, June* 23, 1925.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 89 of to-day's date, regarding the signing of the Turco-Greek Agreement, I have the honour to inform you that the main part of the agreement was signed on the 21st, while the annexes were signed yesterday.

2. The full text of the agreement has not yet been published, but according to a statement which has appeared in the press it is divided into four parts, concerning respectively:—

(*a.*) The inhabitants of Western Thrace.
(*b.*) The Greeks of Constantinople.
(*c.*) Greeks who left without a passport.
(*d.*) The property belonging to Moslems, which has been confiscated in Greece.

3. According to the terms of the agreement it appears that Greeks who left without a passport will not be allowed to return to Turkey. They will, however, be permitted to liquidate their real estate through their local agents, but within a fixed period.

4. Greeks who left with a Turkish passport will be allowed to return.

5. The Greek Government will refund to the Moslems concerned the sums realised from the sale of their real estate.

6. The owners of immovable property will sell their belongings to the State. The value will be estimated by experts of the two parties and the total amount will be paid to the persons concerned.

7. All these questions must be finally settled within nine months.

8. The local press reports that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has stated that the present agreement has solved almost all outstanding issues between Turkey and Greece, and that the goodwill displayed on both sides is of hopeful augury for the development of satisfactory relations between the two countries. The agreement would be presented at the first opportunity for ratification by the National Assembly.

9. I will endeavour to obtain a copy of this agreement and forward it to you in due course.

10. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Athens.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

[E 3830/32/65] No. 187.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 500.)

Sir, *Therapia, June* 24, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 247 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which I have addressed to the delegation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with regard to the continuation of the anti-British campaign in the Turkish press.

2. The first of the articles enclosed* in my note is that summarised in my despatch under reference, while the assurances to which I refer were reported in Sir R. Lindsay's despatches No. 363 of the 15th May and No. 469 of the 10th June.

3. As you are aware, the "Hakimiet-i-Millieh" is the only paper published at Angora, and is admitted to be the semi-official organ of the Government.

4. It is probably true that nothing that appears in the press is of any real importance, but it appeared to me desirable to endeavour to bring home to Tewfik Rushdi Bey the responsibility of the Turkish Government and the desirability of paying some attention to the representations of His Majesty's Ambassador.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

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* Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 187.

Mr. Hoare to Nusret Bey.

Thérapia, le 24 juin 1925.

M. le Délégué,

JE prie instamment votre Excellence d'attirer la sérieuse attention du Gouvernement turc aux deux articles publiés par le "Hakimiet-i-Millieh," dont je vous remets copie. En les transmettant, vous voudrez bien rappeler au souvenir de son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires étrangères que Sir R. Lindsay a eu, le 9 mai, une longue conversation avec lui au sujet de la propagande assidue et violente dans la presse turque, et l'a prié, dans l'intérêt des deux nations, d'y mettre un frein. Son Excellence a répondu que, quant à la propagande, il n'avait rien remarqué qui dépassât les limites d'un commentaire légitime, mais dans tous les cas le Gouvernement turc désirait cultiver les meilleures relations avec la Grande-Bretagne.

2. Dans la note que vous m'avez remise le 10 juin, vous avez, en citant la déclaration verbale de Tewfik Ruchdi Bey, réaffirmé que le Gouvernement turc désire cultiver les meilleures relations avec le Gouvernement britannique.

3. Je ne doute pas que cette déclaration a été reçue avec entière satisfaction par Mr. Chamberlain, qui, le 27 mai, a assuré le Chargé d'Affaires de Turquie qu'il désirait oublier les tristes événements du proche passé et voir rétablir la bonne entente antérieure.

4. Il m'est pénible de constater qu'aucune suite n'a été donnée à la représentation de Sir R. Lindsay. A peine un jour passe sans que l'un ou l'autre des journaux et assez souvent la presse à l'unanimité ne publie un "télégramme" sur la pression—même la "torture"—à laquelle les éléments de la population de Mossoul favorables à la cause turque sont exposés. En outre, il n'est pas rare de voir que les esprits du public sont chauffés contre l'Angleterre par des articles qui parlent d'une participation anglaise à l'insurrection kurde.

5. En lisant tous ces articles, je ne peux pas oublier—et il est impossible que leurs auteurs l'oublient—qu'une des principales incriminations contre Hussein Djahid Bey a été de s'être abstenu de commenter les événements. En publiant les commentaires que je vous signale, les journalistes doivent croire qu'ils suivent une ligne acceptable au Gouvernement surtout quand ils lisent dans l'officieux "Hakimiet-i-Millieh" les violents articles que je vous signale et je ne doute pas que le public qui lit les journaux ait la même impression. Si la presse était libre de toute restriction la question de cette propagande serait d'une importance secondaire, mais puisqu'elle ne l'est pas, le Gouvernement a une certaine responsabilité pour les nouvelles et les commentaires qui paraissent. Je dois donc prier votre Excellence de vouloir bien informer son Excellence Tewfik Ruchdi Bey du contenu de cette lettre, en ajoutant que j'ai cru de mon devoir de signaler à mon Gouvernement la continuation d'une propagande qui tend à rendre impossible les cordiales relations dont son Excellence a déclaré souhaiter l'établissement.

Veuillez, &c.

R. H. HOARE.

[E 3852/175/44] No. 188.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Hoare (Constantinople).

(No. 638.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 29, 1925.

I RECEIVED the Turkish Ambassador to-day.

He talked fluently, but somewhat obscurely, of the desire of the Turkish Government for good relations with this country, but observed that for this desire to be realised the wish must be mutual, and we must not continue to treat Turkey as if it were in the enemy camp. It was easier, so he suggested, for the British Government to take the initiative in making some friendly gesture than for the Turkish Government to do the same. Other nations—he named Germany, but I suspect that he wished me to understand Russia—were steadily cultivating Turkish friendship. The Turkish Republic desired good relations with us above everyone, for the British Empire was a world-power and the acts of its Government were of greater importance than those of the Government of any other nation. But the Turkish Government could not let go any support which it derived from other sources unless it was assured of British friendship and had security on our side.

I told his Excellency that I entirely shared his view of the desirability of cultivating cordial relations. The Republic of Turkey and the British Empire were both great Mahometan Powers and had, therefore, much in common. The Ambassador hastily interjected that the Turkish Republic was now so completely secularised that the fact that the British Empire included large Mahometan populations was now really immaterial to the view taken by his Government.

I repeated that, in any case, we had every desire to revert, as time and circumstances permitted, to the cordial relations which had so long existed between Turkey and this country. I was not aware that there was any question of difficulty between us at the present moment except that of the frontier of Irak, and, since we had both agreed to refer this question to the League and had both agreed to accept the decision of the League, whatever it might be, we might regard that difficulty as being as good as settled. I added that I did not exactly understand what he meant by the phrase in which he had spoken of treating Turkey as if she were still in the enemy camp. This was not at all our attitude. I followed closely all that happened at Angora, and I had at once taken friendly note of any friendly expressions that were used by the representatives of the Turkish Government either in the Turkish Parliament or to Sir R. Lindsay. Of course, there could be no question of an alliance, for, except in a very restricted field, as indicated in my public declarations, His Majesty's Government were not prepared to enter into any new alliances, but, short of this, we were ready to cultivate friendship.

The Ambassador at once said that an alliance was not expected, but he repeated that some friendly utterances on our side were required before the Turkish Government could take any further steps. I replied that the very fact that no occasion for a declaration had arisen since I had been Foreign Secretary showed that nothing of a contrary kind had been said from any quarter in Parliament. If an occasion arose naturally, it might be taken for such a declaration either on the one side or the other, but I thought it would be a mistake to go out of the way to create an occasion for a declaration for which there was no necessity. What I hoped was that the conduct of the Governments on both sides would be such that our relations would steadily improve until relations of cordiality and confidence were again re-established.

His Excellency then expressed the hope that he would be received at an early date by His Majesty, and suggested that perhaps the opportunity might be taken for His Majesty to make some declaration of his friendly sentiments towards Turkey. I replied that this was scarcely possible. The practice of the Court of St. James was that the Ambassador, in presenting his credentials, should do so in a few simple phrases, to which His Majesty was wont to reply with equal simplicity and cordiality, but that no publicity was ever given to what passed at these interviews.

As in these last observations the Ambassador had appeared to betray at least a suspicion that I had not been in a hurry to receive him and that he might be kept waiting for his audience of His Majesty, I added that, as I had told him, I followed everything that went on at Angora with equal attention, whether it was agreeable or disagreeable, and I think this left his Excellency under no doubt that the discourtesy to Sir R. Lindsay had not passed unnoticed or unresented.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

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